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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
typo3 -- multiple vulnerabilities
2 January 2020
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
Operating System: FreeBSD
Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Existing Account
Cross-site Scripting -- Remote with User Interaction
Access Confidential Data -- Existing Account
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FreeBSD VuXML: Documenting security issues in FreeBSD and the FreeBSD Ports
typo3 -- multiple vulnerabilities
typo3-8 < 8.7.30
typo3-9 < 9.5.13
VuXML ID 1c9178aa-2709-11ea-9673-4c72b94353b5
Typo3 core team reports:
It has been discovered that the output of field validation errors in the
Form Framework is vulnerable to cross-site scripting.
It has been discovered that t3:// URL handling and typolink functionality
are vulnerable to cross-site scripting. Not only regular backend forms are
affected but also frontend extensions which use the rendering with typolink.
It has been discovered that the output table listing in the Files backend
module is vulnerable to cross-site scripting when a file extension contains
malicious sequences. Access to the file system of the server - either directly
or through synchronization - is required to exploit the vulnerability.
It has been discovered that the extraction of manually uploaded ZIP
archives in Extension Manager is vulnerable to directory traversal. Admin
privileges are required in order to exploit this vulnerability. Since TYPO3 v9
LTS, System Maintainer privileges are required as well.
Failing to properly escape user submitted content, class QueryGenerator is
vulnerable to SQL injection. Having system extension ext:lowlevel installed
and a valid backend user having administrator privileges are required to
exploit this vulnerability.
It has been discovered that classes QueryGenerator and QueryView are
vulnerable to insecure deserialization. Requirements for successfully
exploiting this vulnerability (one of the following): - having system
extension ext:lowlevel (Backend Module: DB Check) installed and valid backend
user having administrator privileges - having system extension ext:sys_action
installed and valid backend user having limited privileges
TYPO3 allows to upload files either in the backend user interface as well
as in custom developed extensions. To reduce the possibility to upload
potential malicious code TYPO3 uses the fileDenyPattern to deny e.g. user
submitted PHP scripts from being persisted. Besides that it is possible for
any editor to upload file assets using the file module (fileadmin) or changing
their avatar image shown in the TYPO3 backend. Per default TYPO3 allows to
upload and store HTML and SVG files as well using the mentioned
functionalities. Custom extension implementations probably would also accept
those files when only the fileDenyPattern is evaluated. Since HTML and SVG
could be directly displayed in web clients, the whole web application is
exposed to be vulnerable concerning Cross-Site Scripting. Currently the
following scenarios are known - given an authenticated regular editor is able
to upload files using the TYPO3 backend: - directly target a potential victim
to a known public resource in a URL, e.g. /fileadmin/malicious.svg or
/fileadmin/malicious.html - using the TypoScript content object SVG
(implemented in class ScalableVectorGraphicsContentObject) having renderMode
set to inline for SVG files (available since TYPO3 v9.0) - custom
implementations that directly output and render markup of HTML and SVG files
SVG files that are embedded using an img src=malicious.svg tag are not
vulnerable since potential scripts are not executed in these scenarios (see
https://www.w3.org/wiki/SVG_Security). The icon API of TYPO3 is not scope of
this announcement since SVG icons need to be registered using an individual
implementation, which is not considered as user submitted content.
It has been discovered that request handling in Extbase can be vulnerable
to insecure deserialization. User submitted payload has to be signed with a
corresponding HMAC-SHA1 using the sensitive TYPO3 encryptionKey as secret -
invalid or unsigned payload is not deserialized. However, since sensitive
information could have been leaked by accident (e.g. in repositories or in
commonly known and unprotected backup files), there is the possibility that
attackers know the private encryptionKey and are able to calculate the
required HMAC-SHA1 to allow a malicious payload to be deserialized.
Requirements for successfully exploiting this vulnerability (all of the
following): - rendering at least one Extbase plugin in the frontend -
encryptionKey has been leaked (from LocalConfiguration.php or corresponding
.env file). [source]
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