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===========================================================================
             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

             ESB-2001.223 -- NetBSD Security Advisory 2001-006
           Denial of service using bogus fragmented IPv4 packets
                                31 May 2001

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Vendor:                 NetBSD
Operating System:       NetBSD-current prior to April 17, 2001
                        NetBSD 1.5.x pror to April 24, 2001
                        NetBSD 1.4.x
Impact:                 Denial of Service
Access Required:        Remote

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                 NetBSD Security Advisory 2001-006
                 =================================

Topic:		Denial of service using bogus fragmented IPv4 packets
Version:	NetBSD 1.4, 1.5, -current
Severity:       Network-connected systems can be crashed remotely
Fixed:		NetBSD-current:    April 17, 2001 (1.5U)
		NetBSD-1.5 branch: April 24, 2001 (1.5.1 will include the fix)
		NetBSD-1.4 branch: (not yet available)

Abstract
========

Malicious parties may be able to prevent a NetBSD node from
communicating with other nodes by transmitting a lot of bogus
fragmented IPv4 packets.

For the attack to be effective, the attacker needs to have good
network connectivity to the victim node (like logged onto the victim
machine itself, connected by a fat LAN, or whatever).

There are exploits for this problem available on the Internet.
However, the attack is timing dependent and the attack is not
always successful.


Technical Details
=================

In the IPv4 input path (sys/netinet/ip_input.c), there's code to
reassemble fragmented IPv4 datagrams.  Datagram fragments destined to
the node will be queued for 30 seconds, to allow fragmented datagrams to
be reassembled.

Until recently, there was no upper limit in the number of reassembly
queues.  Therefore, a malicious party may be able to transmit a
lot of bogus fragmented packets (with different IPv4 identification
field - ip_id), and may be able to put the target machine into mbuf
starvation state.

Recently we introduced a new sysctl(3) - net.inet.ip.maxfragpackets.
With this, you can configure an upper limit to the number of reassembly
queues.  If you want the old behavior (no limit), you can set the
value to a negative value.


Solutions and Workarounds
=========================

  (1) Upgrade the system from newer sources or binaries:

	Compile and install a kernel which has the sysctl(3) variable
	net.inet.ip.maxfragpackets in the sysctl MIB.  With this
	variable, you can limit the number of IPv4 fragment reassembly
	queues kept on the system.  The value needs to be picked
	carefully, considering the role of the node (i.e. if the
	node is a busy web server, you may want to set the value
	higher).  Note that, however, even with the configuration
	knob, it is possible for attackers to transmit a lot of
	bogus IPv4 fragmented packets, and prevent other fragmented
	IPv4 traffic from getting reassembled.  Unfragmented IPv4
	communication will be kept safe by the variable.

	Systems running NetBSD-current dated from before April 17,
	2001 should be upgraded to NetBSD-current dated April 17,
	2001 or later.

	Systems running NetBSD 1.5.x systems dated from before
	April 24, 2001 should be upgraded to NetBSD 1.5.x dated
	April 24, 2001 or later.
	NetBSD 1.5.1 will ship with the fix.

	There is no fix to 1.4.x available at this time.

  (2) Increase the kernel option NMBCLUSTERS

	Use an appropriate value for NMBCLUSTERS for the node.
	Normally, it is the cluster mbufs which go into a starvation
	state with this attack.  By setting NMBCLUSTERS to a higher
	value, you may be able to prevent the mbuf memory pool from
	starving.

	Note that a couple of NetBSD device drivers pre-allocate
	cluster mbufs within the driver, for performance reasons
	and DMA management reasons.  For example, the fxp driver
	pre-allocates 64 cluster mbufs per interface.  If you
	are using such network cards, you will want to raise
	NMBCLUSTERS even more.


Thanks To
=========

James Thomas for bringing this problem to our attention, and
Jun-ichiro Hagino for providing a fix for the problem.


Revision History
================

        2001-05-29 - Initial Release

More Information
================

An up-to-date PGP signed copy of this release will be maintained at
  ftp://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2001-006.txt.asc

Information about NetBSD and NetBSD security can be found at
http://www.NetBSD.ORG/ and http://www.NetBSD.ORG/Security/.


Copyright 2001, The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.  All Rights Reserved.

$NetBSD: NetBSD-SA2001-006.txt,v 1.7 2001/05/29 05:58:41 lukem Exp $
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