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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2020.1036
SUSE-SU-2020:0743-1 Security update for strongswan
24 March 2020
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: strongswan
Publisher: SUSE
Operating System: SUSE
Impact/Access: Denial of Service -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2018-17540 CVE-2018-16152 CVE-2018-16151
CVE-2018-10811 CVE-2018-6459 CVE-2018-5388
Reference: ESB-2019.4644
ESB-2019.4463
Original Bulletin:
https://www.suse.com/support/update/announcement/2020/suse-su-20200743-1.html
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SUSE Security Update: Security update for strongswan
______________________________________________________________________________
Announcement ID: SUSE-SU-2020:0743-1
Rating: moderate
References: #1079548
Cross-References: CVE-2018-6459
Affected Products:
SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Open Buildservice Development Tools 15-SP1
SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Basesystem 15-SP1
______________________________________________________________________________
An update that fixes one vulnerability is now available.
Description:
This update for strongswan fixes the following issues:
Strongswan was updated to version 5.8.2 (jsc#SLE-11370).
Security issue fixed:
o CVE-2018-6459: Fixed a DoS vulnerability in the parser for PKCS#1
RSASSA-PSS signatures that was caused by insufficient input validation (bsc
#1079548).
Full changelogs:
Version 5.8.2
* Identity-based CA constraints, which enforce that the certificate chain of
the remote peer contains a CA certificate with a specific identity, are
supported via vici/swanctl.conf. This is similar to the existing CA constraints
but doesn't require that the CA certificate is locally installed, for instance,
intermediate CA certificates received from the peers. Wildcard identity
matching (e.g. ..., OU=Research, CN=*) could also be used for the latter but
requires trust in the intermediate CAs to only issue certificates with
legitimate subject DNs (e.g. the "Sales" CA must not issue certificates with OU
=Research). With the new constraint that's not necessary as long as a path
length basic constraint (--pathlen for pki --issue) prevents intermediate CAs
from issuing further intermediate CAs. * Intermediate CA certificates may now
be sent in hash-and-URL encoding by configuring a base URL for the parent CA (#
3234, swanctl/rw-hash-and-url-multi-level). * Implemented NIST SP-800-90A
Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on AES-CTR and SHA2-HMAC modes.
Currently used by the gmp and ntru plugins. * Random nonces sent in an OCSP
requests are now expected in the corresponding OCSP responses. * The
kernel-netlink plugin now ignores deprecated IPv6 addresses for MOBIKE. Whether
temporary or permanent IPv6 addresses are included now depends on the
charon.prefer_temporary_addrs setting (#3192). * Extended Sequence Numbers
(ESN) are configured via PF_KEY if supported by the kernel. * The PF_KEY
socket's receive buffer in the kernel-pfkey plugin is now cleared before
sending requests, as many of the messages sent by the kernel are sent as
broadcasts to all PF_KEY sockets. This is an issue if an external tool is used
to manage SAs/policies unrelated to IPsec (#3225). * The vici plugin now uses
unique section names for CHILD_SAs in child-updown events (7c74ce9190). * For
individually deleted CHILD_SAs (in particular for IKEv1) the vici child-updown
event now includes more information about the CHILD_SAs such as traffic
statistics (#3198). * Custom loggers are correctly re-registered if log levels
are changed via stroke loglevel (#3182). * Avoid lockups during startup on low
entropy systems when using OpenSSL 1.1.1 (095a2c2eac). * Instead of failing
later when setting a key, creating HMACs via openssl plugin now fails instantly
if the underlying hash algorithm isn't supported (e.g. MD5 in FIPS-mode) so
fallbacks to other plugins work properly (#3284). * Exponents of RSA keys read
from TPM 2.0 via SAPI are correctly converted (8ee1242f1438). * Routing table
IDs > 255 are supported for custom routes on Linux. * To avoid races, the check
for hardware offloading support in the kernel-netlink plugin is performed
during initialization of the plugin (a605452c03). * The D-Bus config file for
charon-nm is now installed in $(datadir)/dbus-1/system.d instead of $
(sysconfdir)/dbus-1/system.d, which is intended for sysadmin overrides.
INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION notifies are now correctly sent in messages of the same
exchange type and with the same message ID as the request. * IKEv2 SAs are now
immediately destroyed when sending or receiving INVALID_SYNTAX notifies in
authenticated messages. * For developers working from the repository the
configure script now aborts if GNU gperf is not found.
Version 5.8.1
* RDNs in DNs of X.509 certificates can now optionally be matched less strict.
The global strongswan.conf option charon.rdn_matching takes two alternative
values that cause the matching algorithm to either ignore the order of matched
RDNs (reordered) or additionally (relaxed) accept DNs that contain more RDNs
than configured (unmatched RDNs are treated like wildcard matches). * The
updown plugin now passes the same interface to the script that is also used for
the automatically installed routes, that is, the interface over which the peer
is reached instead of the interface on which the local address is found (#
3095). * TPM 2.0 contexts are now protected by a mutex to prevent issues if
multiple IKE_SAs use the same private key concurrently (4b25885025). * Do a
rekey check after the third QM message was received (#3060). * If available,
explicit_bzero() is now used as memwipe() instead of our own implementation. *
An .editorconfig file has been added, mainly so Github shows files with proper
indentation (68346b6962). * The internal certificate of the load-tester plugin
has been modified so it can again be used as end-entity cert with 5.6.3 and
later (#3139). * The maximum data length of received COOKIE notifies (64 bytes)
is now enforced (#3160).
Version 5.8.0
* The systemd service units have been renamed. The modern unit, which was
called strongswan-swanctl, is now called strongswan (the previous name is
configured as alias in the unit, for which a symlink is created when the unit
is enabled). The legacy unit is now called strongswan-starter. * Support for
XFRM interfaces (available since Linux 4.19) has been added, which are intended
to replace VTI devices (they are similar but offer several advantages, for
instance, they are not bound to an address or address family). * IPsec SAs and
policies are associated with such interfaces via interface IDs that can be
configured in swanctl.conf (dynamic IDs may optionally be allocated for each SA
and even direction). It's possible to use separate interfaces for in- and
outbound traffic (or only use an interface in one direction and regular
policies in the other). * Interfaces may be created dynamically via updown/vici
scripts, or statically before or after establishing the SAs. Routes must be
added manually as needed (the daemon will not install any routes for outbound
policies with an interface ID). * When moving XFRM interfaces to other network
namespaces they retain access to the SAs and policies installed in the original
namespace, which allows providing IPsec tunnels for processes in other network
namespaces without giving them access to the IPsec keys or IKE credentials.
More information can be found on the page about route-based VPNs. * Initiation
of childless IKE_SAs is supported (RFC 6023). If enabled and supported by the
responder, no CHILD_SA is established during IKE_AUTH. Instead, all CHILD_SAs
are created with CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges. This allows using a separate DH
exchange even for the first CHILD_SA, which is otherwise created during
IKE_AUTH with keys derived from the IKE_SA's key material. * The swanctl
- --initiate command may be used to initiate only the IKE_SA via --ike option if
- --child is omitted and the peer supports this extension. * The NetworkManager
backend and plugin support IPv6. * The new wolfssl plugin is a wrapper around
the wolfSSL crypto library. Thanks to Sean Parkinson of wolfSSL Inc. for the
initial patch. * IKE SPIs may optionally be labeled via the charon.spi_mask|
label options in strongswan.conf. This feature was extracted from charon-tkm,
however, now applies the mask/label in network order. * The openssl plugin
supports ChaCha20-Poly1305 when built with OpenSSL 1.1.0. * The PB-TNC finite
state machine according to section 3.2 of RFC 5793 was not correctly
implemented when sending either a CRETRY or SRETRY batch. These batches can
only be sent in the "Decided" state and a CRETRY batch can immediately carry
all messages usually transported by a CDATA batch. It is currently not possible
to send a SRETRY batch since full-duplex mode for PT-TLS transport is not
supported. * Instead of marking IPv6 virtual IPs as deprecated, the
kernel-netlink plugin now uses address labels to avoid that such addresses are
used for non-VPN traffic (00a953d090). * The agent plugin now creates sockets
to the ssh/gpg-agent dynamically and does not keep them open, which otherwise
might prevent the agent from getting terminated. * To avoid broadcast loops the
forecast plugin now only reinjects packets that are marked or received from the
configured interface. * UTF-8 encoded passwords are supported via EAP-MSCHAPv2,
which internally uses an UTF-16LE encoding to calculate the NT hash (#3014). *
Properly delete temporary drop policies (used when updating IP addresses of
SAs) if manual priorities are used, which was broken since 5.6.2 (8e31d65730).
* Avoid overwriting start_action when parsing the inactivity timeout in the
vici plugin (#2954). * Fixed the automatic termination of reloaded vici
connections with start_action=start, which was broken since 5.6.3 (71b22c250f).
* The lookup for shared secrets for IKEv1 SAs via sql plugin should now work
better (6ec9f68f32). * Fixed a race condition in the trap manager between
installation and removal of a policy (69cbe2ca3f). * The IPsec stack detection
and module loading in starter has been removed (it wasn't enforced anyway and
loading modules doesn't seem necessary, also KLIPS hasn't been supported for a
long time and PF_KEY will eventually be removed from the Linux kernel,
ba817d2917). * Several IKEv2 protocol details are now handled more strictly:
Unrequested virtual IPs are ignored, CFG_REPLY payloads are ignored if no
CFG_REQUEST payloads were sent, a USE TRANSPORT_MODE notify received from the
responder is checked against the local configuration. * The keys and
certificates used by the scenarios in the testing environment are now generated
dynamically. Running the testing/scripts/build-certs script after creating the
base and root images uses the pki utility installed in the latter to create the
keys and certificates for all the CAs and in some cases for individual
scenarios. These credentials are stored in the source tree, not the image, so
this has to be called only once even if the images are later rebuilt. The
script automatically (re-)rebuilds the guest images as that generates fresh
CRLs and signs the DNS zones. The only keys/certificates currently not
generated are the very large ones used by the ikev2/rw-eap-tls-fragments
scenario.
Version 5.7.2
* For RSA with PSS padding, the TPM 2.0 specification mandates the maximum salt
length (as defined by the length of the key and hash). However, if the TPM is
FIPS-168-4 compliant, the salt length equals the hash length. This is assumed
for FIPS-140-2 compliant TPMs, but if that's not the case, it might be
necessary to manually enable charon.plugins.tpm.fips_186_4 if the TPM doesn't
use the maximum salt length. * Directories for credentials loaded by swanctl
are now accessed relative to the loaded swanctl.conf file, in particular, when
loading it from a custom location via --file argument. * The base directory,
which is used if no custom location for swanctl.conf is specified, is now also
configurable at runtime via SWANCTL_DIR environment variable. * If RADIUS
Accounting is enabled, the eap-radius plugin will add the session ID
(Acct-Session-Id) to Access-Request messages, which e.g. simplifies associating
database entries for IP leases and accounting with sessions (the session ID
does not change when IKE_SAs are rekeyed, #2853). * All IP addresses assigned
by a RADIUS server are included in Accounting-Stop messages even if the client
did not claim them, allowing to release them early in case of connection errors
(#2856). * Selectors installed on transport mode SAs by the kernel-netlink
plugin are now updated if an IP address changes (e.g. via MOBIKE) and it was
part of the selectors. * No deletes are sent anymore when a rekeyed CHILD_SA
expires (#2815). * The bypass-lan plugin now tracks interfaces to handle
subnets that move from one interface to another and properly update associated
routes (#2820). * Only valid and expected inbound IKEv2 messages are used to
update the timestamp of the last received message (previously, retransmits also
triggered an update). * IKEv2 requests from responders are now ignored until
the IKE_SA is fully established (e.g. if a DPD request from the peer arrives
before the IKE_AUTH response does, 46bea1add9). Delayed IKE_SA_INIT responses
with COOKIE notifies we already recevied are ignored, they caused another reset
of the IKE_SA previously (#2837). * Active and queued Quick Mode tasks are now
adopted if the peer reauthenticates an IKEv1 SA while creating lots of
CHILD_SAs. * Newer versions of the FreeBSD kernel add an SADB_X_EXT_SA2
extension to SADB_ACQUIRE messages, which allows the kernel-pfkey plugin to
determine the reqid of the policy even if it wasn't installed by the daemon
previously (e.g. when using FreeBSD's if_ipsec(4) VTIs, which install policies
themselves, 872b9b3e8d). * Added support for RSA signatures with SHA-256 and
SHA-512 to the agent plugin. For older versions of ssh/gpg-agent that only
support SHA-1, IKEv2 signature authentication has to be disabled via
charon.signature_authentication. * The sshkey and agent plugins support Ed25519
/Ed448 SSH keys and signatures. * The openssl plugin supports X25519/X448
Diffie-Hellman and Ed25519/Ed448 keys and signatures when built against OpenSSL
1.1.1. * Support for Ed25519, ChaCha20/Poly1305, SHA-3 and AES-CCM were added
to the botan plugin. * The mysql plugin now properly handles database
connections with transactions under heavy load (#2779). * IP addresses in ha
pools are now distributed evenly among all segments (#2828). * Private key
implementations may optionally provide a list of supported signature schemes,
which, as described above, is used by the tpm plugin because for each key on a
TPM 2.0 the hash algorithm and for RSA also the padding scheme is predefined. *
The testing environment is now based on Debian 9 (stretch) by default. This
required some changes, in particular, updating to FreeRADIUS 3.x (which forced
us to abandon the TNC@FHH patches and scenarios, 2fbe44bef3) and removing
FIPS-enabled versions of OpenSSL (the FIPS module only supports OpenSSL 1.0.2).
* Most test scenarios were migrated to swanctl.
Version 5.7.1
* Fixes a vulnerability in the gmp plugin triggered by crafted certificates
with RSA keys with very small moduli. When verifying signatures with such keys,
the code patched with the fix for CVE-2018-16151/2 caused an integer underflow
and subsequent heap buffer overflow that results in a crash of the daemon. *
The vulnerability has been registered as CVE-2018-17540.
Version 5.7.0
* Fixes a potential authorization bypass vulnerability in the gmp plugin that
was caused by a too lenient verification of PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures. Several
flaws could be exploited by a Bleichenbacher-style attack to forge signatures
for low-exponent keys (i.e. with e=3). * CVE-2018-16151 has been assigned to
the problem of accepting random bytes after the OID of the hash function in
such signatures, and CVE-2018-16152 has been assigned to the issue of not
verifying that the parameters in the ASN.1 algorithmIdentitifer structure is
empty. Other flaws that don't lead to a vulnerability directly (e.g. not
checking for at least 8 bytes of padding) have no separate CVE assigned. * Dots
are not allowed anymore in section names in swanctl.conf and strongswan.conf.
This mainly affects the configuration of file loggers. If the path for such a
log file contains dots it now has to be configured in the new path setting
within the arbitrarily renamed subsection in the filelog section. * Sections in
swanctl.conf and strongswan.conf may now reference other sections. All settings
and subsections from such a section are inherited. This allows to simplify
configs as redundant information has only to be specified once and may then be
included in other sections (see strongswan.conf for an example). * The
originally selected IKE config (based on the IPs and IKE version) can now
change if no matching algorithm proposal is found. This way the order of the
configs doesn't matter that much anymore and it's easily possible to specify
separate configs for clients that require weaker algorithms (instead of having
to also add them in other configs that might be selected). * Support for
Postquantum Preshared Keys for IKEv2 (draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2) has been
added. For an example refer to the swanctl/rw-cert-ppk scenario (or with EAP,
or PSK authentication). * The new botan plugin is a wrapper around the Botan
C++ crypto library. It requires a fairly recent build from Botan's master
branch (or the upcoming 2.8.0 release). Thanks to RenA(C) Korthaus and his team
from Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity for the initial patch and to Jack Lloyd for
quickly adding missing functions to Botan's FFI (C89) interface. *
Implementation of RFC 8412 "Software Inventory Message and Attributes (SWIMA)
for PA-TNC". * SWIMA subscription option sets CLOSE_WRITE trigger on apt
history.log file resulting in a ClientRetry PB-TNC batch to initialize a new
measurement cycle. The new imv/imc-swima plugins replace the previous imv/
imc-swid plugins, which were removed. * Added support for fuzzing the PA-TNC
(RFC 5792) and PB-TNC (RFC 5793) NEA protocols on Google's OSS-Fuzz
infrastructure. * Support for version 2 of Intel's TPM2-TSS TGC Software Stack.
The presence of the in-kernel /dev/tpmrm0 resource manager is automatically
detected. * The pki tool accepts a xmppAddr otherName as a
subjectAlternativeName using the syntax --san xmppaddr: . * swanctl.conf
supports the configuration of marks the in- and/or outbound SA should apply to
packets after processing on Linux. Configuring such a mark for outbound SAs
requires at least a 4.14 kernel. The ability to set a mask and configuring a
mark/mask for inbound SAs will be added with the upcoming 4.19 kernel. * New
options in swanctl.conf allow configuring how/whether DF, ECN and DS fields in
the IP headers are copied during IPsec processing. Controlling this is
currently only possible on Linux. * The handling of sequence numbers in IKEv1
DPDs has been improved (#2714). * To avoid conflicts, the dhcp plugin now only
uses the DHCP server port if explicitly configured.
Version 5.6.3
* Fixed a DoS vulnerability in the IKEv2 key derivation if the openssl plugin
is used in FIPS mode and HMAC-MD5 is negotiated as PRF. This vulnerability has
been registered as CVE-2018-10811. * Fixed a vulnerability in the stroke
plugin, which did not check the received length before reading a message from
the socket. Unless a group is configured, root privileges are required to
access that socket, so in the default configuration this shouldn't be an issue.
This vulnerability has been registered as CVE-2018-5388. * CRLs that are not
yet valid are now ignored to avoid problems in scenarios where expired
certificates are removed from new CRLs and the clock on the host doing the
revocation check is trailing behind that of the host issuing CRLs. Not doing
this could result in accepting a revoked and expired certificate, if it's still
valid according to the trailing clock but not contained anymore in not yet
valid CRLs. * The issuer of fetched CRLs is now compared to the issuer of the
checked certificate (#2608). * CRL validation results other than revocation
(e.g. a skipped check because the CRL couldn't be fetched) are now stored also
for intermediate CA certificates and not only for end-entity certificates, so a
strict CRL policy can be enforced in such cases. * In compliance with RFC 4945,
section 5.1.3.2, certificates used for IKE must now either not contain a
keyUsage extension (like the ones generated by pki), or have at least one of
the digitalSignature or nonRepudiation bits set. * New options for vici/swanctl
allow forcing the local termination of an IKE_SA. This might be useful in
situations where it's known the other end is not reachable anymore, or that it
already removed the IKE_SA, so retransmitting a DELETE and waiting for a
response would be pointless. * Waiting only a certain amount of time for a
response (i.e. shorter than all retransmits would be) before destroying the
IKE_SA is also possible by additionally specifying a timeout in the forced
termination request. * When removing routes, the kernel-netlink plugin now
checks if it tracks other routes for the same destination and replaces the
installed route instead of just removing it. Same during installation, where
existing routes previously weren't replaced. This should allow using traps with
virtual IPs on Linux (#2162). * The dhcp plugin now only sends the client
identifier DHCP option if the identity_lease setting is enabled (7b660944b6).
It can also send identities of up to 255 bytes length, instead of the previous
64 bytes (30e886fe3b, 0e5b94d038). If a server address is configured, DHCP
requests are now sent from port 67 instead of 68 to avoid ICMP port
unreachables (becf027cd9). * The handling of faulty INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD notifies
(e.g. one containing a DH group that wasn't proposed) during CREATE_CHILD_SA
exchanges has been improved (#2536). * Roam events are now completely ignored
for IKEv1 SAs (there is no MOBIKE to handle such changes properly). * ChaCha20/
Poly1305 is now correctly proposed without key length (#2614). For
compatibility with older releases the chacha20poly1305compat keyword may be
included in proposals to also propose the algorithm with a key length
(c58434aeff). * Configuration of hardware offload of IPsec SAs is now more
flexible and allows a new setting (auto), which automatically uses it if the
kernel and device both support it. If hw offload is set to yes and offloading
is not supported, the CHILD_SA installation now fails. * The kernel-pfkey
plugin optionally installs routes via internal interface (one with an IP in the
local traffic selector). On FreeBSD, enabling this selects the correct source
IP when sending packets from the gateway itself (e811659323). * SHA-2 based
PRFs are supported in PKCS#8 files as generated by OpenSSL 1.1 (#2574). * The
pki --verify tool may load CA certificates and CRLs from directories. * The IKE
daemon now also switches to port 4500 if the remote port is not 500 (e.g.
because the remote maps the response to a different port, as might happen on
Azure), as long as the local port is 500 (85bfab621d). * Fixed an issue with
DNS servers passed to NetworkManager in charon-nm (ee8c25516a). * Logged
traffic selectors now always contain the protocol if either protocol or port
are set (a36d8097ed). * Only the inbound SA/policy will be updated as reaction
to IP address changes for rekeyed CHILD_SAs that are kept around. * The parser
for strongswan.conf/swanctl.conf now accepts = characters in values without
having to put the value in quotes (e.g. for Base64 encoded shared secrets).
Notes for developers: * trap_manager_t: Trap policies are now unistalled by
peer/child name and not the reqid. * No reqid is returned anymore when
installing trap policies. * child_sa_t: A new state (CHILD_DELETED) is used for
CHILD_SAs that have been deleted but not yet destroyed (after a rekeying
CHILD_SAs are kept around for a while to process delayed packets). This way
child_updown events are not triggered anymore for such SAs when an IKE_SA that
has such CHILD_SAs assigned is deleted.
Version 5.6.2
* Fixed a DoS vulnerability in the parser for PKCS#1 RSASSA-PSS signatures that
was caused by insufficient input validation. One of the configurable parameters
in algorithm identifier structures for RSASSA-PSS signatures is the mask
generation function (MGF). Only MGF1 is currently specified for this purpose.
However, this in turn takes itself a parameter that specifies the underlying
hash function. strongSwan's parser did not correctly handle the case of this
parameter being absent, causing an undefined data read. This vulnerability has
been registered as CVE-2018-6459. * When rekeying IKEv2 IKE_SAs the previously
negotiated DH group will be reused, instead of using the first configured
group, which avoids an additional exchange if the peer previously selected a
different DH group via INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD notify. The same is also done when
rekeying CHILD_SAs except for the first rekeying of the CHILD_SA that was
created with the IKE_SA, where no DH group was negotiated yet. Also, the
selected DH group is moved to the front in all sent proposals that contain it
and all proposals that don't are moved to the back in order to convey the
preference for this group to the peer. * Handling of MOBIKE task queuing has
been improved. In particular, the response to an address update (with NAT-D
payloads) is not ignored anymore if only an address list update or DPD is
queued as that could prevent updating the UDP encapsulation in the kernel. * On
Linux, roam events may optionally be triggered by changes to the routing rules,
which can be useful if routing rules (instead of e.g. route metrics) are used
to switch from one to another interface (i.e. from one to another routing
table). Since routing rules are currently not evaluated when doing route
lookups this is only useful if the kernel-based route lookup is used
(4664992f7d). * The fallback drop policies installed to avoid traffic leaks
when replacing addresses in installed policies are now replaced by temporary
drop policies, which also prevent acquires because we currently delete and
reinstall IPsec SAs to update their addresses (35ef1b032d). * Access X.509
certificates held in non-volatile storage of a TPM 2.0 referenced via the NV
index. Adding the --keyid parameter to pki --print allows to print private keys
or certificates stored in a smartcard or a TPM 2.0. * Fixed proposal selection
if a peer incorrectly sends DH groups in the ESP proposal during IKE_AUTH and
also if a DH group is configured in the local ESP proposal and charon.prefer
configured_proposals is disabled (d058fd3c32). * The lookup for PSK secrets for
IKEv1 has been improved for certain scenarios (see #2497 for details). * MSKs
received via RADIUS are now padded to 64 bytes to avoid compatibility issues
with EAP-MSCHAPv2 and PRFs that have a block size Version 5.6.1
* Several algorithms were removed from the default ESP/AH and IKE proposals in
compliance with RFC 8221 and RFC 8247, respectively. Removed from the default
ESP/AH proposal were the 3DES and Blowfish encryption algorithms and the
HMAC-MD5 integrity algorithm. From the IKE default proposal the HMAC-MD5
integrity algorithm and the MODP-1024 Diffie-Hellman group were removed (the
latter is significant for Windows clients in their default configuration).
These algorithms may still be used in custom proposals. * Support for
RSASSA-PSS signatures has been added. For compatibility with previous releases
they are currently not used automatically, by default, to change that
charon.rsa_pss may be enabled. To explicitly use or require such signatures
during IKEv2 signature authentication (RFC 7427) ike:rsa/pss... authentication
constraints may be used for specific connections (regardless of whether the
strongswan.conf option above is enabled). Only the hash algorithm can be
specified in such constraints, the MGF1 will be based on that hash and the salt
length will equal the hash length (when verifying the salt length is not
enforced). To enforce such signatures during PKI verification use rsa/pss...
authentication constraints. * All pki commands that create certificates/CRLs
can be made to sign with RSASSA-PSS instead of the classing PKCS#1 scheme with
the --rsa-padding pss option. As with signatures during authentication, only
the hash algorithm is configurable (via --digest option), the MGF1 will be
based on that and the salt length will equal the hash length. * These
signatures are supported by all RSA backends except pkcs11 (i.e. gmp, gcrypt,
openssl). The gmp plugin requires the mgf1 plugin. Note that RSASSA-PSS
algorithm identifiers and parameters in keys (public keys in certificates or
private keys in PKCS#8 files) are currently not used as constraints. * The
sec-updater tool checks for security updates in dpkg-based repositories (e.g.
Debian/Ubuntu) and sets the security flags in the IMV policy database
accordingly. Additionally for each new package version a SWID tag for the given
OS and HW architecture is created and stored in the database. * Using the
sec-updater.sh script template the lookup can be automated (e.g. via an hourly
cron job). * When restarting an IKEv2 negotiation after receiving an
INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD notify (or due to other reasons like too many retransmits) a
new initiator SPI is allocated. This prevents issues caused by retransmits for
IKE_SA_INIT messages. * Because the initiator SPI was previously reused when
restarting the connection delayed responses for previous connection attempts
were processed and might have caused fatal errors due to a failed DH
negotiation or because of the internal retry counter in the ike-init task. For
instance, if we proposed a DH group the responder rejected we might have later
received delayed responses that either contained INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD notifies
with the DH group we already switched to, or, if we retransmitted an
IKE_SA_INIT with the requested group but then had to restart again, a KE
payload with a group different from the one we proposed. * The introduction of
file versions in the IMV database scheme broke file reference hash
measurements. This has been fixed by creating generic product versions having
an empty package name. * A new timeout option for the systime-fix plugin stops
periodic system time checks after a while and enforces a certificate
verification, closing or reauthenticating all SAs with invalid certificates. *
The IKE event counters, previously only available via ipsec listcounters
command, may now also be queried and reset via vici and the new swanctl
- --counters command. They are collected and provided by the optional counters
plugin (enabled by default for backwards compatibility if the stroke plugin is
built). * Class attributes received in RADIUS Access-Accept messages may
optionally be added to RADIUS accounting messages (655924074b). * Basic support
for systemd sockets has been added, which may be used for privilege separation
(59db98fb94). * Inbound marks may optionally be installed in the SA again (was
removed with 5.5.2) by enabling the mark_in_sa option in swanctl.conf. * The
timeout of leases in pools configured via pool utility may be configured in
other units than hours. INITIAL_CONTACT notifies are now only omitted if never
is configured as uniqueness policy. * Outbound FWD policies for shunts are not
installed anymore, by default (as is the case for other policies since 5.5.1).
* Don't consider a DH group mismatch during CHILD_SA rekeying as failure as
responder (e7276f78aa). * Handling of fragmented IPv4 and IPv6 packets in
libipsec has been improved (e138003de9). * Trigger expire events for the
correct IPsec SA in libipsec (6e861947a0). * A crash in CRL verification via
openssl plugin using OpenSSL 1.1 has been fixed (78acaba6a1). * No hard-coded
default proposals are passed from starter to the stroke plugin anymore (the IKE
proposal used curve25519 since 5.5.2, which is an optional plugin). * A
workaround for an issue with virtual IPs on macOS 10.13 (High Sierra) has been
added (039b85dd43). * Handling of IKE_SA rekey collisions in charon-tkm has
been fixed. * Instead of failing or just silently doing nothing unit tests may
now warn about certain conditions (e.g. if a test was not executed due to
external dependencies).
Patch Instructions:
To install this SUSE Security Update use the SUSE recommended installation
methods like YaST online_update or "zypper patch".
Alternatively you can run the command listed for your product:
o SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Open Buildservice Development Tools
15-SP1:
zypper in -t patch SUSE-SLE-Module-Development-Tools-OBS-15-SP1-2020-743=1
o SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Basesystem 15-SP1:
zypper in -t patch SUSE-SLE-Module-Basesystem-15-SP1-2020-743=1
Package List:
o SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Open Buildservice Development Tools 15-SP1
(aarch64 ppc64le s390x x86_64):
strongswan-debuginfo-5.8.2-4.6.14
strongswan-debugsource-5.8.2-4.6.14
strongswan-mysql-5.8.2-4.6.14
strongswan-mysql-debuginfo-5.8.2-4.6.14
strongswan-nm-5.8.2-4.6.14
strongswan-nm-debuginfo-5.8.2-4.6.14
strongswan-sqlite-5.8.2-4.6.14
strongswan-sqlite-debuginfo-5.8.2-4.6.14
o SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Basesystem 15-SP1 (aarch64 ppc64le s390x
x86_64):
strongswan-5.8.2-4.6.14
strongswan-debuginfo-5.8.2-4.6.14
strongswan-debugsource-5.8.2-4.6.14
strongswan-hmac-5.8.2-4.6.14
strongswan-ipsec-5.8.2-4.6.14
strongswan-ipsec-debuginfo-5.8.2-4.6.14
strongswan-libs0-5.8.2-4.6.14
strongswan-libs0-debuginfo-5.8.2-4.6.14
o SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Basesystem 15-SP1 (noarch):
strongswan-doc-5.8.2-4.6.14
References:
o https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2018-6459.html
o https://bugzilla.suse.com/1079548
- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------
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