Published:
28 May 1998
Protect yourself against future threats.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- =========================================================================== AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution ESB-98.081 -- SGI Security Advisory 19980503-01-I tcpmux Port Scanning and Root Compromises 29 May 1998 =========================================================================== Silicon Graphics Inc. has released the following advisory concerning tcpmux/port 1 scanning and root compromises on IRIX based systems. It is believed that a new methodology is being used to identify SGI IRIX based systems on the Internet, in order to target them for potential attack and compromise. This bulletin describes measures to prevent exposure to this new methodology. The following security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As AusCERT did not write this document, AusCERT has had no control over its content. As such, the decision to use any or all of this information is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be done so in accordance with site policies and procedures. NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It will not be updated when the original bulletin is. If downloading at a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved from the original authors to ensure that the information is still current. Contact information for SGI is included in the Security Bulletin below. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact them directly. Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/Information/advisories.html If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact AusCERT or your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams). Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for emergencies. - ------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT----------------------- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: tcpmux Port Scanning and Root Compromises Number: 19980503-01-I Date: May 28, 1998 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics has been in communication with the CERT Coordination Center in regards to observed increases in tcpmux/port 1 scanning and root compromises on IRIX based systems. Upon examining this trend, Silicon Graphics and the CERT Coordination Center have theorized that a new methodology is currently being used to identify the continually increasing number of Silicon Graphics IRIX based systems on the Internet, in order to then target them for potential attack and compromise. - - ----------------------- - - --- Issue Specifics --- - - ----------------------- Silicon Graphics believes at this time that no new IRIX vulnerability has been found. However, this new methodology is based upon an understanding of the default IRIX environment and could lead to a system compromise. The tcpmux protocol is used by many computing platforms. By default, Silicon Graphics based IRIX systems have the tcpmux protocol activated for use on port 1. Utilizing this fact, widespread scanning of networks for systems that respond to probes of port 1 could be used to obtain a list of systems that might be running IRIX. Again, at this time, there is no known vulnerability in the tcpmux protocol or the services it provides and responding to a probe of port 1 is normal behavior for the tcpmux protocol. Using a scan generated list, the next component of the methodology would be to attempt to exploit IRIX-specific security problems. This may include attempting to log into well known accounts that are unpassworded by default and upon successfully finding any open default account, attempting security exploits requiring local account access. These accounts are shipped unpassworded by default to foster a "collaborative" environment and are documented in SGI system documentation and also in SGI security advisory 19951002. Additionally, the scan generated list could be used to target systems for remote exploits, which do not require local account access. In both local and remote cases, a system compromise is possible if security patches have not been installed and/or the system is misconfigured. - - ---------------- - - --- Solution --- - - ---------------- At this time, Silicon Graphics does not believe any new vulnerability exists in regards to this issue and therefore has no patches to offer. All current security patches and information can be found at: http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html ftp://sgigate.sgi.com/patches ftp://sgigate.sgi.com/security Silicon Graphics believes the best measures for preventing exposure to this new methodology is to 1) ensure all accounts have good passwords or are disabled, and 2) that all current security patches are installed. Furthermore, keeping current with new security information and system monitoring for intrusions would be considered prudent. If your IRIX machine currently has unpassworded accounts, it would be prudent to inspect your system for signs of intrusion. Please refer to the "Recovering from an Incident" section at the CERT Coordination Center website (www.cert.org). - - ------------------------ - - --- Acknowledgments --- - - ------------------------ Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the CERT Coordination Center for their assistance in this matter. - - ----------------------------------------------------------- - - --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - - ----------------------------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress> end ^d In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNW38erQ4cFApAP75AQGBhgP8Cp6UXtNAuN2L/052n09TNdwoAJykstoS uk/JAQXjp5rgYPb3B281OE4fL06Um/ZCeDvCLYzhpxn6E3jWRm273CFA9oNlID3R Nfvh1KEVZ3QhU0DtVfRoQeHaZ59NfLPftgnBecwFls36p79O+pP+uS0T3MkrKELE A+C0hS8OB44= =kuZ7 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - -------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT------------------------ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv Comment: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/AUSCERT_PGP.key iQCVAwUBNW6laCh9+71yA2DNAQHKmwP/a2dT2Qr+HtgVz76lQU+UzWLXuOCLVE05 a835v4Cwfc2Pf2YmLnHYoT8ifox6m2jbxm/rJ06o7wqM240ZpN/aBt1LWypURVQY NJiStDheqCdHCQVnm1PJRNzC/Ti3qeWzXR+BO0EfUu+NOA269wCWb3ekfcz6wnTA ec9SLnZST+M= =jvP8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----