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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2020.2144
Advisory (icsma-20-170-05) BIOTRONIK CardioMessenger II
22 June 2020
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: BIOTRONIK CardioMessenger II
Publisher: US-CERT
Operating System: Network Appliance
Impact/Access: Access Confidential Data -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Mitigation
CVE Names: CVE-2019-18256 CVE-2019-18254 CVE-2019-18252
CVE-2019-18248 CVE-2019-18246
Original Bulletin:
https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/advisories/icsma-20-170-05
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ICS Medical Advisory (ICSMA-20-170-05)
BIOTRONIK CardioMessenger II
Original release date: June 18, 2020
Legal Notice
All information products included in https://us-cert.gov/ics are provided"as
is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained
within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, referenced in
this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product is governed by
the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For more information
about TLP, see https://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/ .
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
o CVSS v3 4.6
o ATTENTION: Exploitable with adjacent access/low skill level to exploit
o Vendor: BIOTRONIK
o Equipment: CardioMessenger II-S T-Line, CardioMessenger II-S GSM
o Vulnerabilities: Improper Authentication, Cleartext Transmission of
Sensitive Information, Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data, Storing
Passwords in a Recoverable Format
2. RISK EVALUATION
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker with
physical access to the CardioMessenger to obtain sensitive data, obtain
transmitted medical data from implanted cardiac devices with the implant's
serial number or impact Cardio Messenger II product functionality. Successful
exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker with adjacent
access to influence communications between the Home Monitoring Unit (HMU) and
the Access Point Name (APN) gateway network.
3. TECHNICAL DETAILS
3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS
The following versions of the CardioMessenger II, a home monitoring unit, are
affected:
o CardioMessenger II-S T-Line T4APP 2.20
o CardioMessenger II-S GSM T4APP 2.20
3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW
3.2.1 IMPROPER AUTHENTICATION CWE-287
The affected products do not properly enforce mutual authentication with the
BIOTRONIK Remote Communication infrastructure.
CVE-2019-18246 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
4.3 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is ( AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/
C:L/I:N/A:N ).
3.2.2 CLEARTEXT TRANSMISSION OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION CWE-319
The affected products transmit credentials in cleartext prior to switching to
an encrypted communication channel. An attacker can disclose the product's
client credentials for connecting to the BIOTRONIK Remote Communication
infrastructure.
CVE-2019-18248 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
4.3 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is ( AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/
C:L/I:N/A:N ).
3.2.3 IMPROPER AUTHENTICATION CWE-287
The affected products allow credential reuse for multiple authentication
purposes. An attacker with adjacent access to the CardioMessenger can disclose
its credentials used for connecting to the BIOTRONIK Remote Communication
infrastructure.
CVE-2019-18252 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
4.3 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is ( AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/
C:L/I:N/A:N ).
3.2.4 MISSING ENCRYPTION OF SENSITIVE DATA CWE-311
The affected products do not encrypt sensitive information while at rest. An
attacker with physical access to the CardioMessenger can disclose medical
measurement data and the serial number from the implanted cardiac device the
CardioMessenger is paired with.
CVE-2019-18254 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
4.6 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is ( AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/
C:H/I:N/A:N ).
3.2.5 STORING PASSWORDS IN A RECOVERABLE FORMAT CWE-257
The affected products use individual per-device credentials that are stored in
a recoverable format. An attacker with physical access to the CardioMessenger
can use these credentials for network authentication and decryption of local
data in transit.
CVE-2019-18256 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
4.6 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is ( AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/
C:H/I:N/A:N ).
3.3 BACKGROUND
o CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Healthcare and Public Health
o COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
o COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Germany
3.4 RESEARCHER
Guillaume Bour, Anniken Wium Lie, and Marie Moe reported these vulnerabilities
to CISA.
4. MITIGATIONS
BIOTRONIK reports they will not be issuing a product security update; however,
BIOTRONIK has identified compensating controls which have been put place that
reduce the risk of exploitation and prevent patient safety risks. BIOTRONIK
assessed these vulnerabilities and determined no new potential safety risks
exist.
BIOTRONIK recommends users take the following defensive measures to minimize
the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Specifically, users should:
o Maintain good physical control over home monitoring units.
o Use only home monitoring units obtained directly from a trusted healthcare
provider or a BIOTRONIK representative to ensure integrity of the system.
o Report any concerning behavior regarding these products to your healthcare
provider or a BIOTRONIK representative.
CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of
exploitation of this vulnerability. Specifically, users should:
o Where feasible, users with concerns about the cybersecurity of their
current medical devices should contact their healthcare provider or a
BIOTRONIK professional.
o Do not connect unapproved devices to the home monitoring unit by any
network or physical connections.
o Only use the home monitoring units in private controlled environments such
as a home, apartment, or otherwise physically controlled environment.
o Restrict system access to authorized personnel only.
o Follow proper disposal procedures of the home monitoring unit for the
continued protection sensitive data.
o In cases where additional information is needed, refer to existing
cybersecurity in medical device guidance issued by the FDA.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices
on the ICS webpage on us-cert.gov . Several recommended practices are available
for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems
Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies .
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available
on the ICS webpage on us-cert.gov in the Technical Information Paper,
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation
Strategies .
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to CISA for tracking
and correlation against other incidents.
No known public exploits specifically target these vulnerabilities.
For any questions related to this report, please contact the CISA at:
Email: CISAservicedesk@cisa.dhs.gov
Toll Free: 1-888-282-0870
CISA continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can help by
choosing one of the links below to provide feedback about this product.
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