Date: 01 May 1997
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AL-96.04 AUSCERT Alert
Vulnerability in Solaris 2.x vold
2 August 1996
Last Revised: 1 May 1997
Remove SUN Security bulletin (incorrect patch information)
Changed Section 3 to include correct vendor patch
information.
Updated acknowledgments
A complete revision history is at the end of this file.
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AUSCERT has received a report of a vulnerability in the Sun Microsystems
Solaris 2.x distribution involving the Volume Management daemon, vold(1M).
This program is used to help manage CDROM and floppy devices.
This vulnerability may allow a local user to gain root privileges.
Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been made publicly
available.
Vendor patches have been released addressing this vulnerability.
AUSCERT recommends that sites take the steps outlined in section 3 as soon
as possible.
This advisory will be updated as more information becomes available.
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1. Description
The Volume Management daemon, vold(1M), manages the CDROM and floppy
devices. For example, it provides the ability to automatically detect,
and then mount, removable media such as CDROMs and floppy devices.
vold is part of the Solaris 2.x Volume Management package (SUNWvolu).
It is executed as a background daemon on system startup and runs as
root.
When vold detects that a CDROM or floppy has been inserted into a
drive, it is configured to automatically mount the media, making it
available to users. Part of this process includes the creation of
temporary files, which are used to allow the Openwindows File Manager,
filemgr(1), to determine that new media has been mounted. These files
are created by the action_filemgr.so shared object which is called
indirectly by vold through rmmount(1M). The handling of these files
is not performed in a secure manner. As vold is configured to access
these temporary files with root privileges, it may be possible to
manipulate vold into creating or over-writing arbitrary files on the
system.
This vulnerability requires that vold be running and media managed by
vold, such as a CDROM or floppy, be physically loaded into a drive.
Note that a local user need not have physical access to the media
drive to exploit this vulnerability. It is enough to wait until
somebody else loads the drive, exploiting the vulnerability at that
time.
This vulnerability is known to be present in Solaris 2.4 and Solaris
2.5. Solaris distributions prior to Solaris 2.4 are also expected to
be vulnerable.
2. Impact
Local users may be able to create or over-write arbitrary files on
the system. This can be leveraged to gain root privileges.
3. Workaround
Official vendor patches have been released by Sun Microsystems which
address this vulnerability (Section 3.1).
If the patches recommended by Sun Microsystems cannot be applied,
AUSCERT recommends that sites prevent the exploitation of this
vulnerability in vold by immediately applying the workaround given in
Sections 3.2 or 3.3.
3.1 Install vendor patches
Sun Microsystems has released patches which address the vulnerability
described in this advisory. AUSCERT recommends that sites apply theses
patches as soon as possible.
Operating System Patch MD5 Checksum
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~
Solaris 2.4 sparc: 101907-14.tar.Z 8156721f3667a0fd48a4ed845f3b007a
Solaris 2.4 x86: 101908-14.tar.Z 33c766dab8adce77fe3eafa5ec4795df
Solaris 2.5 sparc: 104015-01.tar.Z e70fbafdc2a2defa8d0f12d91f5fda0d
Solaris 2.5 x86: 104016-01.tar.Z 8baa449e0bf0de2ac5d12a2994ab44ef
Solaris 2.5.1 sparc: 104010-01.tar.Z e24bf103c84b21ac6c8833317d63c9f1
Solaris 2.5.1 x86: 104011-01.tar.Z e1c39d7bba0ff2d10d00316b11a11ac4
Solaris 2.5.1 ppc: 104012-01.tar.Z 86bca895fdcf628edc35be2b43f9e017
All of the patches, except 104012-01.tar.Z (for Solaris 2.5.1 ppc),
can be retrieved from:
ftp://sunsolve1.sun.com.au/pub/patches/
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/sunsolve1.sun.com/
Sites with Sunsolve contracts will be able to obtain 104012-01.tar.Z
from the contract area at their local Sunsolve site. For more
information on this, please contact your local Sunsolve Solution
Centre.
3.2 Edit /etc/rmmount.conf
The temporary files which are susceptible to attack are created by
the /usr/lib/rmmount/action_filemgr.so.1 shared object which is called
indirectly by vold through rmmount(1M). rmmount(1M) can be configured
so that it does not create the temporary files, thereby removing this
vulnerability.
To our knowledge, configuring rmmount(1M) in this fashion will not
affect the functionality of vold. It will, however, remove the ability
of the Openwindows File Manager, filemgr(1), to automatically detect
newly mounted media.
To prevent rmmount(1M) creating temporary files, sites must edit the
/etc/rmmount.conf file and comment out (or remove) any entry which
references action_filemgr.so.
The standard /etc/rmmount.conf contains the following entries which
must be commented out (or deleted) to remove this vulnerability:
action cdrom action_filemgr.so
action floppy action_filemgr.so
After applying this workaround, an example of /etc/rmmount.conf may
look like:
# @(#)rmmount.conf 1.2 92/09/23 SMI
#
# Removable Media Mounter configuration file.
#
# File system identification
ident hsfs ident_hsfs.so cdrom
ident ufs ident_ufs.so cdrom floppy pcmem
ident pcfs ident_pcfs.so floppy pcmem
# Actions
#
# Following two lines commented out to remove vold vulnerability
#
# action cdrom action_filemgr.so
# action floppy action_filemgr.so
Note that vold does not have to be restarted for these changes to
take effect.
3.3 Remove the Volume Management system
Sites who do not require the vold functionality should remove the
complete set of Volume Management packages. These are SUNWvolg,
SUNWvolu and SUNWvolr. These packages can be removed using pkgrm(1M).
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AUSCERT wishes to thanks to Leif Hedstrom, Mark McPherson(QTAC), Marek
Krawus(UQ), DFN-CERT, CERT/CC, Marko Laakso (University of Oulu) and Sun
Microsystems for their assistance in this matter.
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The AUSCERT team have made every effort to ensure that the information
contained in this document is accurate. However, the decision to use the
information described is the responsibility of each user or organisation.
The appropriateness of this document for an organisation or individual system
should be considered before application in conjunction with local policies
and procedures. AUSCERT takes no responsibility for the consequences of
applying the contents of this document.
If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact AUSCERT or your
representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams).
AUSCERT is located at The University of Queensland within the Prentice Centre.
AUSCERT is a full member of the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
(FIRST).
AUSCERT maintains an anonymous FTP service which is found on:
ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/. This archive contains past SERT and AUSCERT
Advisories, and other computer security information.
AUSCERT also maintains a World Wide Web service which is found on:
http://www.auscert.org.au/.
Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile: (07) 3365 4477
Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
AUSCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours
which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
On call after hours for emergencies.
Postal:
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
c/- Prentice Centre
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld. 4072.
AUSTRALIA
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Revision History
1 May 1997 Removed the Sun security bulletin as it referenced some
incorrect patches for this vulnerability. Included
the correct patch information in Section 3.
Updated acknowledgements to include Sun Microsystems and
Marko Laakso.
21 Apr 1997 Sun Microsystems has released a security bulletin addressing
this vulnerability in the vold program. This was appended
in Appendix A. Section 3 was modified to include this
information.
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