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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

       Schneider Electric Wonderware System Platform Vulnerabilities
                               19 June 2015


        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary

Product:           Schneider Electric Wonderware System Platform
Publisher:         US-CERT
Operating System:  Windows
Impact/Access:     Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote with User Interaction
Resolution:        Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names:         CVE-2015-3940  

Original Bulletin: 

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Advisory (ICSA-15-169-02)

Schneider Electric Wonderware System Platform Vulnerabilities

Original release date: June 18, 2015

Legal Notice

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Ivan Sanchez of WiseSecurity Team has identified a fixed search path 
vulnerability in Schneider Electrics Wonderware InTouch, Application Server, 
Historian, and SuiteLink applications, which are part of the Wonderware System
Platform suite. Schneider Electric has produced a patch that mitigates this 
vulnerability. Ivan Sanchez has tested the patch to validate that it resolves
the vulnerability.


The following Schneider Electric products are affected:

Wonderware System Platform 2014 R2 and prior versions.


Successful exploitation of this vulnerability would require the victim to 
install and execute malicious code that could result in arbitrary code 

Impact to individual organizations depends on many factors that are unique to
each organization. NCCIC/ICS-CERT recommends that organizations evaluate the 
impact of this vulnerability based on their operational environment, 
architecture, and product implementation.


Schneider Electrics corporate headquarters is located in Paris, France, and 
maintains offices in more than 100 countries worldwide.

According to Schneider Electric, the Wonderware System Platform, is deployed 
across several sectors including Chemical, Commercial Facilities, Critical 
Manufacturing, Energy, Food and Agriculture, and Water and Wastewater Systems.
Schneider Electric estimates that these products are used worldwide.




Successful exploitation of this vulnerability would require the local user to
load a malicious DLL that is called using a fixed search path at runtime, 
which may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code.

CVE-2015-3940[b] has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v2 base score 
of 7.2 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is 



This vulnerability is not exploitable remotely and cannot be exploited without
user interaction. The exploit is only triggered when a local user runs the 
vulnerable application and loads the malicious file.


No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability.


Crafting a working exploit for this vulnerability would be difficult. Social 
engineering is required to convince the user to accept the malicious file. 
This decreases the likelihood of a successful exploit.


Schneider Electric has released the Wonderware System Platform 2014 R2 Patch 
01, which addresses multiple instances of the identified vulnerability. 
Schneider Electric has identified the severity rating of this vulnerability as
high and recommends applying the patch as soon as possible.

Schneider Electrics Wonderware System Platform 2014 R2 Patch 01 is available 
at the following URL:


Schneider Electrics security bulletin, LFSEC00000106, is located at the 
following URL:


ICS-CERT recommends that users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of
exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Specifically, users should consider the
following defensive measures:

Do not upload and run untrusted files without verifying the integrity of the 

Interact with, and only obtain files and software from trusted highly 
reputable sources.

Where possible, create isolated accounts using lowest privileges to accomplish
minimum required tasks.

Restrict network and physical access to assets using the Wonderware System 
Platform suite to authorized personnel.

Maintain layered physical and logical security to implement defense-in-depth 
design practices for ICS.

Ensure that employees with access to the Wonderware System Platform suite are
aware of the ongoing potential for social engineering attacks and are trained
to identify and avoid social engineering attacks.

Use application whitelisting to detect and prevent files from executing if 
they have not been approved. Application whitelisting will not prevent 
memory-based attacks, such as exploiting buffer overflows vulnerabilities, but
it can prevent shell code from running executables that have not been 

Follow good network design practices that include network separation and 
segmentation; use DMZs with properly configured firewalls to selectively 
control and monitor traffic passed between zones and systems.

Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and 
ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet.

When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private 
Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be
updated to the most current version available. Also recognize that VPN is only
as secure as the connected devices.

ICS-CERT reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk 
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended 
practices on the ICS-CERT web page at: 
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/recommended-practices. Several recommended
practices are available for reading and download, including Improving 
Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly 
available in the ICS-CERT Technical Information Paper, 
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation 
Strategies, that is available for download from the ICS-CERT web site 

Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their 
established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for 
tracking and correlation against other incidents.

In addition, ICS-CERT recommends that users take the following measures to 
protect themselves from social engineering attacks:

Do not click web links or open unsolicited attachments in email messages.

Refer to Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams[d] for more information on 
avoiding email scams.

Refer to Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks[e] for more 
information on social engineering attacks.

a. CWE-427: Uncontrolled Search Path Element, 
http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/427.html, web site last accessed June 
18, 2015.

b. NVD, http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2015-3940, NIST 
uses this advisory to create the CVE web site report. This web site will be 
active sometime after publication of this advisory.

c. CVSS Calculator, 
http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?version=2&vector=AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C, web
site last accessed June 18, 2015.

d. Recognizing and Avoiding Email Scams, 
http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/emailscams_0905.pdf, web site last 
accessed June 18, 2015.

e. National Cyber Alert System Cyber Security Tip ST04-014, 
http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-014.html, web site last accessed June 18,

Contact Information

For any questions related to this report, please contact ICS-CERT at:

Email: ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov

Toll Free: 1-877-776-7585

International Callers: (208) 526-0900

For industrial control systems security information and incident reporting: 

ICS-CERT continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can 
help by choosing one of the links below to provide feedback about this 

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