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              AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
                             
                ESB-1999.122 -- ISS X-Force Security Advisory
                 Root Compromise Vulnerabilities in Oracle 8
                              30 August 1999

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ISS X-Force has released the following advisory concerning vulnerabilities
in setuid programs in Oracle 8 for Unix. These vulnerabilities may allow
local users to gain root access.

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ISS Security Advisory
August 23, 1999

Root Compromise Vulnerabilities in Oracle 8

Synopsis:

Internet Security Systems (ISS) X-Force has discovered vulnerabilities in
superuser owned executables that may allow local root compromise.
Attackers may uses these vulnerabilities to create, destroy, or modify
any file on the system, including files owned by the superuser.  This
attack may be particularly useful to gain complete control of the
database system, to manipulate Oracle database files, or to deny service.

Affected Versions:

ISS X-Force has determined that all current versions of Oracle 8 for Unix
are vulnerable.  These versions include: 8.03, 8.04, 8.05 and 8.15.
Oracle 8 for Windows NT is not affected by these vulnerabilities.

Description:

Oracle has made a recent effort to secure setuid administrative tools
shipped with Oracle 8.  Certain utilities are still shipped with the
setuid bit enabled.  The superuser also owns these utilities.  ISS
X-Force has determined that these vulnerabilities are still exploitable in
the most current revisions of Oracle 8.  The vulnerabilities described in
this advisory are similar to those described in the May 6th ISS X-Force
Advisory titled, "Multiple File system Vulnerabilities in Oracle 8."
These vulnerabilities are also a result of implicit trust of Oracle
system environment variables, as well as insecure file creation and
manipulation.  The combined effect of these vulnerabilities may allow
local attackers to create, append to, or overwrite any file on
the file-system as well as privileged oracle files.

Temporary files that follow symbolic links are a common source of
vulnerabilities in setuid executables.  Administrators should remove or
restrict access to setuid executables if possible.

Developers of setuid programs need to take special precautions to prevent
the introduction of vulnerabilities of this nature.  The ISS X-Force
recommends that all Unix developers become familiar with Matt Bishop's
secure programming guide, available at
http://olympus.cs.ucdavis.edu/~bishop/secprog.html

Fix Information:

ISS X-Force has worked with Oracle to provide a patch for the
vulnerabilities described in this advisory.  This patch is available to
the public on technet.oracle.com. The direct URL is
http://technet.oracle.com/misc/agent/section.htm.

Oracle has provided the following information to answer any questions
concerning these vulnerabilities. The FAQ is available in HTML format at
http://technet.oracle.com/misc/agent/faq.htm.

1. Do I need to upgrade my databases to 8.0.5 or 8.0.6 in order to pick
   up this fix?

No! The Agent may be upgraded on its own, without affecting the version
of the databases it manages. To do this, install the Agent and the
appropriate patch in a separate Oracle Home. This Agent will be able to
manage all targets on its node, irrespective of their versions.

2. What can I do until the fix is available on my platform?

While waiting for the fix to be available on your platform, you may use
the following workaround:

Create a Unix user with normal permissions under which the Agent runs
Enterprise Manager jobs.

Note: This means all jobs submitted through the Enterprise Manager
Console will now run as the 'normal user' instead of the user specified
as preferred credentials within the Console. Additionally the 'normal
user' will only have access to the ORACLE_HOMEAgent directory, unless
otherwise specified by the system administrator. Finally, the Agent will
only start as the 'normal user.'

Steps to apply the workaround:

On the system on which the Agent resides, choose/create a Unix user with
normal permissions on the system. This user must not be: (A) The user who
installed the Oracle RDBMS Server and other Oracle products on the system
OR (B) A user with root privileges.  The user must belong to a normal
group and not "dba".

For example:

1. Create a user "agent" belonging to group "agentgrp".
2. Install an Agent in a new Oracle Home as user "agent". Note: DO NOT
   run the root.sh script under this Oracle Home as part of    this
   installation process.
3. Shutdown the old Agent.
4. Copy files from the Oracle Home of the old Agent to the Oracle Home of
   the newly installed Agent as follows:

cp $ORACLE_HOME(old)/network/agent/* $ORACLE_HOME(new)/network/agent

Important: Make sure that the user "agent" owns all files under the
$ORACLE_HOME(new)/network/agent directory.

5. Using a terminal window that has the environment of user "agent",
start the Agent with:

lsnrctl dbsnmp_start

For further security, job system access can be prevented if you are using
Enterprise Manager version 2.0.

To do so, log into the Enterprise Manager Console as a Super
Administrator. Using the System -> Manage Administrators option, edit the
General Preferences, deactivating 'Access to Job System' for each
Administrator you wish to prevent from using the job system.

If you are not comfortable with this workaround, suspend the use of the
Agent until the fix is available on your platform.

ISS X-Force recommends that all administrators also complete a proactive
survey of their Oracle installations to determine which machines require
the Intelligent Agent.

Additional Information:

Dan Ingevaldson <dingevaldson@iss.net> of the ISS X-Force primarily
researched these vulnerabilities. ISS X-Force would like to thank Oracle
Corporation for their response and handling of these vulnerabilities.

________

About ISS:

ISS leads the market as the source for e-business risk management
solutions, serving as a trusted security provider to thousands of
organizations including 21 of the 25 largest U.S. commercial banks and
more than 35 government agencies. With its Adaptive Security Management
approach, ISS empowers organizations to measure and manage enterprise
security risks within Intranet, extranet and electronic commerce
environments. Its award-winning SAFEsuite(r) product line of intrusion
detection, vulnerability management and decision support solutions are
vital for protection in today's world of global connectivity, enabling
organizations to proactively monitor, detect and respond to security
risks. Founded in 1994, ISS is headquartered in Atlanta, GA with
additional offices throughout the U.S. and international operations in
Australia/New Zealand, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, Latin America and
the UK. For more information, visit the ISS Web site at www.iss.net or
call 800-776-2362.

Copyright (c) 1999 by Internet Security Systems, Inc.

Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this Alert
electronically.  It is not to be edited in any way without express consent
of the X-Force.  If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this
Alert in any other medium excluding electronic medium, please e-mail
xforce@iss.net for permission.

Disclaimer

The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of this
information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There
are NO warranties with regard to this information. In no event shall the
author be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in
connection with the use or spread of this information. Any use of this
information is at the user's own risk.

X-Force PGP Key available at: http://xforce.iss.net/sensitive.php3 as
well as on MIT's PGP key server and PGP.com's key server.

Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to: X-Force xforce@iss.net
of Internet Security Systems, Inc.


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