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A  U  S  C  E  R  T                                           A  L  E  R  T

                       AL-2007.0120 -- AUSCERT ALERT
                               [UNIX/Linux]
                     Multiple Vulnerabilities in Samba
                             16 November 2007

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Alert Summary
        ---------------------

Product:              Samba
Publisher:            Samba
Operating System:     UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX)
Impact:               Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands
Access:               Remote/Unauthenticated
CVE Names:            CVE-2007-5398 CVE-2007-4572

Comment: This alert contains two (2) Samba advisories.
         
         Whilst the second advisory is believed to be non-exploitable, the
         first is much more serious as it can result in the execution of
         arbitrary code from remote sources.

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==========================================================
==
== Subject:     Remote code execution in Samba's WINS
==              server daemon (nmbd) when processing name
==              registration followed name query requests.
==
== CVE ID#:     CVE-2007-5398
==
== Versions:    Samba 3.0.0 - 3.0.26a (inclusive)
==
== Summary:     When nmbd has been configured as a WINS
==              server, a client can send a series of name
==              registration request followed by a specific
==              name query request packet and execute
==              arbitrary code.
==
==========================================================

===========
Description
===========

Secunia Research reported a vulnerability that allows for
the execution of arbitrary code in nmbd.  This defect may
only be exploited when the "wins support" parameter has
been enabled in smb.conf.


==================
Patch Availability
==================

A patch addressing this defect has been posted to

  http://www.samba.org/samba/security/

Additionally, Samba 3.0.27 has been issued as a security
release to correct the defect.


==========
Workaround
==========

Samba administrators may avoid this security issue by
disabling the "wins support" feature in the hosts smb.conf
file.


=======
Credits
=======

This vulnerability was reported to Samba developers by
Alin Rad Pop, Secunia Research.

The time line is as follows:

* Oct 30, 2007: Initial report to security@samba.org.
* Oct 30, 2007: First response from Samba developers confirming
  the bug along with a proposed patch.
* Nov 15, 2007: Public security advisory to be made available.


==========================================================
== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
== The Samba Team
==========================================================
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==========================================================
==
== Subject:     Stack buffer overflow in nmbd's logon
==              request processing.
==
== CVE ID#:     CVE-2007-4572
==
== Versions:    Samba 3.0.0 - 3.0.26a (inclusive)
==
== Summary:     Processing of specially crafted GETDC
==              mailslot requests can result in a buffer
==              overrun in nmbd.  It is not believed that
==              that this issues can be exploited to
==              result in remote code execution.
==
==========================================================

===========
Description
===========

Samba developers have discovered what is believed to be
a non-exploitable buffer over in nmbd during the processing
of GETDC logon server requests.  This code is only used
when the Samba server is configured as a Primary or Backup
Domain Controller.


==================
Patch Availability
==================

A patch addressing this defect has been posted to

  http://www.samba.org/samba/security/

Additionally, Samba 3.0.27 has been issued as a security
release to correct the defect.


==========
Workaround
==========

Samba administrators may avoid this security issue by disabling
both the "domain logons" and the "domain master" options in in
the server's smb.conf file.  Note that this will disable all
domain controller features as well.


=======
Credits
=======

This vulnerability was discovered by Samba developers during
an internal code audit.

The time line is as follows:

* Sep 13, 2007: Initial report to security@samba.org including
  proposed patch.
* Sep 14, 2007: Patch review by members of the Josh Bressers
  (RedHat Security Team) and Simo Sorce (Samba/RedHat developer)
* Nov 15, 2007: Public security advisory made available.



==========================================================
== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
== The Samba Team
==========================================================

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===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072

Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
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===========================================================================

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