ESB-2018.2286 - [Appliance] Medtronic MiniMed 508 Insulin Pump: Multiple vulnerabilities 2018-08-08

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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2018.2286
        Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified in Medtronic
                         MiniMed 508 Insulin Pump
                               8 August 2018

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        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           Medtronic MiniMed 508 Insulin Pump
Publisher:         ICS-CERT
Operating System:  Network Appliance
Impact/Access:     Provide Misleading Information -- Remote/Unauthenticated      
                   Access Confidential Data       -- Remote with User Interaction
Resolution:        Mitigation
CVE Names:         CVE-2018-14781 CVE-2018-10634 

Original Bulletin: 
   https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSMA-18-219-02

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Advisory (ICSMA-18-219-02)

Medtronic MiniMed 508 Insulin Pump

Original release date: August 07, 2018

Legal Notice

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referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this product
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CVSS v3 5.3

Vendor: Medtronic

Equipment: MiniMed 508 Insulin Pump

Vulnerabilities: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information, 
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay

2. RISK EVALUATION

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to 
replay captured wireless communications and cause an insulin (bolus) delivery.
This is only possible when non-default options are configured. Additionally, 
the pump will annunciate this by providing a physical alert, and the user has
the capability to suspend the bolus delivery.

3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

The following supported Medtronic products are affected:

MMT - 508 MiniMed insulin pump,

MMT - 522 / MMT - 722 Paradigm REAL-TIME,

MMT - 523 / MMT - 723 Paradigm Revel,

MMT - 523K / MMT - 723K Paradigm Revel, and

MMT - 551 / MMT - 751 MiniMed 530G

3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

3.2.1 CLEARTEXT TRANSMISSION OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION CWE-319

Communications between the pump and wireless accessories are transmitted in 
cleartext. A sufficiently skilled attacker could capture these transmissions 
and extract sensitive information, such as device serial numbers.

CVE-2018-10634 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score 
of 4.8 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is 
(AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).

3.2.2 AUTHENTICATION BYPASS BY CAPTURE-REPLAY CWE-294

The models identified above, when paired with a remote controller and having 
the easy bolus and remote bolus options enabled (non-default), are vulnerable
to a capture-replay attack. An attacker can capture the wireless transmissions
between the remote controller and the pump and replay them to cause an insulin
(bolus) delivery.

CVE-2018-14781 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score 
of 5.3 has been assigned; the CVSS vector string is 
(AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N).

3.3 BACKGROUND

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Healthcare and Public Health

COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: Worldwide

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: Ireland

3.4 RESEARCHER

Billy Rios, Jesse Young, and Jonathan Butts of Whitescope LLC reported these 
vulnerabilities to NCCIC.

4. MITIGATIONS

Medtronic will not be developing a product update to address these 
vulnerabilities. If a user has never programmed or used a remote controller, 
they are not susceptible to this attack. Additionally, if the user disables 
the remote option or turns off the easy bolus option in their pump, they are 
not susceptible to this attack.

The easy bolus and remote options are turned off in the pump by default. In 
cases where users want to continue to use the convenience of the remote 
controller, as a precaution to this attack, Medtronic recommends the easy 
bolus is turned off when they are not intending to use remote bolus option; 
and when the easy bolus option is turned on, be attentive to pump alerts.

Medtronic has released additional patient focused information, at the 
following location:

https://www.medtronic.com/security

Additionally, Medtronic will be sending a letter to all the patients who have
acquired these remote controllers over the past four years to inform them 
about the security risks and compensating controls.

NCCIC recommends that users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of 
exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Specifically, users should:

Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and 
ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet.

Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and 
isolate them from the business network.

NCCIC reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk 
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

NCCIC also provides a section for control systems security recommended 
practices on the ICS-CERT web page. Several recommended practices are 
available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control 
Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly 
available on the ICS-CERT website in the Technical Information Paper, 
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation 
Strategies.

Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their 
established internal procedures and report their findings to NCCIC for 
tracking and correlation against other incidents.

No known public exploits specifically target these vulnerabilities. These 
vulnerabilities are not exploitable remotely. High skill level is needed to 
exploit.

Contact Information

For any questions related to this report, please contact the NCCIC at:

Email: NCCICCUSTOMERSERVICE@hq.dhs.gov

Toll Free: 1-888-282-0870

For industrial control systems cybersecurity information: 
http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov

or incident reporting: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Report-Incident?

The NCCIC continuously strives to improve its products and services. You can 
help by choosing one of the links below to provide feedback about this 
product.

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