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===========================================================================
             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                ESB-2006.0916 -- [Win][UNIX/Linux][NetBSD]
                       libc glob(3) buffer overflow
                             15 December 2006

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:              libc glob(3)
Publisher:            NetBSD
Operating System:     NetBSD
                      UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX)
                      Windows
Impact:               Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands
Access:               Remote/Unauthenticated

Original Bulletin:
  ftp://ftp.NetBSD.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2006-027.txt.asc

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		 NetBSD Security Advisory 2006-027
		 =================================

Topic:		libc glob(3) buffer overflow

Version:	NetBSD-current:	source prior to September 13, 2005
		NetBSD 4.0_BETA2:	not affected
		NetBSD 3.1:		affected
		NetBSD 3.0.*:		affected
		NetBSD 3.0:		affected
		NetBSD 2.1:		affected
		NetBSD 2.0.*:		affected
		NetBSD 2.0:		affected
		pkgsrc:			20040810 and earlier

Severity:	Potential remote root for systems providing the ftpd service
		with a custom configuration.

Fixed:		NetBSD-current:		September 13, 2005
		NetBSD-3-0 branch:	December 2, 2006
		NetBSD-3 branch:	December 2, 2006
		NetBSD-2-1 branch:	December 2, 2006
		NetBSD-2-0 branch:	December 2, 2006
		NetBSD-2 branch:	December 2, 2006
		pkgsrc:  		tnftpd-20040810nb1 corrects this issue


Abstract
========

A flaw in glob(3) could potentially allow for the execution of untrusted code.
Currently the NetBSD ftp daemon that ships with the base distribution uses 
glob(3) which has been found to be potentially vulnerable to attack.  In 
addition to this there may be other applications/network services which 
use glob(3) which are also potentially vulnerable.

In the case of ftpd the server must be configured to allow remote users
to create directories in order for attackers to exploit this issue.


Technical Details
=================

The limit computation of an internal buffer was done incorrectly.  The
size of the buffer in byte was used as element count, even though the
elements of the buffer are 2 bytes long.  Long expanded path names would
therefore overflow the buffer.


Solutions and Workarounds
=========================

* Determining if you could be vulnerable (inetd):
By default ftpd is not enabled in the default install of NetBSD.
To confirm if the host in question is running ftpd, check the ftp
entries in /etc/inetd.conf. By default, the entries look like this:

#ftp	stream	tcp	nowait	root	/usr/libexec/ftpd	ftpd -ll
#ftp	stream	tcp6	nowait	root	/usr/libexec/ftpd	ftpd -ll

If the comment character (#) has been removed from the start of the
lines, then ftpd has been enabled on this host. Hosts not running ftpd
are not vulnerable, but libc should be updated to prevent future
exposure if ftpd is enabled at a later date.

* Disable ftpd (inetd):
As root, comment out the ftp lines in /etc/inetd.conf, and execute the 
following command to disable ftpd:

	% /etc/rc.d/inetd reload

* Determining if you could be vulnerable (standalone):
On NetBSD-current it is also possible to run ftpd in standalone
mode by adding the following to rc.conf:

	ftpd=YES

If this entry exists then ftpd is being run in standalone mode.

* Disable ftpd (standalone):
As root, comment out the ftpd line in rc.conf, and execute the following
command to disable ftpd:

	% /etc/rc.d/ftpd forcestop

* Limit directory creation:
Another possible workaround is to not allow remote users to create 
directories of their choice on the ftpd server.

* Directory names:
If you allow users to create directories of their own choice check
for very long directory names.

* Drop root privileges:
As root, add -r to the command line options for any ftp entry in 
/etc/inetd.conf. Then run: 

	% /etc/rc.d/inetd reload 

This option may not be acceptable at all sites, since client compatibility 
issues are possible. See the ftpd(8) man page for more details about -r.

The following instructions describe how to upgrade your libc binaries 
by updating your source tree and rebuilding and installing a new version 
of libc.

* NetBSD-current:

	Systems running NetBSD-current dated from before 2005-09-13
	should be upgraded to NetBSD-current dated 2005-09-14 or later.

	The following files need to be updated from CVS HEAD:
		lib/libc/gen/glob.c

	To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install libc:

		# cd src
		# cvs update lib/libc/gen/glob.c
		# cd lib/libc
		# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
		# make USETOOLS=no install

		# cd ../../libexec/ftpd
		# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
		# make USETOOLS=no install


* NetBSD 3.*:

	Systems running NetBSD 3.* sources dated from before
	2006-12-02 should be upgraded from NetBSD 3.* sources dated
	2006-12-03 or later.

	The following files need to be updated from the
	netbsd-3, netbsd-3-0, netbsd-3-1 CVS branches:
		lib/libc/gen/__glob13.c

	To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install libc:

		# cd src
		# cvs update lib/libc/gen/__glob13.c
		# cd lib/libc
		# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
		# make USETOOLS=no install

		# cd ../../libexec/ftpd
		# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
		# make USETOOLS=no install


* NetBSD 2.*:

	Systems running NetBSD 2.* sources dated from before
	2006-12-02 should be upgraded from NetBSD 2.* sources dated
	2006-12-03 or later.

	The following files need to be updated from the
	netbsd-2, netbsd-2-0 or netbsd-2-1 CVS branches:
		lib/libc/gen/__glob13.c

	To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install libc:

		# cd src
		# cvs update lib/libc/gen/__glob13.c
		# cd lib/libc
		# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
		# make USETOOLS=no install

		# cd ../../libexec/ftpd
		# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
		# make USETOOLS=no install


Thanks To
=========

Tomas Skare for reporting this issue and the initial analysis.


Revision History
================

	2006-12-14	Initial release


More Information
================

Advisories may be updated as new information becomes available.
The most recent version of this advisory (PGP signed) can be found at 
  ftp://ftp.NetBSD.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2006-027.txt.asc

Information about NetBSD and NetBSD security can be found at
http://www.NetBSD.org/ and http://www.NetBSD.org/Security/.


Copyright 2006, The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.  All Rights Reserved.
Redistribution permitted only in full, unmodified form.

$NetBSD: NetBSD-SA2006-027.txt,v 1.4 2006/12/14 20:13:16 adrianp Exp $

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