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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2021.3266
         Boston Scientific Zoom Latitude: Multiple vulnerabilities
                              1 October 2021

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        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           Boston Scientific Zoom Latitude
Publisher:         ICS-CERT
Operating System:  Network Appliance
Impact/Access:     Access Confidential Data -- Console/Physical
                   Reduced Security         -- Console/Physical
Resolution:        Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names:         CVE-2021-38400 CVE-2021-38398 CVE-2021-38396
                   CVE-2021-38394 CVE-2021-38392 

Original Bulletin: 
   https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsma-21-273-01

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ICS Medical Advisory (ICSMA-21-273-01)

Boston Scientific Zoom Latitude

Original release date: September 30, 2021

Legal Notice

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  o CVSS v3 6.9
  o ATTENTION: Low attack complexity
  o Vendor: Boston Scientific
  o Equipment: ZOOM LATITUDE Programmer/Recorder/Monitor Model 3120
  o Vulnerabilities: Use of Password Hash with Insufficient Computational
    Effort, Missing Protection Against Hardware Reverse Engineering Using
    Integrated Circuit (IC) Imaging Techniques, Improper Access Control,
    Missing Support for Integrity Check, Reliance on Component That is Not
    Updateable

2. RISK EVALUATION

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may allow an attacker with
physical access to the affected device to obtain patient protected health
information (PHI), and/or compromise the integrity of the device. The affected
device is not network connected and does not contain hardware to be network
connected.

3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

Boston Scientific reports these vulnerabilities affects the ZOOM LATITUDE
Programmer/Recorder/Monitor (PRM) Model 3120.

3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

3.2.1 USE OF PASSWORD HASH WITH INSUFFICIENT COMPUTATIONAL EFFORT CWE-916

An attacker with physical access to the affected device can remove the hard
disk drive or create a specially crafted USB to extract the password hash for
brute force reverse engineering of the system password.

CVE-2021-38400 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
6.9 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is ( AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/
C:H/I:H/A:L ).

3.2.2 MISSING PROTECTION AGAINST HARDWARE REVERSE ENGINEERING USING INTEGRATED
CIRCUIT (IC) IMAGING TECHNIQUES CWE-1278

An attacker with physical access to the device can extract the binary that
checks for the hardware key and reverse engineer it, which could be used to
create a physical duplicate of a valid hardware key. The hardware key allows
access to special settings when inserted.

CVE-2021-38394 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
6.2 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is ( AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/
C:L/I:H/A:L ).

3.2.3 IMPROPER ACCESS CONTROL CWE-284

A skilled attacker with physical access to the affected device can gain access
to the hard disk drive of the device to change the telemetry region and could
use this setting to interrogate or program an implantable device in any region
in the world.

CVE-2021-38392 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
6.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is ( AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/
C:L/I:H/A:L ).

3.2.4 MISSING SUPPORT FOR INTEGRITY CHECK CWE-353

The programmer installation utility does not perform a cryptographic
authenticity or integrity checks of the software on the flash drive. An
attacker could leverage this weakness to install unauthorized software using a
specially crafted USB.

CVE-2021-38396 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
6.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is ( AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/
C:L/I:H/A:L ).

3.2.5 RELIANCE ON COMPONENT THAT IS NOT UPDATEABLE CWE-1329

The affected device uses off-the-shelf software components that contain
unpatched vulnerabilities. A malicious attacker with physical access to the
affected device could exploit these vulnerabilities.

CVE-2021-38398 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
6.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is ( AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/
C:L/I:H/A:L ).

3.3 BACKGROUND

  o CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Healthcare and Public Health
  o COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
  o COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: United States

3.4 RESEARCHER

Endres Puschner - Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, Bochum,
Christoph Saatjohann - FH Munster University of Applied Sciences, Christian
Dresen - FH Munster University of Applied Sciences, and Markus Willing -
University of Muenster, discovered these issues as part of broader academic
research of cardiac devices and reported them to Boston Scientific.

4. MITIGATIONS

Boston Scientific is in the process of transitioning all users to a replacement
programmer with enhanced security, the LATITUDE Programming System, Model 3300.
Boston Scientific will not issue a product update to address the identified
vulnerabilities in the ZOOM LATITUDE Programming System, Model 3120.

To reduce the risk of exploitation, Boston Scientific recommends those still
utilizing the ZOOM LATITUDE PRM Model 3120 implement the following measures:

  o Control access to the device and ensure all access is properly inventoried.
  o Maintain the device in a secure or locked location when not in use; and
  o Remove PHI prior to retiring or removing the device from the facility.
    Instructions for removing PHI are outlined in the operator's manual.

CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices
on the ICS webpage on us-cert.cisa.gov . Several recommended practices are
available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control
Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies .

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available
on the ICS webpage on us-cert.cisa.gov in the Technical Information Paper,
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation
Strategies .

Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to CISA for tracking
and correlation against other incidents.

No known public exploits specifically target these vulnerabilities. These
vulnerabilities are not exploitable remotely.

For any questions related to this report, please contact the CISA at:

Email: CISAservicedesk@cisa.dhs.gov
Toll Free: 1-888-282-0870

CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by
choosing one of the links below to provide feedback about this product.

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