Operating System:

[Win]

Published:

13 August 2015

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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2015.2093
                Schneider Electric IMT25 DTM Vulnerability
                              13 August 2015

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           Schneider Electric IMT25 DTM
Publisher:         ICS-CERT
Operating System:  Windows
Impact/Access:     Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote/Unauthenticated
                   Denial of Service               -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution:        Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names:         CVE-2015-3977  

Original Bulletin: 
   https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-223-01

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Advisory (ICSA-15-223-01)

Schneider Electric IMT25 DTM Vulnerability

Original release date: August 11, 2015

All information products included in http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov are provided
"as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information
contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service,
referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this
product is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the
header. For more information about TLP, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/.

OVERVIEW

Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov, and Svetlana Cherkasova of Digital
Security have identified a memory corruption vulnerability in Schneider
Electric IMT25 DTM component. Schneider Electric has produced a patch that
mitigates this vulnerability. Digital Security has tested this patch to
validate that it resolves the vulnerability.

This vulnerability could be exploited remotely.

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

The following Schneider Electric IMT25 Magnetic Flow DTM versions are
affected:

    IMT25 Magnetic Flow DTM, Version 1.500.000 and all previous versions.

IMPACT

The vulnerability produces an overwritten memory value that could cause
a denial of service and potentially remote code execution. The denial of
service would impact the DTM component and possibly the Frame Application
running the DTM software. Remote code execution means that a malicious
actor could execute commands and software at the same level of permissions
as the Frame Application on the machine hosting the Frame Application.

Impact to individual organizations depends on many factors that are unique
to each organization. NCICIC/ICS-CERT recommends that organizations evaluate
the impact of this vulnerability based on their operational environment,
architecture, and product implementation.

BACKGROUND

Schneider Electric's corporate headquarters is located in Paris, France. It
maintains offices in more than 100 countries worldwide.

The affected product, IMT25 Magnetic Flow DTM, is an FDT/DTM software
library. According to Schneider Electric, this is deployed across several
sectors including Commercial Facilities, Critical Manufacturing, Energy,
Water and Wastewater Systems, and others. Schneider Electric estimates
that these products are used primarily in the United States and Europe
with a small percentage in Asia.

VULNERABILITY CHARACTERIZATION

VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

MEMORY CORRUPTION[a]

A specific memory value can be overwritten by sending a special reply to
a HART command. The overwritten memory value can cause a denial of service
and remote code execution.

CVE-2015-3977[b] has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS
v2 base score of 7.7 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is
(AV:A/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C).[c]

VULNERABILITY DETAILS

EXPLOITABILITY

This vulnerability could be exploited remotely from an adjacent network.

EXISTENCE OF EXPLOIT

No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability.

DIFFICULTY

Crafting a working exploit for this vulnerability would be moderately
difficult. Access to an adjacent network is required to exploit. This
decreases the likelihood of a successful exploit.

MITIGATION

Schneider Electric has produced a new version to mitigate this vulnerability,
and recommends customers download and install version 1.500.004 of the
DTM software. This software version can be found at:

http://iom.invensys.com/EN/Pages/Foxboro_MandI_DocTools_DeviceManagers.aspx/

Schneider Electric has published Security Notification SEVD-2015-215-01
with details about this vulnerability. This notice may be downloaded at

http://www.schneider-electric.com/ww/en/download/document/SEVD-2015-215-01?showAsIframe=true

For further information on vulnerabilities in Schneider Electric's products,
please visit Schneider Electric's cybersecurity web page at

http://www2.schneider-electric.com/sites/corporate/en/support/cybersecurity/cybersecurity.page

ICS-CERT recommends that users take defensive measures to minimize the
risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Specifically, users should:

    Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems,
    and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet.
    Keep control system traffic seperate from other networks as much
    as possible.
    Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls,
    and isolate them from the business network.
    When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual
    Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities
    and should be updated to the most current version available. Also
    recognize that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices.

ICS-CERT reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems
security recommended practices on the ICS-CERT web page at:
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/recommended-practices. Several
recommended practices are available for reading and download, including
Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth
Strategies.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are
publicly available in the ICS-CERT Technical Information Paper,
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation
Strategies, that is available for download from the ICS-CERT web site
(http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/).

Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for
tracking and correlation against other incidents.

    a.
    CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a
    Memory Buffer, http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html, web
    site last accessed August 06, 2015.
    b.
    NVD, http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2015-3977,
    NIST uses this advisory to create the CVE web site report. This web
    site will be active sometime after publication of this advisory.
    c.
    CVSS Calculator,
    http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?version=2&vector=AV:A/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C,
    web site last accessed August 06, 2015


Contact Information

For any questions related to this report, please contact ICS-CERT at:

Email: ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov
Toll Free: 1-877-776-7585
International Callers: (208) 526-0900

For industrial control systems security information and incident reporting:
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov

ICS-CERT continuously strives to improve its products and services. You
can help by choosing one of the links below to provide feedback about
this product.

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