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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2021.0229
ICS Advisory (icsma-21-019-01) Philips Interventional Workstations
20 January 2021
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Philips Interventional Workstations
Publisher: ICS-CERT
Operating System: Network Appliance
Impact/Access: Denial of Service -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2020-27298
Original Bulletin:
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/icsma-21-019-01
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ICS Medical Advisory (ICSMA-21-019-01)
Philips Interventional Workstations
Original release date: January 19, 2021
Legal Notice
All information products included in https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics are provided
"as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information
contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service,
referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product
is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For more
information about TLP, see https://us-cert.cisa.gov/tlp/ .
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
o CVSS v3 6.5
o ATTENTION: Low skill level to exploit
o Vendor: Philips
o Equipment: Philips Interventional WorkSpot, Coronary Tools/Dynamic Coronary
Roadmap/Stentboost Live, ViewForum
o Vulnerability: OS Command Injection
2. RISK EVALUATION
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability makes it possible for someone
within the hospital network to remotely shut down or restart the workstation.
In the event the workstation is remotely shut down, physicians are still able
to use diagnostic imaging from the X-ray system.
3. TECHNICAL DETAILS
3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS
This issue affects four Haswell workstations labeled with 12NC identification
numbers (4598 009 39471, 4598 009 39481, 4598 009 70861, 4598 009 98531) when
running the following versions of interventional software:
o Interventional Workspot (Release 1.3.2, 1.4.0, 1.4.1, 1.4.3, 1.4.5)
o Coronary Tools/Dynamic Coronary Roadmap/Stentboost Live (Release 1.0)
o ViewForum (Release 6.3V1L10)
3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW
3.2.1 IMPROPER NEUTRALIZATION OF SPECIAL ELEMENTS USED IN AN OS COMMAND ('OS
COMMAND INJECTION') CWE-78
The software constructs all or part of an OS command using externally
influenced input from an upstream component but does not neutralize or
incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS
command when sent to a downstream component.
CVE-2020-27298 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
6.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is ( AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/
C:N/I:N/A:H ).
3.3 BACKGROUND
o CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Healthcare and Public Health
o COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
o COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Netherlands
3.4 RESEARCHER
Philips reported this vulnerability to CISA.
4. MITIGATIONS
Philips has released a software patch to proactively address this vulnerability
in the installed base and will schedule service activities with impacted users
to implement the correction. As a mitigation for this vulnerability, users with
expertise are advised to change the IPMI password for the workstation
interface.
Users with questions regarding specific Philips Interventional Workspot and/or
installations and correction eligibility should contact a Philips service
support team, regional service support , or call 1-800-722-9377 with reference
to field change order (FCO) number 2019-IGTBST-014.
Please see the Philips product security website for the Philips advisory and
the latest security information for Philips products.
CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of
exploitation of this vulnerability. Specifically, users should:
o Implement physical security measures to limit or control access to critical
systems.
o Restrict system access to authorized personnel only and follow a least
privilege approach.
o Apply defense-in-depth strategies.
o Disable unnecessary accounts and services.
o Where additional information is needed, refer to existing cybersecurity in
medical device guidance issued by the FDA .
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices
on the ICS webpage on us-cert.cisa.gov . Several recommended practices are
available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control
Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies .
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available
on the ICS webpage on us-cert.cisa.gov in the Technical Information Paper,
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation
Strategies .
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to CISA for tracking
and correlation against other incidents.
No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability. This
vulnerability is not exploitable remotely.
For any questions related to this report, please contact the CISA at:
Email: CISAservicedesk@cisa.dhs.gov
Toll Free: 1-888-282-0870
CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by
choosing one of the links below to provide feedback about this product.
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