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AL-2004.17 -- Korgo Worm Variants Exploiting LSASS Vulnerability

Date: 25 June 2004

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A  U  S  C  E  R  T                                           A  L  E  R  T
                                      
                        AL-2004.17 -- AUSCERT ALERT
            Korgo Worm Variants Exploiting LSASS Vulnerability
                               24 June 2004

===========================================================================

PROBLEM:  

	New variants of a worm named Korgo, aka Padobot, are currently being 
	created and detected in the wild on a daily basis.  AusCERT has
	received reports that new variants are not being detected by some
	anti-virus software with previous Korgo signatures.  Reports to
	AusCERT detail network traffic congestion, in addition to the potential
	compromise of data through the creation of a backdoor on infected
	computers.

	The Korgo worm spreads through the LSASS vulnerability in the
	Windows operating system, as detailed in the Microsoft Security
	Bulletin MS04-011[1].  This is the same vulnerability which was
	exploited by the Sasser, Bobax and Cycle worms.


PLATFORM: 
	
	Korgo variants spread through the remote exploitation of computers
	running Windows 2000 and Windows XP, which have not been patched
	as per directions from Microsoft Security Bulletin MS04-011[1].


IMPACT:   

	While it is possible for new variants of the worm to change behavior
	and for the worm to update itself with new functionality, the basic
	modes of prorogation and infection are similar.

	Once a computer is infected with the worm, a connection is made from
	the worm to one of several web sites which allow for the following:

	  - Download and execute files from the web site
	  - Download and execute files from another URL
	  - Send information to the web site regarding the infection

	The worm will also perform the following:

	  - Open port 113/TCP and a random TCP port to allow for a copy of the
	    worm to be downloaded as part of the prorogation routine

	  - Create a copy of itself in the %System% directory with a random
	    filename of 5 to 8 characters in length

	  - Create/modify a registry entry with one of several names in
	    HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
	    pointing the worm executable "%System%\<random filename>.exe"

	  - Delete several registry "Run" keys, including those named:
	    * Windows Security Manager
	    * Disk Defragmenter
	    * System Restore Service
	    * Bot Loader
	    * WinUpdate
	    * Windows Update Service
	    * avserve.exe
	    * avserve2.exeUpdate Service

	  - Inject a function of the worm code into the Explorer.exe process

	  - Scan random IP addresses on port 445 attempting to exploit the
	    LSASS vulnerability and prorogate further


MITIGATION: 

	Administrators are urged to test and deploy patches detailed in the
	Microsoft Security Bulletin MS04-011[1], in addition to ensuring
	anti-virus software is installed and regularly updated on all
	computers and servers.

	To assist in ensuring Windows computers are appropriately patched,
	administrators may wish to use the Microsoft Baseline Security
	Analyzer (MBSA)[2] or Software Update Services (SUS)[3].  For more
	details, see the AusCERT paper "Protecting your computer from
	malicious code."[4]

	Ingress and egress filtering on port 445/TCP where possible will
	also providing another layer of defence against this and similar
	malicious activity.

	Removal tools for some variants of the Korgo worm are available
	from anti-virus vendors, however it is recommended only to use the
	tool for the specific variant detected.  AusCERT encourages
	administrators to visit their appropriate anti-virus web site for
	additional information and updates on Korgo variants, and other virus
	related information.


REFERENCES:

	1 - http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS04-011.mspx
	2 - http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools/mbsahome.mspx
	3 - http://www.microsoft.com/windowsserversystem/sus/default.mspx
	4 - http://www.auscert.org.au/3352

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The AusCERT team has made every effort to ensure that the information
contained in this security bulletin is accurate at the time of publication. 
However, the decision to follow or act on information or advice contained in 
this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and 
should be considered in accordance with your organisation\'s site policies and 
procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences which may arise 
from following or acting on information or advice contained in this security 
bulletin.

If you believe that your computer system has been compromised or attacked in 
any way, we encourage you to let us know by completing the secure National IT 
Incident Reporting Form at:

        http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=3192

AusCERT maintains a World Wide Web service which is found on:
http://www.auscert.org.au.

Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile:      (07) 3365 7031
Telephone:      (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
                AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business
                hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).  On call after hours
                for member emergencies only.
	
Postal:
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld  4072
AUSTRALIA
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