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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified in General
Motors and Shanghai OnStar (SOS) iOS Client
10 January 2018
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
Product: General Motors and Shanghai OnStar (SOS) iOS Client
Operating System: Apple iOS
Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Access Confidential Data -- Remote with User Interaction
Unauthorised Access -- Existing Account
CVE Names: CVE-2017-12697 CVE-2017-12695 CVE-2017-9663
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General Motors and Shanghai OnStar (SOS) iOS Client
Original release date: January 09, 2018
All information products included in http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov are provided
"as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information
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referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product
is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For
more information about TLP, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/.
CVSS v3 9.8
ATTENTION: Remotely exploitable/low skill level to exploit.
Vendor: General Motors (GM), Shanghai OnStar (SOS)
Equipment: SOS iOS Client
Vulnerabilities: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information,
Man-in-the-Middle, Improper Authentication
This advisory was originally posted to the NCCIC Portal on August 22, 2017,
and is being released to the ICS-CERT web site.
The following version of Shanghai OnStar iOS Client, a vehicle management
mobile application, is affected:
Shanghai OnStar iOS Client Version 7.1
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to
remotely gain full access to the Shanghai OnStar iOS client, allowing for the
control of remote vehicle commands and the ability to view and edit account
GM recommends the following mitigations:
Users should not root or jailbreak their phones to prevent the preconditions
for attacker access to mobile phone memory, including the ability to read JSON
web token encryption keys.
GM HTTP Public Key Pinning rollout is complete to mitigate Man-In-The-Middle
attacks for SOS iOS Client Version 7.1. The rollout includes back office and
iOS client changes (now version 7.2). For North America iOS OnStar clients,
HTTP Public KeyPinning deployment (back office and mobile app) is scheduled
for December 2017.
Debugging code was removed from SOS Identity Management servers to prevent
attacker access to user accounts.
ICS-CERT recommends that users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of
exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Specifically, users should:
Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and
ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet.
Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and
isolate them from the business network.
When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be
updated to the most current version available. Also recognize that VPN is only
as secure as the connected devices.
ICS-CERT reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended
practices on the ICS-CERT web page. Several recommended practices are
available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control
Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly
available in the ICS-CERT Technical Information Paper,
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation
Strategies, that is available for download from the ICS-CERT web site.
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for
tracking and correlation against other incidents.
No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability.
CLEARTEXT STORAGE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION CWE-312
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to
access an encryption key that is stored in cleartext in memory.
CVE-2017-9663 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
9.8 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is
CHANNEL ACCESSIBLE BY NON-ENDPOINT (MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE) CWE-300
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow an attacker to
intercept sensitive information when the client connects to the server.
CVE-2017-12697 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score
of 8.8 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is
IMPROPER AUTHENTICATION CWE-287
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow an attacker to subvert
security mechanisms and reset a user account password.
CVE-2017-12695 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score
of 8.8 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is
Charles Gans reported these vulnerabilities to ICS-CERT.
Critical Infrastructure Sector: Transportation Systems
Countries/Areas Deployed: United States, Asia
Company Headquarters Location: United States
For any questions related to this report, please contact the NCCIC at:
Email: NCCICCUSTOMERSERVICE@hq.dhs.gov (link sends e-mail)
Toll Free: 1-888-282-0870
For industrial control systems cybersecurity information:
or incident reporting: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Report-Incident?
The NCCIC continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can
help by choosing one of the links below to provide feedback about this
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