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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2013.0241
   ICSA-13-045-01 - Tridium NiagaraAX Directory Traversal Vulnerability
                             22 February 2013

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        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           Tridium NiagaraAX
Publisher:         US-CERT
Operating System:  Windows
                   Linux variants
Impact/Access:     Unauthorised Access -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution:        Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names:         CVE-2012-4701  

Original Bulletin: 
   http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/pdf/ICSA-13-045-01.pdf

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ICS-CERT ADVISORY

ICSA-13-045-01 - TRIDIUM NIAGARAAX DIRECTORY TRAVERSAL VULNERABILITY

February 14, 2013

OVERVIEW

This advisory provides mitigation details for a vulnerability in the Tridium 
NiagaraAX software.

Independent researchers Billy Rios and Terry McCorkle discovered a directory 
traversal vulnerability in the Tridium NiagaraAX software product. They 
demonstrated that with a valid user account or guest privileges enabled, 
privilege escalation is possible on a NiagaraAX system. Exploitation of this 
vulnerability could allow loss of availability, integrity, and confidentiality 
of the system.

Tridium has produced a patch that mitigates this vulnerability. This 
vulnerability is remotely exploitable.

AFFECTED PRODUCTS

The following Tridium products are affected: 
* Tridium NiagaraAX, [a] all versions.

IMPACT

A loss of integrity, data, and possibly physical damage can result if the 
software is being used to control a physical process. Another consequence 
might be the compromise of facility security where NiagaraAX is used for 
facility access control and administration.

Impact to individual organizations depends on many factors that are unique to 
each organization. ICS-CERT recommends that organizations evaluate the impact 
of this vulnerability based on their operational environment, architecture, 
and product implementation.

BACKGROUND

Tridium is a US-based company that maintains offices in several countries 
around the world, including the US, UK, Singapore, and China. Tridium also 
deploys systems to Latin America.

NiagaraAX is a general framework that can be used to integrate and manage 
diverse industrial control system components, e.g., HVAC, building automation 
controls, and facility management that can be controlled over the Internet 
from a Web browser. According to Tridium, more than 350,000 instances of the 
NiagaraAX Framework are used worldwide.

Tridium estimates that these products are used primarily in the commercial 
facilities (88 percent), energy (5 percent), education (5 percent), and 
government facilities and other sectors (2 percent).

VULNERABILITY CHARACTERIZATION

VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

PATH TRAVERSAL [b]

If an installed NiagaraAX instance has its Web interface accessible from the 
Internet, and the user has valid user credentials, or if the system's 
guest user function is enabled, the application could be subverted to escalate 
the user's credentials and gain control of the system. The attacker could 
read the contents of unexpected files, expose sensitive data, execute 
arbitrary code, and affect the availability by sending a specially crafted 
packet to the Web server on Port 80/TCP.

CVE-2012-4701 [c] has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v2 base 
score of 8.5 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is 
(AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C). [d] If the guest user function is enabled, no 
authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.

VULNERABILITY DETAILS

EXPLOITABILITY

This vulnerability can be exploited remotely.

EXISTENCE OF EXPLOIT

No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability.

DIFFICULTY

An attacker with medium skill may be able to exploit this vulnerability.

MITIGATION

Tridium has developed patches for all current versions (Versions 3.5, 3.6, and 
3.7) of the NiagaraAX software. Links to the patches, along with instructions 
on their use, can be obtained from the Tridium Security Update Web page: 
https://www.niagara-central.com/ord?portal:/dev/wiki/Niagara_AX_Security_Patch_11-Feb-2013.

For users of older versions of NiagaraAX software (prior to Version 3.5), 
Tridium recommends that users either upgrade to the newest version or take 
careful measures to isolate access to the Web interface from the Internet. 
Users are encouraged to contact Tridium for details on disabling the Web 
interface and for information on how to get to the most current version of 
NiagaraAX.

* ICS-CERT encourages asset owners to take additional defensive measures to 
  protect against this and other cybersecurity risks.
* Minimize network exposure for all control system devices. Critical devices 
  should not directly face the Internet.
* Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and 
  isolate them from the business network.
* When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private 
  Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected 
  devices.

ICS-CERT also provides a section for control systems security recommended 
practices on the US-CERT Web page. Several recommended practices are available 
for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems 
Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies. [e] ICS-CERT reminds 
organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to 
taking defensive measures.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly 
available in the ICS-CERT Technical Information Paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B - 
2014Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies, [f] that is 
available for download from the ICS-CERT Web page (www.ics-cert.org).

Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their 
established internal procedures and report their findings to ICS-CERT for 
tracking and correlation against other incidents.

ICS-CERT CONTACT

For any questions related to this report, please contact ICS-CERT at:

Email: ics-cert@hq.dhs.gov 
Toll Free: 1-877-776-7585 

For industrial control systems security information and incident reporting: 
www.ics-cert.org.

REFERENCES
[a] Tridium NiagaraAX - http://www.tridium.com/cs/products_/_services/niagaraax
    last visited February 14, 2013.
[b] CWE-22, http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html, CWE-22: Path 
    Traversal, Web site last accessed February 14, 2013. 
[c] NVD, http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-4701 , NIST 
    uses this advisory to create the CVE Web site report. This Web site will 
    be active sometime after publication of this advisory. 
[d] CVSS Calculator, http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm?version=2&vector=(AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C)
    Web site last visited February 14, 2013.
[e] CSSP Recommended Practices, http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/practices/Recommended_Practices.html
    Web site last accessed February 14, 2013.
[f] Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies, 
    http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICS- TIP-12-146-01B.pdf, Web 
    site last accessed February 14, 2013.

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