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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2020.0241 Cisco Application Policy Infrastructure Controller Out Of Band Management IP Tables Bypass Vulnerability 24 January 2020 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: Cisco Application Policy Infrastructure Controller (APIC) Publisher: Cisco Systems Operating System: Cisco Impact/Access: Reduced Security -- Remote/Unauthenticated Resolution: Patch/Upgrade CVE Names: CVE-2020-3139 Original Bulletin: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-iptable-bypass-GxW88XjL - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- Cisco Application Policy Infrastructure Controller Out Of Band Management IP Tables Bypass Vulnerability Priority: Medium Advisory ID: cisco-sa-iptable-bypass-GxW88XjL First Published: 2020 January 22 16:00 GMT Version 1.0: Final Workarounds: No workarounds availableCisco Bug IDs: CSCvs10135 CVE-2020-3139 CWE-20 CVSS Score: 5.3 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N/E:X/RL:X/RC:X Summary o [CVE-2020-3139_su] A vulnerability in the out of band (OOB) management interface IP table rule programming for Cisco Application Policy Infrastructure Controller (APIC) could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass configured deny entries for specific IP ports. These IP ports would be permitted to the OOB management interface when, in fact, the packets should be dropped. The vulnerability is due to the configuration of specific IP table entries for which there is a programming logic error that results in the IP port being permitted. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending traffic to the OOB management interface on the targeted device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to bypass configured IP table rules to drop specific IP port traffic. The attacker has no control over the configuration of the device itself. Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. This advisory is available at the following link: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/ cisco-sa-iptable-bypass-GxW88XjL [/CVE-2020-3139_su] Affected Products o [CVE-2020-3139_ap] [/CVE-2020-3139_ap] Vulnerable Products [CVE-2020-3139_vp] At the time of publication, this vulnerability affected Cisco APIC releases prior to the first fixed software Release 4.2(3j). See the Details section in the bug ID(s) at the top of this advisory for the most complete and current information. [/CVE-2020-3139_vp] Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable [CVE-2020-3139_nv] Only products listed in the Vulnerable Products section of this advisory are known to be affected by this vulnerability. Cisco has confirmed that this vulnerability does not affect Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switches in Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) mode. [/CVE-2020-3139_nv] Details o [CVE-2020-3139_de] The result of this vulnerability is that the UI CLI command acidiag run iptables-list will show that the IP port number is configured for deny but that configuration setting was not actually properly programmed. For additional information on how to secure the OOB management interface, see Securing Management Access . [/CVE-2020-3139_de] Workarounds o [CVE-2020-3139_wa] There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. [/CVE-2020-3139_wa] Fixed Software o [CVE-2020-3139_fs] When considering software upgrades , customers are advised to regularly consult the advisories for Cisco products, which are available from the Cisco Security Advisories and Alerts page , to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, customers are advised to contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their contracted maintenance providers. [/CVE-2020-3139_fs] [CVE-2020-3139_fs] Fixed Releases At the time of publication, Cisco APIC Release 4.2(3j) and later contained the fix for this vulnerability. See the Details section in the bug ID(s) at the top of this advisory for the most complete and current information. [/CVE-2020-3139_fs] Exploitation and Public Announcements o [CVE-2020-3139_ex] The Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability that is described in this advisory. [/CVE-2020-3139_ex] Source o [CVE-2020-3139_vs] This vulnerability was found during the resolution of a Cisco TAC support case. [/CVE-2020-3139_vs] Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy o To learn about Cisco security vulnerability disclosure policies and publications, see the Security Vulnerability Policy . This document also contains instructions for obtaining fixed software and receiving security vulnerability information from Cisco. URL o https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/ cisco-sa-iptable-bypass-GxW88XjL Revision History o +----------+---------------------------+----------+--------+--------------+ | Version | Description | Section | Status | Date | +----------+---------------------------+----------+--------+--------------+ | 1.0 | Initial public release. | - | Final | 2020-JAN-22 | +----------+---------------------------+----------+--------+--------------+ - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au and we will forward your request to the appropriate person. NOTE: Third Party Rights This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in this security bulletin. NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current. Contact information for the authors of the original document is included in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact them directly. Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: https://www.auscert.org.au/bulletins/ =========================================================================== Australian Computer Emergency Response Team The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld 4072 Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). 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