ESB-2018.1531 - [Appliance] N'Vision Clinician Programmer: Access confidential data - Console/physical 2018-05-18

Printable version
PGP/GPG verifiable version

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

===========================================================================
             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2018.1531
        PII not encrypted at rest in N'Vision Clinician Programmer
                                18 May 2018

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           N'Vision Clinician Programmer
Publisher:         ICS-CERT
Operating System:  Network Appliance
Impact/Access:     Access Confidential Data -- Console/Physical
Resolution:        Mitigation

Original Bulletin: 
   https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSMA-18-137-01

- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

Advisory (ICSMA-18-137-01)

Medtronic N'Vision Clinician Programmer

Original release date: May 17, 2018

Legal Notice

All information products included in http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov are
provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any
information contained within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or
service, referenced in this product or otherwise. Further dissemination of this
product is governed by the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) marking in the header.
For more information about TLP, see http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/.

- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  * CVSS v3 4.6
  * ATTENTION: Low skill level to exploit
  * Vendor: Medtronic
  * Equipment: N'Vision Clinician Programmer
  * Vulnerability: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data

2. RISK EVALUATION

As part of the normal functionality of this device, the N'Vision Clinician
Programmer may store Personal Health Information (PHI) or Personal Identifying
Information (PII). Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow an
attacker with physical access to an 8870 N'Vision Compact Flash card to access
this PHI or PII.

3. TECHNICAL DETAILS

3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS

The N'Vision Clinician Programmer is a small, portable device that offers a
single programming platform for Medtronic Neurological implantable therapy
devices. The following products are affected:

  * 8840 N'Vision Clinician Programmer, all versions, and
  * 8870 N'Vision removable Application Card, all versions.

3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW

3.2.1   MISSING ENCRYPTION OF SENSITIVE DATA CWE-311

The affected product does not encrypt the following sensitive information while
at rest:

  * PII ? Personally Identifiable Information. Some combination of personal
    data that enables the unique identification of an individual. PII is
    defined as ?information that can be used to distinguish or trace an
    individual?s identity, either alone or when combined with other personal or
    identifying information that is linked or linkable to a specific
    individual.?
  * PHI ? Protected Health Information. Some combination of PII and associated
    health related data.

CVE-2018-8849 has been assigned to this vulnerability. A CVSS v3 base score of
4.6 has been calculated; the CVSS vector string is (AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H
/I:N/A:N).

3.3 BACKGROUND

  * Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Healthcare and Public Health
  * Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
  * Company Headquarters Location: Dublin, Ireland

3.4 RESEARCHER

Billy Rios of Whitescope LLC reported this vulnerability to NCCIC.

4. MITIGATIONS

Medtronic has not developed a product update to address the vulnerability, but
is reinforcing security reminders within this advisory to help reduce the risk
associated with the vulnerability

The 8870 Therapy Application card stores PHI and PII as part of its normal
operating procedure and should be handled, managed and secured in a manner
consistent with the applicable laws for patient data privacy.

Medtronic recommends users take additional defensive measures to minimize the
risk of exploitation of this vulnerability. Specifically, hospitals and
clinicians should:

  * Maintain strict physical control of the 8870 application card.
  * Use only legitimately obtained 8870 cards and not cards provided by any
    third party as firmware and system updates are provided directly by
    Medtronic using new 8870 application cards.
  * 8840 Programmers and 8870 Therapy Application compact flash cards are the
    property of Medtronic and should be returned to Medtronic when no longer in
    use. If that is not an option, you should securely dispose of them.

Medtronic has released additional patient focused information, at the following
location:

https://www.medtronic.com/security

NCCIC recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of
exploitation of this vulnerability. Specifically, users should:

  * Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems,
    and ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet.
  * Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls, and
    isolate them from the business network.

NCCIC reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk
assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.

NCCIC also provides a section for control systems security recommended
practices on the ICS-CERT web page. Several recommended practices are available
for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems
Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.

Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available
on the ICS-CERT website in the Technical Information Paper,
ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation
Strategies.

Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their
established internal procedures and report their findings to NCCIC for tracking
and correlation against other incidents.

No known public exploits specifically target this vulnerability. This
vulnerability is not exploitable remotely.


Contact Information

For any questions related to this report, please contact the NCCIC at:

Email: NCCICCUSTOMERSERVICE@hq.dhs.gov
Toll Free: 1-888-282-0870

For industrial control systems cybersecurity information:  http://
ics-cert.us-cert.gov 
or incident reporting:  https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Report-Incident?

- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.

NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members.  As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.

NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin.  It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made.  If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current.

Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above.  If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.

Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:

        https://www.auscert.org.au/bulletins/

===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072

Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile:      (07) 3365 7031
Telephone:      (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
                AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
                which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
                On call after hours for member emergencies only.
===========================================================================
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967
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=yYdz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

« Back to bulletins