![]() |
|
ESB-2007.1017 -- [Solaris] -- Solaris 10 Kernel Patches May Allow Privileged Remote Users to Gain Root Access to Files Shared by NFS Servers |
|
Date: 09 January 2008 Original URL: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980&it=8513 Click here for PGP verifiable version -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
===========================================================================
AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2007.1017 -- [Solaris]
Solaris 10 Kernel Patches May Allow Privileged Remote Users
to Gain Root Access to Files Shared by NFS Servers
10 January 2008
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Kernel
Publisher: Sun Microsystems
Operating System: Solaris 10
Impact: Root Compromise
Access: Existing Account
Original Bulletin:
http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/printfriendly.do?assetkey=1-26-103162-1
Revision History: January 10 2008: Updated the Impact section to
detail that the vulnerability is
exploitable by remote clients
instead of systems which are not
part of the configured netgroup.
December 17 2007: Initial Release
- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------
Sun(sm) Alert Notification
* Sun Alert ID: 103162
* Synopsis: Solaris 10 Kernel Patches May Allow Privileged Remote
Users to Gain Root Access to Files Shared by NFS Servers
* Category: Security, Availability
* Product: Solaris 10 Operating System
* BugIDs: 6602070
* Avoidance: Patch, Workaround
* State: Resolved
* Date Released: 13-Dec-2007
* Date Closed: 13-Dec-2007
* Date Modified: 14-Dec-2007, 21-Dec-2007, 08-Jan-2008
1. Impact
A security vulnerability exists for Solaris 10 systems with kernel
patches 120011-04 or later (SPARC) and 120012-04 or later (x86) which
are configured as NFS servers and grant root user access to remote
clients. This vulnerability may allow root users on remote clients
which are not authorized to access the shared file systems as root to
also have root access to files shared by the NFS server.
2. Contributing Factors
This issue can occur in the following releases:
SPARC Platform:
* Solaris 10 with patch 120011-04 or later and without patch
127111-05
x86 Platform:
* Solaris 10 with patch 120012-04 or later and without patch
127954-03
NOTE: Solaris 8 and 9 are not impacted by this issue.
A system is only impacted by this issue if both the following are
true:
a) The system is acting as a NFS server, is sharing root access to
remote clients using the "root=" option and is mounting the file
systems either as read-only ("ro=" option) or as read-write ("rw="
option). See share_nfs(1M) for information on file system sharing
options. To list all file systems shared by an NFS server, the
'/usr/sbin/share' command may be used as in the following example:
$ share
/NFSTEST root=hostname ""
b) Either the 'ipnodes' OR the 'hosts' entry (OR both these entries)
in /etc/nsswitch.conf have only "files" used to define the source. The
following command may be executed to check these entries in
/etc/nsswitch.conf:
$ egrep '^ipnodes|^hosts' /etc/nsswitch.conf
hosts: files nisplus dns [NOTFOUND=return] files
ipnodes: nisplus [NOTFOUND=return] files
3. Symptoms
There are no predictable symptoms that would indicate the described
vulnerability has been exploited.
4. Relief/Workaround
A) To work around this issue, patch 120011-04 or later (SPARC) or
patch 120012-04 or later (x86) may be removed using the patchrm(1M)
command.
Note however that these patches cannot be removed on Solaris 10 8/07
systems, as they are part of the initial installation of Solaris 10
8/07.
B) Alternatively, this issue can be avoided by adding another name
service for hosts and ipnodes in /etc/nsswitch.conf. For example:
$ egrep '^ipnodes|^hosts' /etc/nsswitch.conf
hosts: files nis
ipnodes: files nis
C) This issue can also be avoided by disabling the nscd(1M) daemon on
the NFS server. Disabling the nscd daemon may slow responses to name
service requests on the NFS server. The nscd daemon may be disabled by
running the following command (as 'root' user):
# svcadm disable svc:/system/name-service-cache:default
5. Resolution
This issue is addressed in the following releases:
SPARC Platform
* Solaris 10 with patch 127111-05 or later
x86 Platform
* Solaris 10 with patch 127954-03 or later
Change History
14-Dec-2007:
* Updated Contributing Factors section
21-Dec-2007:
* Updated Impact and Contributing Factors sections for clarification
08-Jan-2008:
* Updated Impact section
This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS"
basis. This Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by
third parties. The issues described in this Sun Alert notification may
or may not impact your system(s). Sun makes no representations,
warranties, or guarantees as to the information contained herein. ANY
AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR
NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING THIS DOCUMENT
YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT ARISE
OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN.
This Sun Alert notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential
information. It is being provided to you pursuant to the provisions of
your agreement to purchase services from Sun, or, if you do not have
such an agreement, the Sun.com Terms of Use. This Sun Alert
notification may only be used for the purposes contemplated by these
agreements.
Copyright 2000-2006 Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle, Santa
Clara, CA 95054 U.S.A. All rights reserved
- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------
You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.
NOTE: Third Party Rights
This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice
contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or
organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's
site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences
which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in
this security bulletin.
NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current.
Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.
Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:
http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980
If you believe that your computer system has been compromised or attacked in
any way, we encourage you to let us know by completing the secure National IT
Incident Reporting Form at:
http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=3192
===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072
Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for member emergencies only.
===========================================================================
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967
iQCVAwUBR4WgYih9+71yA2DNAQK5EgP/WQTlYLVmKBNgjyO0h02LsQm8+0phGbYa
+aXJnelfWBv9qURZaSkib9EvgO3DNXWZLc5WHh3DbnGYOW9gi/L41GUcZCBL0EhF
SzN/klUCAqFnILTU+Be/QAWLZRlvD3ySg5VdPTv4ygKn0Xi8WgMRPGisTiQX8+ol
ro+7k84bCVs=
=DI/H
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
|