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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

             Schneider Electric Trio J-Series Radio Encryption
                              30 August 2013


        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary

Product:           Schneider Electric Trio J-Series Radio
Publisher:         ICS-CERT
Operating System:  Network Appliance
Impact/Access:     Reduced Security -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution:        Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names:         CVE-2013-2782  

Original Bulletin: 

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Advisory (ICSA-13-234-01)

Schneider Electric Trio J-Series Radio Encryption

Original release date: August 22, 2013

Legal Notice

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"as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information 
contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service, 
referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product
is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header. For more
information about TLP, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/.


Schneider Electric has self-reported a hard-coded encryption key vulnerability
in Schneider Electric's J-Series Radios. Schneider Electric has produced a 
patch that mitigates this vulnerability and has published a customer security 

This vulnerability could be exploited remotely.


The following Schneider Electric Trio J-Series Radio versions running Firmware 
Versions V3.6.0, V3.6.1, V3.6.2, and V3.6.3 are affected:



In certain cases the affected Trio J-Series radio firmware versions do not 
correctly generate an advanced encryption standard (AES) encryption key when 
AES encryption is enabled in the device configuration. An attacker could 
potentially leverage this situation to gain control of a device or to access 
a connected device or industrial control system (ICS) network.

If a Trio J-Series Radio with V3.6.0, V3.6.1, V3.6.2, or V3.6.3 has AES 
encryption enabled with a user-defined pass phrase, the AES encryption key is 
not generated correctly, unless it is part of an upgrade.

If the radio had AES encryption enabled at the time of the V3.5.0 or earlier 
firmware upgrade to the affected versions, and the AES encryption pass phrase 
was not changed, then the Trio J-Series will continue to properly encrypt the 
radio traffic.

If the radio running firmware V3.5.0 or earlier was upgraded to these affected
versions and the AES encryption was changed from disable to enable or had the
AES encryption key changed, then the encryption key will not be generated 

Impact to individual organizations depends on many factors that are unique to 
each organization. ICS-CERT recommends that organizations evaluate the impact
of this vulnerability based on their operational environment, architecture,
and product implementation.


Schneider Electric is a Europe-based company that maintains offices in 190 
countries worldwide. Their PLC products are used in a wide variety of 
automation and control applications across all industrial, infrastructure, 
and building sectors.

These radios are used mostly in Australia and the US, with smaller deployments
in Brazil, Europe, and the UK. Sectors most commonly using the affected devices 
include oil and gas, water and waste water, and mining.



Hard-Coded Encryption Key[b]

The affected devices may, under some circumstances, not properly generate an 
encryption key. This could potentially result in an attacker gaining access to
the radio communications link traffic and potentially the ICS network.

CVE-2013-2782[c] has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v2 base score
of 8.3 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is 



This vulnerability could be exploited remotely.


No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability.


An attacker with a low skill would be able to exploit this vulnerability.


The best mitigation for this vulnerability is to install the vendor firmware 
update from Schneider Electric, which can be accessed from the link below.


ICS-CERT encourages asset owners to take additional defensive measures to 
protect against this and other cybersecurity risks.

    Minimize network exposure for all control system devices. Critical devices
    should not directly face the Internet.
    Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and 
    isolate them from the business network.
    When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private
    Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected 

ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended 
practices on the ICS-CERT Web page. Several recommended practices are available
for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems 
Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.[e] ICS-CERT reminds 
organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to 
taking defensive measures.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly 
available in the ICS-CERT Technical Information Paper, 
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B-Targeted Cyber Intrusion Mitigation Strategies,[f] that is 
available for download from the ICS-CERT Web page 

Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their 
established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for 
tracking and correlation against other incidents.

    a. Schneider Electric Cybersecurity Vulnerability Disclosure, 
       Web site last accessed August 22, 2013.
    b. CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key,  
       http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/321.html, Web site last accessed
       August 22, 2013.
    c. NVD, http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2013-2782 ,
       NIST uses this advisory to create the CVE Web site report. This Web site
       will be active sometime after publication of this advisory.
    d. CVSS Calculator, 
       Web site last accessed August 22, 2013.
    e. CSSP Recommended Practices, 
       http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/recommended-practices, Web site last 
       accessed August 22, 2011.
    f. Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies, 
       http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B, Web site last 
       accessed August 22, 2013.

Contact Information

For any questions related to this report, please contact ICS-CERT at:

Email: ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov
Toll Free: 1-877-776-7585
International Callers: (208) 526-0900

For industrial control systems security information and incident reporting: 

ICS-CERT continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can 
help by answering a short series of questions about this product at the 
following URL: https://forms.us-cert.gov/ncsd-feedback/.


For Legal Information pertaining to this document, please consult 

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