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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2008.0444 -- [Appliance]
Motorola Surfboard cable modem cross-site request forgery vulnerability
30 April 2008
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
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Product: Motorola Surfboard cable mode
Publisher: US-CERT
Operating System: Network Appliance
Impact: Cross-site Request Forgery
Access: Remote/Unauthenticated
CVE Names: CVE-2008-2002
Original Bulletin: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/643049
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Vulnerability Note VU#643049
Motorola Surfboard cable modem cross-site request forgery vulnerability
Overview
Motorola Surfboard cable modems may contain a cross-site request forgery
vulnerability that allows an attacker to cause an affected modem to reboot or
reload its configuration.
I. Description
Cable modems are designed to deliver broadband Internet access via unused
bandwidth on a cable television network. Some models of Motorola Surfboard cable
modems have a web interface that can be used to view log files, check signal
levels, restart the modem, and reload the modem's configuration. This web
interface listens on a private (RFC 1918) IP address, and can not be accessed
via the Internet. Users conntected to the modem's LAN interface access the
interface via a web browser.
Because the interface uses no authentication, other than binding to a private
IP address, the Motorola Surfboard may be vulnerable to various cross-site
request forgery (XSRF) vulnerabilities. Note that to exploit these
vulnerabilities, an attacker would need to convince a user to visit a
specially crafted web page or open an HTML formatted email.
II. Impact
A remote, unauthenticated attacker may be able to take any action that an
authorized user can including restarting the cable modem, or forcing it to
reload its configuration file. While a cable modem is rebooting systems that
rely on the affected modem will have limited ability to access the Internet.
III. Solution
We are currently unaware of a practical solution to this problem.
Restrict access
Restricting access to the Surfboard's web interface by using proxy filtering
rules, router access control lists or firewall rules will mitigate this
vulnerability. To effectively block access, the rules must prevent users on
the LAN side of the cable modem from connecting to the web interface's IP
address (usually 192.168.100.1).
Systems Affected
Vendor Status Date Updated
Motorola, Inc. Vulnerable 29-Apr-2008
References
http://www.rooksecurity.com/blog/?p=4
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1918
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSRF
http://www.visolve.com/squid/squid24s1/access_controls.php
Credit
Thanks to the Rook Security blog for information that was used in this report.
This document was written by Ryan Giobbi.
Other Information
Date Public 17/04/2008
Date First Published 29/04/2008 14:10:15
Date Last Updated 29/04/2008
CERT Advisory
CVE Name
US-CERT Technical Alerts
Metric 13.50
Document Revision 15
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