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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2011.0331
(0day) IBM Lotus Domino Server Controller Authentication
Bypass Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
24 March 2011
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: IBM Lotus Domino
Publisher: IBM
Operating System: Windows
Linux variants
Solaris
AIX
Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: None
Original Bulletin:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-11-110/
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ZDI-11-110: (0day) IBM Lotus Domino Server Controller Authentication Bypass Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-11-110
March 22, 2011
- -- CVSS:
10, (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C)
- -- Affected Vendors:
IBM
- -- Affected Products:
IBM Lotus Domino
- -- Vulnerability Details:
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of Lotus Domino Server Controller.
Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The flaw exists within the remote console functionality which listens by
default on TCP port 2050. When handling A user authentication the server
uses a user supplied COOKIEFILE path to retrieve stored credentials. The
application then compares this data against the user provided username
and cookie. The path to the COOKIEFILE can be a UNC path allowing the
attacker to control both the known good credentials and the challenge
credentials. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute
arbitrary code under the context of the SYSTEM user.
- -- Vendor Response:
March 22, 2011 - This vulnerability is being disclosed publicly without
a patch in accordance with the ZDI 180 day deadline.
- -- Mitigations:
Setting a console password provides another level of authentication and
limits the commands available in the console.
To further mitigate this vulnerability access to 2050/tcp on hosts
running the Domino Server Controller application should be restricted to
authorized hosts.
- -- Disclosure Timeline:
2010-09-23 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2011-03-22 - Public release of advisory
- -- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by:
* Patrik Karlsson <patrik@cqure.net>
- -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI):
Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents
a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly
disclosing discovered vulnerabilities.
Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research
through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com
The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is
used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any
exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor,
TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through
its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the
specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until
an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the
altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint
provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security
vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or
mitigation product.
Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at:
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/
Follow the ZDI on Twitter:
http://twitter.com/thezdi
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