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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2012.0691 HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 20 July 2012 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent Publisher: Zero Day Initiative Operating System: Windows Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote/Unauthenticated Resolution: Mitigation Original Bulletin: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-126/ http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-127/ Comment: This bulletin contains two (2) Zero Day Initiative security advisories. - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- ZDI-12-126 : (0 day) HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent RsaCIFS.dll Remote Code Execution Vulnerability http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-126 July 18, 2012 - - -- CVE ID: - - -- CVSS: 10, AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C - - -- Affected Vendors: Hewlett-Packard - - -- Affected Products: Hewlett-Packard StorageWorks - - -- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection: TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 12455. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit: http://www.tippingpoint.com - - -- Vulnerability Details: This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the HsmCfgSvc.exe service which listens by default on TCP port 9111. When processing CIFS archives the process does not properly validate the size of the archive name and proceeds to copy the string into a fixed-length buffer on the stack. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary remote code under the context of the running service. - - -- Vendor Response: Hewlett-Packard states: The overall design of the File Migration Agent (FMA) assumes it runs as an application on a Windows server. Given the stated purpose of FMA, and the nature of the vulnerability, the only salient mitigation strategy is to restrict interaction with the service to trusted machines. Only the clients and servers that have a legitimate procedural relationship with the HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent should be permitted to communicate with it. This could be accomplished in a number of ways, most notably with firewall rules/whitelisting. These features are available in the native Windows Firewall, as described in http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc725770%28WS.10%29.aspx and numerous other Microsoft Knowledge Base articles. - - -- Disclosure Timeline: 2011-04-11 - Vulnerability reported to vendor 2012-07-18 - 0-Day advisory released - - -- Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by: * AbdulAziz Hariri - - -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI): Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly disclosing discovered vulnerabilities. Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor, TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or mitigation product. Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/ Follow the ZDI on Twitter: http://twitter.com/thezdi - ----- ZDI-12-127 : (0Day) HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent RsaFTP.dll Remote Code Execution Vulnerability http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-127 July 18, 2012 - - -- CVE ID: - - -- CVSS: 10, AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C - - -- Affected Vendors: Hewlett-Packard - - -- Affected Products: Hewlett-Packard StorageWorks - - -- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection: TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 11980. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit: http://www.tippingpoint.com - - -- Vulnerability Details: This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the HsmCfgSvc.exe service which listens by default on TCP port 9111. When processing FTP archives the process does not properly validate the size of the root path specified and proceeds to copy the string into a fixed-length buffer on the stack. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary remote code under the context of the running service. - - -- Vendor Response: Hewlett-Packard states: The overall design of the File Migration Agent (FMA) assumes it runs as an application on a Windows server. Given the stated purpose of FMA, and the nature of the vulnerability, the only salient mitigation strategy is to restrict interaction with the service to trusted machines. Only the clients and servers that have a legitimate procedural relationship with the HP StorageWorks File Migration Agent should be permitted to communicate with it. This could be accomplished in a number of ways, most notably with firewall rules/whitelisting. These features are available in the native Windows Firewall, as described in http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc725770%28WS.10%29.aspx and numerous other Microsoft Knowledge Base articles. - - -- Disclosure Timeline: 2011-04-11 - Vulnerability reported to vendor 2012-07-18 - 0-Day advisory release - - -- Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by: * AbdulAziz Hariri - - -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI): Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly disclosing discovered vulnerabilities. Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor, TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or mitigation product. Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/ Follow the ZDI on Twitter: http://twitter.com/thezdi - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au and we will forward your request to the appropriate person. NOTE: Third Party Rights This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in this security bulletin. NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current. Contact information for the authors of the original document is included in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact them directly. Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980 =========================================================================== Australian Computer Emergency Response Team The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld 4072 Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for member emergencies only. =========================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967 iQIVAwUBUAjfNu4yVqjM2NGpAQLIVg//Vg7n+TjJcyG7TSbZHnmn7Wyr9aRA1wWO gZjHbZfuHyHe2lhuOcqs2EDwCYoegLI4a7TlmzuVWt/FwL9ywgY74N5TTcmtgpqB UQBJrVOVCQXv0qgNyWFkcVNCjBNmBiMnDVn3iKuYlS0Ai2O8kC7sLR9hHzFoYzgm wJHlM/+Vxp+aUR503s8Xlb63hv+Y4Hj2ZDdVcWhckj9Eg3fkyGfKKt66tBIfpjkG X8wRGAqZhLfgKe1KNCLMslqQO1in/ttoCG1qunQIZr9Qv0HkuQFNbndXI8unl1eF FtMlrnTcgqx9Z+4oWZ24Cy6F/fR81z1ZfQqCsgVuqCiqRrHNxmxz2wnAt7v+M1Dx spnENVmczT5TK1uaOEf+66Uum7ZhzZeEPRtnHrjGXNbUCixz89LONYqECdyRp6kL MCy3zjtwERtTBUHyz+VYW2NhoDpiE7DNj7PNsiDL/GPogJXBkca6NBchXT3QD0ow lkJuGO7NdDQbO30fY45kttKDo91OdQC29iQF/MuLRi+8MrnjqI5fq/U1U1dThx1z hMa3M81az+UcFPMObA5SjfbBuxX9NSmEA4wX+XTKkBv4bw+3laylH8nxLLFtyf/H cbRYl8VZtfvhohFOsqpZx7tTrUYLAmNw6iWRqQmedPoHZCNZ6FuSVwluLNA5JPbi OIL6nVPscqM= =n/26 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----