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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                         ESB-2005.0961 -- [Cisco]
  Cisco Security Notice: Response to OpenSSL - Potential SSL 2.0 Rollback
                              5 December 2005

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        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           Cisco ASA 5500 and Cisco PIX with 7.x Software
                   CiscoWorks Common Services 3.0 and 2.2
                   Cisco Mainframe Channel Connection
                   Cisco Global Site Selector
                   Cisco Wireles Control System Software
                   Cisco IOS-XR
Publisher:         Cisco Systems
Impact:            Reduced Security
                   Access Confidential Data
Access:            Remote/Unauthenticated
CVE Names:         CVE-2005-2969

Ref:               ESB-2005.0801

Original Bulletin: http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20051011.txt

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Cisco Security Notice: Response to OpenSSL - Potential SSL 2.0
Rollback

http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-response-20051202-openssl.shtml

Revision 1.0

For Public Release 2005 December 02 1600 UTC (GMT)

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Please provide your feedback on this document.

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Contents

    Cisco Response
    Additional Information
    Cisco Security Procedures
   
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Cisco Response
This is in response to the OpenSSL Advisory released on 2005-Nov-11.
The advisory is posted at 
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20051011.txt Some of the Cisco 
Systems product lines are affected by this vulnerability. The lists 
are not exhaustive.

Affected Products
+----------------
The following products are affected by this vulnerability:
   
   
  * Cisco ASA 5500 and Cisco PIX running 7.x software
    Sta Associated DDTS is CSCsc48330. Software releases up to, but
    excluding, version 7.0.4. fixed software release will be interim
    release 7.0.4.3. It will be available on 2005-Dec-02.
   
  * CiscoWorks Common Services (CWCS) version 3.0 and CiscoWorks
    Common Services (CWCS) version 2.2
    Associated DDTS is CSCsc27533. Point patch for CWCS 2.2 customers
    should be available by 2005-Dec-07. For CWCS 3.0 customers, the
    point patch will be available by 2005-Dec-16. This fix will also
    be integrated in to forthcoming CWCS 3.0.3 release, which is
    expected to be available for customers during January 2006.
   
  * Cisco Mainframe Channel Connection (CMCC) - PA-4C-E, PA-1C-E,
    PA-1C-P, CX-CIP2 tn3270 server
    Associated DDTS is CSCej54402. Software releases up to version
    28-22 are affected. The first fixed software release will be
    28-23. It is scheduled for release in December 2006.
   
  * Cisco Global Site Selector (4480, 4490, 4491)
    Associated DDTS is CSCsc33835. Software releases up to version
    1.2 are affected. The first fixed release is 1.2(2.2.0).
   
  * Cisco Wireless Control System Software
    Associated DDTS is CSCsc58356. Software release up to version 4.0
    are affected. The first fixed software release will be 4.0. It
    will be available during February 2006.
   
  * Cisco IOS-XR
    Associated DDTS is CSCek01123. Software releases up to version
    3.3 are affected. The first fixed release will be 3.3. It is
    expected during April 2006.
   

Products not Affected
+--------------------
The following products are confirmed to be not affected by this
vulnerability:
   
   
  * Cisco PIX Firewall releases 6.x and below
    Associated DDTS is CSCsc36311. While PIX Firewalls running
    software version 6.x and below are not affected, this DDTS was
    opened to make the changes recommended by the OpenSSL team and to
    prevent the possibility that PIX 6.x becomes vulnerable to this
    issue in the future.
   
  * Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Firewall Services Module
    Associated DDTS is CSCsc34709. While Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series
    FWSM is not affected this DDTS was opened to prevent possibility
    that it becomes vulnerable to this issue in the future. The first
    software release with this fix will be 2.3
   
  * Cisco Content Service Switch (CSS) family
    Associated DDTS is CSCej62856. While Cisco CSS is not affected
    this DDTS was opened to prevent possibility that Cisco CSS
    becomes vulnerable to this issue in the future.
   
  * Cisco Call Manager releases 4.x
    Transport Layer Security (TLS), the component that uses OpenSSL,
    was first introduced in the software release 4.0. Releases prior
    4.0 are also not affected.
   
  * Cisco SIP Proxy Server
   
  * Cisco ONS15xxx family
   
  * Cisco Secure Policy Manager
   
  * Common Services (NMTG)
   
  * Cisco Intrusion Detection System family of products
   
  * Cisco Intrusion Prevention System family of products
   
  * Cisco Call Manager
   
  * Cisco IOS
   
  * Cisco CatOS
   
  * IP Mobility Client
   
  * Cisco Security Agent
   
  * Cisco MDS 9000 Series Multilayer SAN Switches
   
  * Cisco CTI Object Server (CTI OS)
   

Other products are being investigated.

Additional Information
+---------------------
Many products use OpenSSL but not all of them are affected. Some
products use OpenSSL only for its implementation of various
cryptographic functions and are not affected by this vulnerability.

In order to perform a Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) attack, the attacker
must insert themselves in the communication channel between two
parties. They will then mimic the intended recipient for both
parties. In practical terms, this usually means that the attacker
must terminate each session on the host they control and then
initiate a new session to the intended recipient.

There are several ways an attacker can perform MiTM attacks,
including spoofing DHCP information and sending gratuitous ARPs to
the switch. The IP Source Guard and Dynamic ARP Inspection features
can be used to block that attack vector.

It may be possible to execute MiTM attacks in wireless networks that
use the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP). Cisco recommends
the use of the Protected EAP (PEAP) protocol to block this particular
attack vector.

Another possible vector can be DNS poisoning. This attack vector can
be mitigated by using the BIND v9.x DNS software from 
http://www.isc.org/ or equivalent.

Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/
products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes
instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices.
All Cisco security advisories are available at 
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.

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All contents are Copyright 1992-2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights
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