ESB-2017.1638 - [Win][UNIX/Linux] BIND: Multiple vulnerabilities 2017-06-30

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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2017.1638
CVE-2017-3142: An error in TSIG authentication can permit unauthorized zone
                transfers and unauthorized dynamic updates
                               30 June 2017

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:          BIND
Publisher:        ISC
Operating System: UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX)
                  Windows
Impact/Access:    Provide Misleading Information -- Remote/Unauthenticated
                  Access Confidential Data       -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution:       Mitigation
CVE Names:        CVE-2017-3143 CVE-2017-3142 

Comment: This bulletin contains two (2) ISC security advisories.
         
         This advisory references vulnerabilities in products which run on 
         platforms other than ISC. It is recommended that administrators 
         running BIND check for an updated version of the software for their
         operating system.

- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

CVE:                 CVE-2017-3142
Document Version:    2.0
Posting date:        29 June 2017
Program Impacted:    BIND
Versions affected:   9.4.0 -> 9.8.8, 9.9.0 -> 9.9.10-P1, 9.10.0 ->
9.10.5-P1,
                     9.11.0 -> 9.11.1-P1, 9.9.3-S1 -> 9.9.10-S2,
                     9.10.5-S1 -> 9.10.5-S2
Severity:            Medium
Exploitable:         Remotely

Description:

   An attacker who is able to send and receive messages to an
   authoritative DNS server and who has knowledge of a valid TSIG
   key name may be able to circumvent TSIG authentication of AXFR
   requests via a carefully constructed request packet.  A server
   that relies solely on TSIG keys for protection with no other ACL
   protection could be manipulated into:

   -  providing an AXFR of a zone to an unauthorized recipient
   -  accepting bogus NOTIFY packets

Impact:

    An unauthorized AXFR (full zone transfer) permits an attacker
    to view the entire contents of a zone.  Protection of zone
    contents is often a commercial or business requirement.

    If accepted, a NOTIFY sets the zone refresh interval to 'now'.
    If there is not already a refresh cycle in progress then named
    will initiate one by asking for the SOA RR from its list of
    masters.  If there is already a refresh cycle in progress, then
    named will queue the new refresh request.  If there is already
    a queued refresh request, the new NOTIFY will be discarded.
    Bogus notifications can't be used to force a zone transfer from
    a malicious server, but could trigger a high rate of zone refresh
    cycles.

CVSS Score:          5.3
CVSS Vector:         CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

For more information on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System and
to obtain your specific environmental score please visit:
https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Workarounds:

   The effects of this vulnerability can be mitigated by using
   Access Control Lists (ACLs) that require both address range
   validation and use of TSIG authentication in conjunction.  For
   information on how to configure this type of compound authentication
   control, please see:


https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00723/0/Using-Access-Control-Lists-ACLs-with-both-addresses-and-keys.html.

   (Note that this technique may not be effective against bogus
   NOTIFY packets if an attacker is able to reach the target DNS
   server whilst using a spoofed sending address).

Active exploits:

   No known active exploits but a similar issue was announced
   publicly on 23 June 2017 by another DNS server software provider.

Solution:

   Upgrade to the patched release most closely related to your
   current version of BIND. These can all be downloaded from
   http://www.isc.org/downloads.

   -  BIND 9 version 9.9.10-P2
   -  BIND 9 version 9.10.5-P2
   -  BIND 9 version 9.11.1-P2

   BIND Supported Preview Edition is a special feature preview
   branch of BIND provided to eligible ISC support customers.

   -  BIND 9 version 9.9.10-S3
   -  BIND 9 version 9.10.5-S3

Acknowledgements:

   ISC would like to thank Clément Berthaux from Synacktiv for
   reporting this issue.

Document Revision History:

   1.0 Advance Notification 26 June 2017
   1.1 Correct Notify to NOTIFY; Update phrasing in Workarounds section;
       Update phrasing in Description; Correct date of similar public
       announcement, 29 June 2017
   2.0 Public disclosure 29 June 2017

Related Documents:

   See our BIND9 Security Vulnerability Matrix at
   https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00913 for a complete listing of
   Security Vulnerabilities and versions affected.

If you'd like more information on ISC Subscription Support and
Advance Security Notifications, please visit http://www.isc.org/support/.

Do you still have questions?  Questions regarding this advisory
should go to security-officer@isc.org.  To report a new issue,
please encrypt your message using security-officer@isc.org's PGP
key which can be found here:

  https://www.isc.org/downloads/software-support-policy/openpgp-key/.

If you are unable to use encrypted email, you may also report new
issues at: https://www.isc.org/community/report-bug/.

Note:

   ISC patches only currently supported versions. When possible we
   indicate EOL versions affected.  (For current information on
   which versions are actively supported, please see
   http://www.isc.org/downloads/).

ISC Security Vulnerability Disclosure Policy:

   Details of our current security advisory policy and practice can
   be found here: https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00861

This Knowledge Base article https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01504 is
the complete and official security advisory document.

Legal Disclaimer:

   Internet Systems Consortium (ISC) is providing this notice on
   an "AS IS" basis. No warranty or guarantee of any kind is expressed
   in this notice and none should be implied. ISC expressly excludes
   and disclaims any warranties regarding this notice or materials
   referred to in this notice, including, without limitation, any
   implied warranty of merchantability, fitness for a particular
   purpose, absence of hidden defects, or of non-infringement. Your
   use or reliance on this notice or materials referred to in this
   notice is at your own risk. ISC may change this notice at any
   time.  A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this
   document that omits the document URL is an uncontrolled copy.
   Uncontrolled copies may lack important information, be out of
   date, or contain factual errors.

(c) 2001-2017 Internet Systems Consortium
_______________________________________________

CVE:                 CVE-2017-3143
Document Version:    2.0
Posting date:        29 June 2017
Program Impacted:    BIND
Versions affected:   9.4.0 -> 9.8.8, 9.9.0 -> 9.9.10-P1, 9.10.0 ->
9.10.5-P1,
                     9.11.0 -> 9.11.1-P1, 9.9.3-S1 -> 9.9.10-S2,
                     9.10.5-S1 -> 9.10.5-S2
Severity:            High
Exploitable:         Remotely

Description:

    An attacker who is able to send and receive messages to an
    authoritative DNS server and who has knowledge of a valid TSIG
    key name for the zone and service being targeted may be able
    to manipulate BIND into accepting an unauthorized dynamic update.

Impact:

    A server that relies solely on TSIG keys with no other address-based
    ACL protection could be vulnerable to malicious zone content
    manipulation using this technique.

CVSS Score:          7.5
CVSS Vector:         CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

For more information on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System and
to obtain your specific environmental score please visit:
https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Workarounds:

    The effects of this vulnerability can be mitigated by using
    Access Control Lists (ACLs) that require both address range
    validation and use of TSIG authentication in conjunction.  For
    information on how to configure this type of compound authentication
    control, please see:
https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00723/0/Using-Access-Control-Lists

    Administrators who have made use of named.conf option "update-policy
    local;" should refer to the Administrator Reference Manual (ARM)
    for details of the automatic update policy that will be established
    and to assess whether or not this conveys any additional risk
    to their server.  (Note that this option is not enabled by
    default).

Active exploits:

    No known active exploits but a similar issue was announced
    publicly on 23 June 2017 by another DNS server software provider.

Solution:

    Upgrade to the patched release most closely related to your
    current version of BIND. These can all be downloaded from
    http://www.isc.org/downloads.

    -  BIND 9 version 9.9.10-P2
    -  BIND 9 version 9.10.5-P2
    -  BIND 9 version 9.11.1-P2

    BIND Supported Preview Edition is a special feature preview
    branch of BIND provided to eligible ISC support customers.

    -  BIND 9 version 9.9.10-S3
    -  BIND 9 version 9.10.5-S3

Acknowledgements:

   ISC would like to thank Clément Berthaux from Synacktiv for
   reporting this issue.

Document Revision History:

   1.0 Advance Notification 26 June 2017
   1.1 CVSS score corrected (was previously erroneously listed
       as 7.8) 27 June 2017
   1.2 Update phrasing in the Workarounds section; Correct date of similar
       public announcement, 29 June 2017
   1.3 Remove references to SIG(0), which is not affected, 29 June 2017
   2.0 Public disclosure 29 June 2017

Related Documents:

   See our BIND9 Security Vulnerability Matrix at
   https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00913 for a complete listing of
   Security Vulnerabilities and versions affected.

If you'd like more information on ISC Subscription Support and
Advance Security Notifications, please visit http://www.isc.org/support/.

Do you still have questions?  Questions regarding this advisory
should go to security-officer@isc.org.  To report a new issue,
please encrypt your message using security-officer@isc.org's PGP
key which can be found here:

   https://www.isc.org/downloads/software-support-policy/openpgp-key/.

If you are unable to use encrypted email, you may also report new
issues at: https://www.isc.org/community/report-bug/.

Note:

   ISC patches only currently supported versions. When possible we
   indicate EOL versions affected.  (For current information on
   which versions are actively supported, please see
   http://www.isc.org/downloads/).

ISC Security Vulnerability Disclosure Policy:

   Details of our current security advisory policy and practice can
   be found here: https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00861

This Knowledge Base article https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01503 is
the complete and official security advisory document.

Legal Disclaimer:

   Internet Systems Consortium (ISC) is providing this notice on
   an "AS IS" basis. No warranty or guarantee of any kind is expressed
   in this notice and none should be implied. ISC expressly excludes
   and disclaims any warranties regarding this notice or materials
   referred to in this notice, including, without limitation, any
   implied warranty of merchantability, fitness for a particular
   purpose, absence of hidden defects, or of non-infringement. Your
   use or reliance on this notice or materials referred to in this
   notice is at your own risk. ISC may change this notice at any
   time.  A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this
   document that omits the document URL is an uncontrolled copy.
   Uncontrolled copies may lack important information, be out of
   date, or contain factual errors.

(c) 2001-2017 Internet Systems Consortium

- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

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