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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2016.1461
Security Advisories Relating to Symantec Products - Symantec Embedded
Security: Critical System Protection and Symantec Data Center Security:
Server Advanced, Multiple Security Issues
10 June 2016
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Symantec Embedded Security: Critical System Protection
Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced
Publisher: Symantec
Operating System: Windows
Red Hat
VMware ESX Server
Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Existing Account
Access Confidential Data -- Existing Account
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2015-8800 CVE-2015-8799 CVE-2015-8798
CVE-2015-8157
Original Bulletin:
https://www.symantec.com/security_response/securityupdates/detail.jsp?fid=security_advisory&pvid=security_advisory&year=&suid=20160607_00
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Security Advisories Relating to Symantec Products - Symantec Embedded
Security: Critical System Protection and Symantec Data Center Security: Server
Advanced, Multiple Security Issues
SYM16-009
June 7, 2016
Revisions
None
Severity
CVSS2 CVSS2 Vector
Management Server SQL Injection Authentication Bypass - Medium
5.2 AV:A/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P
Management Server Authenticated Path Traversal - High
7.2 AV:A/AC:L/Au:M/C:C/I:C/A:C
Management Server Path Traversal/Binary Planting on Deployed Agent - High
7.1 AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C
Named Pipe Process Call Arbitrary Argument Injection - High
7.0 AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:P/A:C
CVSS3 CVSS3 Vector
Management Server SQL Injection Authentication Bypass - Medium
5.5 AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Management Server Authenticated Path Traversal - High
7.4 AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Management Server Path Traversal/Binary Planting on Deployed Agent - High
7.6 AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Named Pipe Process Call Arbitrary Argument Injection - Medium
6.3 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
Overview
Symantec Embedded Security: Critical System Protection (SES:CSP) and Data
Center Security: Server Advanced (SDCS:SA) were susceptible to security issues
in the management server and deployed agents which could enable unauthorized
elevated access, bypassing security protection on agents, potential
unauthorized insertion of arbitrary code on agents.
Affected Products
Product Version Build Solution(s)
Symantec Embedded Security: Critical System Protection (SES:CSP)1.0.x Management Server Update to SES:CSP 1.0 MP5 latest published build
Symantec Embedded Security: Critical System Protection for 6.5.0 Management Server Update to SES:CSP 6.5.0 MP1 latest published build
Controllers and Devices (SES:CSP)
Symantec Critical System Protection (SCSP) 5.2.9 and earlier Management Server Upgrade to 5.2.9 MP6 latest published build
Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced Server (DCS:SA) 6.0.x Management Server Upgrade to 6.5 MP1 latest published build
Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced Server (DCS:SA) 6.5.x Management Server Upgrade to 6.5 MP1 latest published build
Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced Server (DCS:SA) 6.6 Management Server Upgrade to 6.6 MP1 build
Symantec Data Center Security: Server Advanced Server and 6.6 MP1 Management Server Upgrade to 6.6 MP1 latest published policies
Agents (DCS:SA)
Details
SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Management Server SQL Injection - Management servers were
susceptible to potential SQL Injection by an authorized but non-privileged
network user. A malicious user with network access to the proper port on the
management server could potentially inject arbitrary SQL commands. If
successful, the attacker could bypass authentication and potentially get their
arbitrary commands to run with the privileges of the application.
SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Management Server Path Traversal - The Management Server did
not properly sanitize user-supplied input. An authorized but lower-privileged
management server user could potentially execute arbitrary code with elevated
privileges.
This is not applicable to 5.2.9 and earlier.
SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Management Server Path Traversal/Binary Planting on Deployed
Agent - By leveraging elevated access on the management server, a
less-privileged user could potentially deploy specifically-crafted update
packages to arbitrary locations on SES:CSP/SDCS:SA deployed agents for
possible execution by the agent. This could have resulted in potentially
bypassing security protection on agents and resultant arbitrary remote code
execution.
This is not applicable to 5.2.9 and earlier.
SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Named Pipe Process Call Arbitrary Argument Injection - An
authenticated user who can read/write to a specific named pipe could
potentially inject arbitrary arguments which could allow bypass of security
protection on the agent.
Symantec is not aware of exploitation of or adverse customer impact from this
issue.
Update Information
Updates for SES:CSP 1.0.x and 6.5.0 are available through Symantec File
Connect.
Update information for SES:CSP and SDCS:SA is available through TechNote
INFO3743, http://www.symantec.com/docs/INFO3743
Symantec Response and Mitigations/Workarounds
Symantec recommends customers upgrade to the latest version. However, if
unable to upgrade immediately, there are some workarounds available to
mitigate these issues related to SES:CSP/SDCS:SA server and Windows agents.
SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Management Server SQL Injection
Always configure out of the box prevention policy with local network
information and apply it to the management server to limit access to local
network or just security administrators.
SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Management Server Path Traversal
If a customer has another physical drive available, edit the DCS:SA Server
configuration to change the bulk log files directory so the directory resides
on a different physical drive than where the DCS:SA Server is installed.
SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Management Server Path Traversal/Binary Planting on Deployed
Agent
Symantec recommends upgrading the SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Management Server in order
to mitigate this vulnerability on the agent.
Always configure out of the box prevention policy with local network
information and apply it to the management server and agent to limit access to
local network or just security administrators.
SES:CSP/SDCS:SA Named Pipe Process Call Arbitrary Argument Injection
The latest Symantec Prevention policies contain mitigations for this
vulnerability. Symantec recommends that customers upgrade their Prevention
policies with the latest policies that are posted on Symantec File Connect.
For Detection-only customers Symantec recommends to stop the Utility Service
(SISIPSUtil) on the agent. Note that this will impact event viewer
functionality on the agent.
The updated DCS:SA policy packs published are:
DCS:SA 6.6 MP1
SDCSSPreventionPolicyPack-v6.6.0-m6.0.0-2016060103.zip
SDCSSPreventionPolicyPack-v6.6.0-m5.2.9-2016060102.zip
SDCSSWorkloadPreventionPolicyWorkspacePack-v6.6.0-m5.2.9-2016060102.zip
SDCSSWorkloadPreventionPolicyWorkspacePack-v6.6.0-m6.0.0-2016060102.zip
SDCSSvSpherePreventionPolicyWorkspacePack-v6.6.0-m5.2.9-2016060102.zip
The updated DCS:SA policy packs included in Management Server packaging are:
DCS:SA 6.5 MP1
SDCSSPreventionPolicyPack-v6.5.0-m6.0.0-2016053103.zip
SDCSSPreventionPolicyPack-v6.5.0-m5.2.9-2016053102.zip
SDCSSvSpherePreventionPolicyWorkspacePack-v6.5.0-m5.2.9-2016053102.zip
SCSP 5.2.9 MP6
SCSPPreventionPolicyPack-v5.2.9-m5.2.9-2016053102.zip
SCSPPreventionPolicyPack-v5.2.9-m5.2.0-2016053101.zip
SCSPvSpherePreventionPolicyWorkspacePack-v5.2.9-m5.2.9-2016053102.zip
The updated SES:CSP policy packs published are:
SES:CSP 1.0 MP1
SESCSPPreventionPolicyPack-v1.0.0-m1.0.0-2016053002.zip
SES:CSP 6.5.0 HF1
SESCSPPreventionPolicyPack-v6.5.0-m6.5.0-2016053112.zip
SESCSPPreventionPolicyPack-v1.0.0-m1.0.0-2016053102.zip
Best Practices
As part of normal best practices, Symantec strongly recommends the following:
Restrict access to administrative or management systems to authorized
privileged users.
Restrict remote access, if required, to trusted/authorized systems only.
Run under the principle of least privilege where possible to limit the impact
of potential exploit.
Keep all operating systems and applications current with vendor patches.
Follow a multi-layered approach to security. At a minimum, run both firewall
and anti-malware applications to provide multiple points of detection and
protection to both inbound and outbound threats.
Deploy network- and host-based intrusion detection systems to monitor network
traffic for signs of anomalous or suspicious activity. This may aid in the
detection of attacks or malicious activity related to the exploitation of
latent vulnerabilities.
Credit
Symantec would like to thank Matthias Kaiser and Markus Wulftange with Code
White (http://www.code-white.com), for reporting these issues and working very
closely with Symantec as they were addressed.
References
CVE: These issues are candidates for inclusion in the CVE list
(http://cve.mitre.org/cve), which standardizes identifiers for security
problems.
BID: Symantec Security Focus, http://www.securityfocus.com, has assigned
Bugtraq IDs (BIDs) to these issues for inclusion in the Security Focus
vulnerability database.
CVE BID Description
CVE-2015-8157 90889 Management Server SQL Injection Authentication Bypass
CVE-2015-8798 90884 Management Server Authenticated Path Traversal
CVE-2015-8799 90885 Management Server Path Traversal/Binary Planting on Deployed Agent
CVE-2015-8800 90886 Named Pipe Process Call Arbitrary Argument Injection
Symantec takes the security and proper functionality of our products very
seriously. As founding members of the Organization for Internet Safety
(OISafety), Symantec supports and follows responsible disclosure guidelines.
Please contact secure@symantec.com if you feel you have discovered a security
issue in a Symantec product. A member of the Symantec Product Security team
will contact you regarding your submission to coordinate any required
response. Symantec strongly recommends using encrypted email for reporting
vulnerability information to secure@symantec.com. The Symantec Product
Security PGP key can be found at the location below.
Symantec has developed a Product Vulnerability Response document outlining the
process we follow in addressing suspected vulnerabilities in our products.
This document is available below.
Symantec Vulnerability Response Policy
Symantec Product Vulnerability Management PGP Key
Symantec Product Vulnerability Management PGP Key
Copyright (c) 2016 by Symantec Corp.
Permission to redistribute this alert electronically is granted as long as it
is not edited in any way unless authorized by Symantec Product Security.
Reprinting the whole or part of this alert in any medium other than
electronically requires permission from secure@symantec.com
Disclaimer
The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of
publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information
constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties
with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts
any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage
arising from use of, or reliance on, this information.
Symantec, Symantec products, Symantec Product Security, and
secure@symantec.com are registered trademarks of Symantec Corp. and/or
affiliated companies in the United States and other countries. All other
registered and unregistered trademarks represented in this document are the
sole property of their respective companies/owners.
* Signature names may have been updated to comply with an updated IPS
Signature naming convention. See
http://www.symantec.com/business/support/index?page=content&id=TECH152794&key=54619&actp=LIST
for more information.
Last modified on: June 7, 2016
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