Protect yourself against future threats.
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===========================================================================
AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2009.1194.3
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS XR Software Border
Gateway Protocol Vulnerability
24 August 2009
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Cisco IOS
Publisher: Cisco Systems
Operating System: Cisco
Impact/Access: Denial of Service -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2009-2056 CVE-2009-2055 CVE-2009-1154
Original Bulletin:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090818-bgp.shtml
Comment: There has been some active exploitation using this vulnerability.
Revision History: August 24 2009: Added CVE References
August 21 2009: Cisco has updated their advisory to include
two more vulnerabilities and an official
fix.
August 19 2009: Initial Release
- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------
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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS XR Software Border Gateway Protocol
Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20090818-bgp
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090818-bgp.shtml
Revision 2.1
Last Updated 2009 August 20 1400 UTC (GMT)
For Public Release 2009 August 18 1500 UTC (GMT)
Summary
=======
Cisco IOS XR Software contains multiple vulnerabilities in the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) feature. These vulnerabilities include:
* Cisco IOS XR Software will reset a BGP peering session when
receiving a specific invalid BGP update. The vulnerability manifests
when a BGP peer announces a prefix with a specific invalid
attribute. On receipt of this prefix, the Cisco IOS XR device will
restart the peering session by sending a notification. The peering
session will flap until the sender stops sending the invalid/corrupt
update. This vulnerability was disclosed in revision 1.0 of this
advisory.
* Cisco IOS XR BGP process will crash when sending a long length BGP
update message When Cisco IOS XR sends a long length BGP update
message, the BGP process may crash. The number of AS numbers
required to exceed the total/maximum length of update message and
cause the crash are well above normal limits seen within production
environments.
* Cisco IOS XR BGP process will crash when constructing a BGP update
with a large number of AS prepends If the Cisco IOS XR BGP process
is configured to prepend a very large number of Autonomous System
(AS) Numbers to the AS path, the BGP process will crash. The number
of AS numbers required to be prepended and cause the crash are well
above normal limits seen within production environments.
All three vulnerabilities are different vulnerabilities from what was
disclosed in the Cisco Security Advisory "Cisco IOS Software Border
Gateway Protocol 4-Byte Autonomous System Number Vulnerabilities" on
the 2009 July 29 1600 UTC at the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090729-bgp.shtml.
Cisco has released a free software maintenance upgrade (SMU) that
addresses these vulnerabilities.
Workarounds that mitigates these vulnerabilities are available.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090818-bgp.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
The "Cisco IOS XR Software will reset a BGP peering session when
receiving a specific invalid BGP update" vulnerability affects all Cisco
IOS XR Software devices after and including software release 3.4.0
configured with BGP routing.
The other two vulnerabilities affect all Cisco IOS XR Software devices
configured with BGP routing.
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
To determine the Cisco IOS XR Software release that is running on
a Cisco product, administrators can log in to the device and issue
the show version command to display the system banner. The system
banner confirms that the device is running Cisco IOS XR Software by
displaying text similar to "Cisco IOS XR Software". The software version
is displayed after the text "Cisco IOS XR Software".
The following example identifies a Cisco CRS-1 that is running Cisco IOS
XR Software Release 3.6.2:
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:CRS#show version
Tue Aug 18 14:25:17.407 AEST
Cisco IOS XR Software, Version 3.6.2[00]
Copyright (c) 2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
ROM: System Bootstrap, Version 1.49(20080319:195807) [CRS-1 ROMMON],
CRS uptime is 4 weeks, 4 days, 1 minute
System image file is "disk0:hfr-os-mbi-3.6.2/mbihfr-rp.vm"
cisco CRS-8/S (7457) processor with 4194304K bytes of memory.
7457 processor at 1197Mhz, Revision 1.2
17 Packet over SONET/SDH network interface(s)
1 DWDM controller(s)
17 SONET/SDH Port controller(s)
8 TenGigabitEthernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s)
2 Ethernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s)
1019k bytes of non-volatile configuration memory.
38079M bytes of hard disk.
981440k bytes of ATA PCMCIA card at disk 0 (Sector size 512 bytes).
Configuration register on node 0/0/CPU0 is 0x102
Boot device on node 0/0/CPU0 is mem:
!--- output truncated
The following example identifies a Cisco 12404 router that is running
Cisco IOS XR Software Release 3.7.1:
RP/0/0/CPU0:GSR#show version
Cisco IOS XR Software, Version 3.7.1[00]
Copyright (c) 2008 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
ROM: System Bootstrap, Version 12.0(20051020:160303) SOFTWARE
Copyright (c) 1994-2005 by cisco Systems, Inc.
GSR uptime is 3 weeks, 6 days, 3 hours, 20 minutes
System image file is "disk0:c12k-os-mbi-3.7.1/mbiprp-rp.vm"
cisco 12404/PRP (7457) processor with 2097152K bytes of memory.
7457 processor at 1266Mhz, Revision 1.2
1 Cisco 12000 Series Performance Route Processor
1 Cisco 12000 Series - Multi-Service Blade Controller
1 1 Port ISE Packet Over SONET OC-48c/STM-16 Controller (1 POS)
1 Cisco 12000 Series SPA Interface Processor-601/501/401
3 Ethernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s)
1 SONET/SDH Port controller(s)
1 Packet over SONET/SDH network interface(s)
4 PLIM QoS controller(s)
8 FastEthernet/IEEE 802.3 interface(s)
1016k bytes of non-volatile configuration memory.
1000496k bytes of disk0: (Sector size 512 bytes).
65536k bytes of Flash internal SIMM (Sector size 256k).
Configuration register on node 0/0/CPU0 is 0x2102
Boot device on node 0/0/CPU0 is disk0:
!--- output truncated
Additional information about Cisco IOS XR Software release naming
conventions is available in the "White Paper: Cisco IOS Reference Guide"
at the following link: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html#t6.
Additional information about Cisco IOS XR Software time-based release
model is available in the "White Paper: Guidelines for Cisco IOS XR
Software" at the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/iosswrel/ps8803/ps5845/product_bulletin_c25-478699.html.
BGP is configured in Cisco IOS XR Software with the configuration
command router bgp [AS Number] or router bgp [X.Y]. The device is
vulnerable if it is running an affected Cisco IOS XR Software version
and has BGP configured.
The following example shows a Cisco IOS XR Software device configured
with BGP:
RP/0/0/CPU0:GSR#show running-config | begin router bgp
Building configuration...
router bgp 65535
bgp router-id 192.168.0.1
address-family ipv4 unicast
network 192.168.1.1/32
!
address-family vpnv4 unicast
!
neighbor 192.168.2.1
remote-as 65534
update-source Loopback0
address-family ipv4 unicast
!
!--- output truncated
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
The following Cisco products are confirmed not vulnerable:
* Cisco IOS Software
* Cisco IOS XR Software not configured for BGP routing
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
These vulnerabilities affect Cisco IOS XR devices running affected
software versions and configured with the BGP routing feature. Details
per vulnerability are outlined below:
* Cisco IOS XR Software will reset a BGP peering session when
receiving a specific invalid BGP update. On August 17th, 2009,
a widely-distributed Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) route update
contained a BGP Update message with a specific invalid attribute.
When the invalid BGP Update message was processed by Cisco IOS XR
Software, it began resetting BGP peering sessions over which the
update was received.
When a affected device receives the invalid/corrupt update, Cisco
IOS XR Software will create a log message like the following
example:
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:Aug 17 13:47:05.896 GMT: bgp[122]: %ROUTING-BGP-5-ADJCHANGE : neighbor 192.168.0.1 Down - BGP Notification sent: invalid or corrupt AS path
The peering session will flap until the sender stops sending the
invalid/corrupt BGP update message.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtb42995 and
has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID
CVE-2009-2055.
* Cisco IOS XR BGP process will crash when sending a long length BGP
update message The BGP process on an affected Cisco IOS XR device
may reload when sending a long length BGP update. The number of
AS numbers required to exceed the total/maximum length of update
message and cause the crash are well above normal limits seen within
production environments.
When an affected device BGP process crashes because of this long
length BGP update message, Cisco IOS XR Software may create a log
message like the following example:
bgp[122]: %ROUTING-BGP-3-INTERNAL_ERROR : [10] : Internal error (Write buffer too small to generate update)
The above error message is not always displayed and the BGP process
may crash before IOS XR has the chance to generate the error
message. This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtb05382
and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID
CVE-2009-1154.
* Cisco IOS XR BGP process will crash when constructing a BGP update
with a large number of AS prepends If the Cisco IOS XR BGP process
is configured to prepend a very large number of AS Numbers to the AS
path, the BGP process will crash. The number of AS numbers required
to be prepended to cause the crash are well above normal limits seen
within production environments.
An example of AS path prepending in Cisco IOS XR Software is shown
below:
route-policy prepend-example
prepend as-path 65534 3
prepend as-path 65531 2
end-policy
router bgp 65534
neighbor 192.168.0.1
remote-as 65531
address-family ipv4 unicast
route-policy prepend-example out
When an affected device BGP process crashes because of this large AS
path prepend, no log message will be generated, prior to the crash.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCtb12726 and
has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID
CVE-2009-2056.
The above three vulnerabilities have been fixed in a single SMU and
released under an umbrella Cisco Bug ID CSCtb18562.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based
on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in
this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS
at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
* Cisco IOS XR Software Border Gateway Protocol (CSCtb42995/CSCtb05382)
CVSS Base Score - 4.3
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Medium
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Partial
CVSS Temporal Score - 3.6
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* Cisco IOS XR BGP process will crash when constructing a BGP update
with a large number of AS prepends (CSCtb12726)
CVSS Base Score - 3.3
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - Multiple
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Partial
CVSS Temporal Score - 2.7
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in the
continuous resetting of BGP peering sessions, or the continuous
resetting of the BGP process itself. This may lead to routing
inconsistencies and a denial of service for those affected networks.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
Note: Currently the SMUs are being posted to Cisco.com. This section
will be updated accordingly once the SMUs are available for download.
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| Cisco | | |
| IOS XR | SMU ID | SMU Name |
| Version | | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| | Vulnerable to | |
| | BGP process | |
| 3.2.X | crash | |
| | vulnerabilities; | |
| | Migrate to 3.4.1 | |
| | or later. | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| | Vulnerable to | |
| | BGP process | |
| 3.3.X | crash | |
| | vulnerabilities; | |
| | Migrate to 3.4.1 | |
| | or later. | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| | Vulnerable; | |
| 3.4.0 | Migrate to 3.4.1 | |
| | or later. | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| 3.4.1 | Pending | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| 3.4.2 | Pending | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| 3.4.3 | Pending | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| 3.5.2 | Pending | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| | AA03410 | c12k-rout-3.5.3.CSCtb18562 |
| 3.5.3 | | |
| | AA03396 | hfr-rout-3.5.3.CSCtb18562 |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| | AA03409 | c12k-rout-3.5.4.CSCtb18562 |
| 3.5.4 | | |
| | AA03395 | hfr-rout-3.5.4.CSCtb18562 |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| 3.6.0 | Pending | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| 3.6.1 | Pending | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| | AA03406 | c12k-rout-3.6.2.CSCtb18562 |
| 3.6.2 | | |
| | AA03406 | hfr-rout-3.6.2.CSCtb18562 |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| 3.6.3 | AA03391 | hfr-rout-3.6.3.CSCtb18562 |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| 3.7.0 | Pending | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| 3.7.1 | Pending | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| 3.7.2 | Pending | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| 3.7.3 | Pending | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| 3.8.0 | Pending | |
|---------+------------------+----------------------------|
| 3.8.1 | Pending | |
+---------------------------------------------------------+
Workarounds
===========
Each individual vulnerability has a different workaround. Following are
the mitigations and workarounds recommended for these vulnerabilities,
prior to applying a SMU or software upgrade.
* Cisco IOS XR Software will reset a BGP peering session when
receiving a specific invalid BGP update. There are no workarounds
on the affected device itself. Co-ordination is required with the
peering neighbor support staff to filter the invalid update on their
outbound path. The following procedure explains how to help mitigate
this vulnerability:
Using the peer IP address in the log message that was generated
when the Cisco IOS XR Software device received the invalid update;
capture the notification message hex dump from the CLI command
show bgp neighbor and contact the Cisco TAC, who can assist with a
decode. Details on how to contact Cisco TAC are contained within the
"Obtaining Fixed Software" section of this advisory.
For illustrative purposes, the following example shows a log message
generated by an affected device when it receives an invalid/corrupt
update message:
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:Aug 17 13:47:05.896 GMT: bgp[122]: %ROUTING-BGP-5-ADJCHANGE : neighbor 192.168.0.1 Down - BGP Notification sent: invalid or corrupt AS path
These details can be captured and provided to Cisco TAC to decode
the update message. show bgp neighbors [ip address of neighbor from
above log message]:
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:CRS#show bgp neighbors 192.168.0.1
<capture output and provide to Cisco TAC>
Working with Cisco TAC, the decode of the above will display the AS
path in a manner illustrated below.
ATTRIBUTE NAME: AS_PATH
AS_PATH: Type 2 is AS_SEQUENCE
AS_PATH: Segment Length is 4 (0x04) segments long
AS_PATH: 65533 65532 65531 65531
Working cooperatively with your peering partner, request that they
filter outbound prefix advertisements from the identified source
AS (in this example 65531) for your peering session. The filters
configuration methods will vary depending on the routing device
operating system used. For Cisco IOS XR Software the filters will
be applied using Routing Policy Language (RPL) policies or with
Cisco IOS Software via applying route-maps that deny advertisements
matching that AS in their AS-PATH. Once these policies are applied,
the peering session will be re-established.
For further information on Cisco IOS XR RPL consult the document
"Implementing Routing Policy on Cisco IOS XR Software" at the
following link:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios_xr_sw/iosxr_r3.0/routing/configuration/guide/rc3rpl.html#wp1118699.
For further information on Cisco IOS route maps with BGP, consult
the document "Cisco IOS BGP Configuration Guide, Release 12.4T" at
the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_2sr/12_2srb/feature/guide/tbgp_c.html.
* Cisco IOS XR BGP process will crash when sending a long length BGP
update message While the long length BGP update message can be
caused by any number of attributes, then most common would be the
AS Path. Limiting the number of AS numbers in the AS Path Attribute
should mitigate this vulnerability. The following shows an example
of filtering on AS paths within Cisco IOS XR Software:
route-policy maxas-limit
# Check number of AS Numbers in AS Path attribute.
# If greater than 100 drop the update.
if as-path length ge 100 then
drop
endif
end-policy
router bgp 65533
neighbor 192.168.0.1
remote-as 65534
address-family ipv4 unicast
policy maxas-limit in
policy maxas-limit out
For further information on Cisco IOS XR RPL consult the document
"Implementing Routing Policy on Cisco IOS XR Software" at the
following link:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios_xr_sw/iosxr_r3.0/routing/configuration/guide/rc3rpl.html#wp1118699.
* Cisco IOS XR BGP process will crash when constructing a BGP update
with a large number of AS prepends There is no workaround for this
vulnerability, other than reducing the number of AS path prepends
configured within Cisco IOS XR.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco will be releasing free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult
their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set
compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature
sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing
or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be
bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software
upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such
as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix
is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is
deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a
free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested
through the TAC.
Refer to
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
On August 17, 2009 around 16:30-17:00 UTC several ISP's began
experiencing connectivity issues as BGP sessions were being repeatedly
reset, which corresponds to the vulnerability "Cisco IOS XR will reset
a BGP peering session when receiving a specific invalid BGP update"
disclosed in this advisory. Cisco TAC was engaged with a number of
customers all seeing similar issues. Stability came a few hours
afterward as workarounds were applied. At this time, it is not believed
that the connectivity issues were the result of malicious activity.
The other two BGP process crash vulnerabilities were discovered by Cisco
during internal negative testing.
Status of this Notice: INTERIM
==============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY
ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. CISCO EXPECTS TO UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AS NEW
INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,
and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090818-bgp.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-bulletins@lists.first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Added currently available SMUs |
| 2.1 | 2009-August-20 | to Software Table and |
| | | separated CVSS tables. |
|----------+----------------+--------------------------------|
| Revision | 2009-August-20 | Major update to include all |
| 2.0 | | bugs in Umbrella fix. |
|----------+----------------+--------------------------------|
| Revision | 2009-August-18 | Initial public release. |
| 1.0 | | |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities
in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security
incidents, and registering to receive security information
from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding
Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 2008-2009 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: Aug 20, 2009 Document ID: 110825
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