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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2019.2424
Advisory (icsa-19-183-01) Schneider Electric Modicon Controllers
3 July 2019
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Schneider Electric Modicon Controllers
Publisher: ICS-CERT
Operating System: Network Appliance
Impact/Access: Denial of Service -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2019-6819
Original Bulletin:
https://www.us-cert.gov/ics/advisories/icsa-19-183-01
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ICS Advisory (ICSA-19-183-01)
Schneider Electric Modicon Controllers
Original release date: July 02, 2019
Legal Notice
All information products included in http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov are
provided"as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any
information contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or
service, referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this
product is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header.
For more information about TLP, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/ .
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
o CVSS v3 7.5
o ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low skill level to exploit
o Vendor: Schneider Electric
o Equipment: Modicon Controllers
o Vulnerability: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
2. RISK EVALUATION
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in a
denial-of-service condition.
3. TECHNICAL DETAILS
3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS
The following versions of Modicon Controllers, a PLC and PAC controller for
industrial control systems, are affected:
o Modicon M340: Firmware versions prior to v3.01
o Modicon M580: Firmware versions prior to v2.80
o Modicon Quantum: All firmware versions
o Modicon Premium: All firmware versions
3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW
3.2.1 IMPROPER CHECK FOR UNUSUAL OR EXCEPTIONAL CONDITIONS CWE-754
An attacker could create a denial-of-service condition by sending a specific
crafted Modbus frame to the affected device.
CVE-2019-6819 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
7.5 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is ( AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/
C:N/I:N/A:H ).
3.3 BACKGROUND
o CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Multiple Sectors
o COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide
o COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: France
3.4 RESEARCHER
Zhang Xiaoming, Zhang Jiawei, Sun Zhonghao and Luo bing of CNCERT/CC reported
this vulnerability to NCCIC.
4. MITIGATIONS
Schneider Electric has recommended the following to mitigate this
vulnerability.
Modicon M340 - The vulnerability is fixed in v3.01 and is available for
download below:
o BMXP3420302 and CL and H: https://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/
document/BMXP3420302_Firmwares/
o BMXP342020 and H: https://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/document/
BMXP342020_Firmwares/
o BMXP342000: https://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/document/
BMXP342000_Firmwares/
o BMXP341000 and H: https://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/document/
BMXP341000_Firmwares/
o BMXP3420102 and CL: https://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/document
/BMXP3420102_Firmwares/
o BMXP3420302 and H: https://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/document/
BMXP3420302_Firmwares/
Modicon M580 - The vulnerability is fixed in v2.80 and is available for
download below:
o BMEP584040, BMEP584040S, BMEH584040 and C: https://
www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/document/M580_BMEP584040_SV2.80/
o BMEP586040 and C: https://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/document/
M580_BMEP586040_SV2.80/
o BMEH586040 and C: https://www.schneiderelectric.com/en/download/document/
M580_BMEH586040_SV2.80/
o BMEP581020 and H: https://www.schneiderelectric.com/en/download/document/
M580_BMEP581020_SV2.80/
o BMEP582020 and H: https://www.schneiderelectric.com/en/download/document/
M580_BMEP582020_SV2.80/
o BMEP582040 and H: https://www.schneiderelectric.com/en/download/document/
M580_BMEP582040_SV2.80/
o BMEP583020: https://www.schneiderelectric.com/en/download/document/
M580_BMEP583020_SV2.80/
o BMEP583040: https://www.schneiderelectric.com/en/download/document/
M580_BMEP583040_SV2.80/
o BMEP584020: https://www.schneiderelectric.com/en/download/document/
M580_BMEP584020_SV2.80/
o BMEP585040 and C: https://www.schneiderelectric.com/en/download/document/
M580_BMEP585040_SV2.80/
o BMEP582040S: https://www.schneiderelectric.com/en/download/document/
M580_BMEP582040S_SV2.80/
o BMEH582040 and C: https://www.schneiderelectric.com/en/download/document/
M580_BMEP582040_SV2.80
Schneider Electric's Modicon Quantum controllers have reached the end of their
life and are no longer commercially available. They have been replaced by the
Modicon M580 ePAC controller, Schneider Electric's most current product.
Schneider Electric recommends users migrate to the Modicon M580 ePAC.
To mitigate risks associated with this Modbus vulnerability, users should
immediately set up network segmentation and implement a firewall to block all
unauthorized access to Port 502/TCP.
Schneider Electric general security recommendations:
o Locate control and safety system networks and remote devices behind
firewalls, and isolate them from the business network.
o Physical controls should be in place so no unauthorized persons have access
to the ICS and safety controllers, peripheral equipment, or the ICS and
safety networks.
o All controllers should reside in locked cabinets and never be left in the
"Program" mode.
o All programming software should be kept in locked cabinets and should never
be connected to any network other than the network for the intended
devices.
o All methods of mobile data exchange with the isolated network (e.g., CDs,
USB drives, etc.) should be scanned before use in the terminals or any node
connected to these networks.
o Laptops that have connected to any other network besides the intended
network should never be allowed to connect to the safety or control
networks without proper sanitation.
o Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems,
and ensure they are not accessible from the Internet.
o When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as virtual private
networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should
be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is
only as secure as the connected devices.
For more information, please see Schneider Electric advisory: SEVD-2019-134-05
NCCIC reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
NCCIC also provides a section for control systems security recommended
practices on the ICS-CERT web page. Several recommended practices are available
for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems
Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies .
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available
on the ICS-CERT website in the Technical Information Paper,
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation
Strategies .
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to NCCIC for tracking
and correlation against other incidents.
No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability.
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