SQL Query Method Enables Cached Administrator Connection to be Reused

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===========================================================================
             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

           ESB-2001.237 -- Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-032
   SQL Query Method Enables Cached Administrator Connection to be Reused
                               19 June 2001

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        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:                Microsoft SQL Server 7.0
                        Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Gold
Vendor:                 Microsoft
Impact:                 Increased Privileges
Access Required:        Existing Account

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Title:      SQL Query Method Enables Cached Administrator Connection
            to be Reused
Date:       12 June 2001
Software:   Microsoft SQL Server 2000 and SQL Server 7.0
Impact:     Privilege elevation
Bulletin:   MS01-032

Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at: 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-032.asp.
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Issue:
======
When a client connection to a SQL Server is terminated, it remains
cached for a short period  of time for performance reasons. One SQL
query method contains a flaw that has the effect of  making it
possible for one user's query to reuse a cached connection that
belonged to the sa  account.

Exploiting this vulnerability would enable an attacker to execute the
query using the  administrator's security context. This would give
her the ability to take any desired action  on the database;
moreover, it would give her the ability to run extended stored
procedures,  thereby giving her the opportunity to run code of her
choice and assume
de facto control of the server itself. 

Mitigating Factors:
====================
 - The vulnerability only affects servers configured to use Mixed
Mode.
   Microsoft strongly recommends against using Mixed Mode, and
   recommends using Windows Authentication mode instead. Customers
who
   have configured their servers to use Windows Authentication mode
   are not affected by this vulnerability. 
 - Terminated connections are only cached for a short period. The
   attacker would need to time her attack in order to occur during
the
   period when an administrator's connection was in the cache. 
 - The query method at issue here can only be executed by an
   authenticated user. Not only would this limit the number of users
   who could exploit the vulnerability, it also would allow the
action
   to be audited.

Patch Availability:
===================
 - A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read the 
   Security Bulletin
   http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms01-032.asp
   for information on obtaining this patch.

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SO THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY.


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