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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-2002.460 -- Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-047 Cumulative Patch for Internet Explorer (Q323759) 23 August 2002 =========================================================================== AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary --------------------------------- Product: Internet Explorer 5.01 Internet Explorer 5.5 Internet Explorer 6.0 Vendor: Microsoft Operating System: Windows Impact: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands Access Privileged Data Reduced Security Access Required: Remote Ref: ESB-2002.459 ESB-2002.276 ESB-2002.234 ESB-2002.158 Comment: Microsoft's PGP signature is bad for this advisory, but the content correlates with: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-047.asp - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - - ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Title: Cumulative Patch for Internet Explorer (Q323759) Date: 22 August 2002 Software: Internet Explorer Impact: Six new vulnerabilities, the most serious of which could enable an attacker to execute commands on a user's system. Max Risk: Critical Bulletin: MS02-047 Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-047.asp. - - ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Issue: ====== This is a cumulative patch that includes the functionality of all previously released patches for IE 5.01, 5.5 and 6.0. In addition, it eliminates the following six newly discovered vulnerabilities: - A buffer overrun vulnerability affecting the Gopher protocol handler. This vulnerability was originally discussed in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-027, which provided workaround instructions while the patch provided here was being completed. - A buffer overrun vulnerability affecting an ActiveX control used to display specially formatted text. The control contains a buffer overrun vulnerability that could enable an attacker to run code on a user?s system in the context of the user. - A vulnerability involving how Internet Explorer handles an HTML directive that displays XML data. By design, the directive should only allow XML data from the web site itself to be displayed. However, it does not correctly check for the case where a referenced XML data source is in fact redirected to a data source in a different domain. This flaw could enable an attacker?s web page to open an XML-based files residing a remote system within a browser window that the site could read, thereby enabling the attacker to read contents from websites that users had access to but the attacker was not able to navigate to. - A vulnerability involving how Internet Explorer represents the origin of a file in the File Download Dialogue box. This flaw could enable an attacker to misrepresent the source of a file offered for download in an attempt to fool users into accepting a file download from an untrusted source believing it to be coming from a trusted source. - A Cross Domain verification vulnerability that occurs because of improper domain checking in conjunction with the Object tag. As a result, the vulnerability could enable a malicious web site operator to access data across different domains, for example one in a web site?s domain and the other on the user?s local file system and then pass information from the latter to the former. This could enable the web site operator to read, but not change, any file on the user?s local computer that could be viewed n a browser window. In addition, this can also enable an attacker to invoke, but not pass parameters to, an executable on the local system, much like the "Local Executable Invocation via Object tag" vulnerability discussed in MS02-015. - A newly reported variant of the "Cross-Site Scripting in Local HTML Resource" vulnerability originally discussed in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-023. Like the original vulnerability, this variant could enable an attacker to create a web page that, when opened, would run in the Local Computer zone, allowing it to run with fewer restrictions than it would in the Internet Zone. In addition, the patch sets the Kill Bit on the MSN Chat ActiveX control discussed in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-022 as well as the TSAC ActiveX control discussed in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-046. This has been done to ensure that vulnerable controls cannot be introduced onto users? systems. Customers who use the MSN Chat control should ensure that they have applied the updated version of the control discussed in MS02-022 and customers who use the TSAC control should ensure that they have applied the updated version of the control discussed in MS02-046 . Mitigating Factors: ==================== Buffer Overrun in Gopher Protocol Handler: - The vulnerability would provide the attacker with user?s own privileges on the system. Customers who run with fewer than full privileges on the system would therefore be at lower risk. Buffer Overrun in Legacy Text Formatting ActiveX Control: - The vulnerable ActiveX control is not installed by default as part of a current version of IE. Upon learning of the vulnerability, Microsoft removed the download from its site to minimize the likelihood that users would have the control on their systems. - The vulnerability would provide the attacker with the user?s own privileges on the system. Customers who run with fewer than full privileges on the system would therefore be at lower risk. - Customers who use Outlook Express 6.0 or Outlook 2002 (or Outlook 98 or 2000 in conjunction with the Outlook Email Security Update) would by default by protected against email-borne attacks via this vulnerability unless they specifically clicked a link within the email message. XML File Reading via Redirect: - The vulnerability only provides a capability to read XML-based files that they know the complete path to. - The vulnerability could not be used to add, change or delete files. - Customers who use Outlook Express 6.0 or Outlook 2002 (or Outlook 98 or 2000 in conjunction with the Outlook Email Security Update) would by default by protected against email-borne attacks via this vulnerability. File Origin spoofing: - The vulnerability does not give an attacker the means to place or run executables directly on the system: user interaction is required in a successful attack. Cross Domain Verification in Object Tag: - The vulnerability would not enable the attacker to pass any parameters to an executable program. Microsoft is not aware of any programs installed by default in any version of Windows that, when called with no parameters, could be used to compromise the system. - An attacker could only invoke a file on the victim?s local machine. The vulnerability could not be used to execute a program on a remote share or web site. - The vulnerability would not provide any way for an attacker to put a program of his choice onto another user?s system. - An attacker would need to know the name and location of any file on the system to successfully invoke it. - The vulnerability could only be used to view or invoke files. It could not be used to create, delete, or modify them. - The vulnerability would only allow an attacker to read files that can be rendered in a browser window, such as image files, HTML files and ext files. Other file types, such as binary files, executable files, Word documents, and so forth, could not be read. - Outlook 98 and 2000 (after installing the Outlook Email Security Update), Outlook 2002, and Outlook Express 6 all open HTML mail in the Restricted Sites Zone. As a result, customers using these products would not be at risk from email-borne attacks. Variant of Cross-Site Scripting in Local HTML Resource: - Outlook 98 and 2000 (after installing the Outlook Email Security Update), Outlook 2002, and Outlook Express 6 all open HTML mail in the Restricted Sites Zone. As a result, customers using these products would not be at risk from automated email-borne attacks. However, these customers can still be attacked if they choose to click on a hyperlink in a malicious HTML email. - Customers using Outlook 2002 SP1 who have enabled the "Read as Plain Text" feature would be immune from the HTML email attack. This is because this feature disables all HTML elements, including scripting, from mail when it is displayed. - Any limitations on the rights of the user's account would also limit the actions of the attacker's script. - Customers who exercise caution in what web sites they visit or who place unknown or untrusted sites in the Restricted Sites zone can potentially protect themselves from attempts to exploit this issue on the web. Aggregate Severity of all issues included in this patch (including issues addressed in previously released patches): ============ - Internet systems: Critical - Intranet systems: Critical - Client systems: Critical Patch Availability: =================== - A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read the Security Bulletin at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms02-047.asp for information on obtaining this patch. Acknowledgment: =============== - GreyMagic Software (http://sec.greymagic.com/news/) for reporting the XML File Reading via Redirect vulnerability. - Mark Litchfield of Next Generation Security Software Ltd. (http://www.nextgenss.com/) for reporting the Buffer Overrun in Legacy Text Formatting ActiveX Control vulnerability. - Jouko Pynnonen of Oy Online Solutions Ltd for reporting the File Origin Spoofing vulnerability. - - --------------------------------------------------------------------- THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 7.1 iQEVAwUBPWVeQI0ZSRQxA/UrAQHcxQgAqMsOM44v9lMf0znB4JryPY0ofSe7/TrC zLnutdNHuog3DKH4Ie05PU9oBmOzgzxjWhIGYeW6igSB2eUintlPtHRnQYaPcH2U zrOuQHqCTHzmzd++lXnugxwL/qTLf0pp8HyBKsLnxcVXoQn4s4QwDItK8L3V2lFk LVJfMGHytvKkSAKAOMI52Kv/AmM6kGi20CernLrUNfJPOSAaSJJO+mW5/qvm93Pm 29zM4AIF/yVNO+b8PJ7GzRtsz40MucuL4pUo62V/db1TQ7AJaqyaVCr+fDKJQCCI FNbbD0NoILJ8tempoHyQdTBlc97SgSB3YmFvsFWG4n8p0GTzXisPPA== =c7fr - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. 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Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/advisories.html If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact AusCERT or your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams). Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for member emergencies only. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv Comment: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/AUSCERT_PGP.key iQCVAwUBPWY49Sh9+71yA2DNAQEbgAP+JW0iFdf1uDsgBXwrtYKzBgiGdZNS/p1E iKUUmnDkEVfUcaeB5rqwoo9XtnhZxRBcDmYW8mEztVTnrMUf7uJvX2V+BajPl/5i Wxg8tYP31bEVXu71hYz6gMmb+qzb2G84pdOL6ujz9N4WYPOsj0fWfVnNy3+/6nFM dmnzp2LWXdY= =cgo8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----