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ESB-2003.0227 -- Sendmail Consortium Announcement -- sendmail 8.12.9 available

Date: 31 March 2003
References: ESB-2003.0228  ESB-2003.0230  ESB-2003.0232  

Click here for printable version
Click here for PGP verifiable version
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

===========================================================================
             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

             ESB-2003.0227 -- Sendmail Consortium Announcement
                         sendmail 8.12.9 available
                               31 March 2003

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:                Open-source sendmail prior to 8.12.9
                        Sendmail Pro (all versions)
                        Sendmail Switch 2.1 prior to 2.1.6
                        Sendmail Switch 2.2 prior to 2.2.6
                        Sendmail Switch 3.0 prior to 3.0.4
                        Sendmail for NT 2.X prior to 2.6.3
                        Sendmail for NT 3.0 prior to 3.0.4
Vendor:                 Sendmail Consortium
Impact:                 Root Compromise
                        Denial of Service
Access Required:        Remote
CVE Names:              CAN-2003-0161

Ref:                    AL-2003.05

- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

Sendmail, Inc., and the Sendmail Consortium announce the availability
of sendmail 8.12.9.  It contains a fix for a critical security
problem discovered by Michal Zalewski whom we thank for bringing
this problem to our attention.  Sendmail urges all users to either
upgrade to sendmail 8.12.9 or apply a patch for your sendmail version
that is part of this announcement.  Remember to check the PGP
signatures of patches or releases obtained via FTP or HTTP (to check
the correctness of the patches in this announcement please verify
the PGP signature of it).  For those not running the open source
version, check with your vendor for a patch.

We apologize for releasing this information today (2003-03-29) but
we were forced to do so by an e-mail on a public mailing list (that
has been sent by an irresponsible individual) which contains
information about the security flaw.

For a complete list of changes see the release notes down below.

Please send bug reports to sendmail-bugs@sendmail.org as usual.

Note: We have changed the way we digitally sign the source code
distributions to simplify verification: in contrast to earlier
versions two .sig files are provided, one each for the gzip'ed
version and the compressed version. That is, instead of signing the
tar file, we sign the compressed/gzip'ed files, so you do not need
to uncompress the file before checking the signature.

This version can be found at

ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.9.tar.gz
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.9.tar.gz.sig
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.9.tar.Z
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.9.tar.Z.sig

and the usual mirror sites.

MD5 signatures:

3dba3b6d769b3681640d0a38b0eba48c sendmail.8.12.9.tar.gz
19e39c9e9bc8fae288245c546639e1f4 sendmail.8.12.9.tar.gz.sig
268fc4045ba3eac6dfd9dc95d889ba5f sendmail.8.12.9.tar.Z
19e39c9e9bc8fae288245c546639e1f4 sendmail.8.12.9.tar.Z.sig

You either need the first two files or the third and fourth, i.e.,
the gzip'ed version or the compressed version and the corresponding
.sig file.  The PGP signature was created using the Sendmail Signing
Key/2003, available on the web site (http://www.sendmail.org/) or
on the public key servers.

Since sendmail 8.11 and later includes hooks to cryptography, the
following information from OpenSSL applies to sendmail as well.

   PLEASE REMEMBER THAT EXPORT/IMPORT AND/OR USE OF STRONG CRYPTOGRAPHY
   SOFTWARE, PROVIDING CRYPTOGRAPHY HOOKS OR EVEN JUST COMMUNICATING
   TECHNICAL DETAILS ABOUT CRYPTOGRAPHY SOFTWARE IS ILLEGAL IN SOME
   PARTS OF THE WORLD.  SO, WHEN YOU IMPORT THIS PACKAGE TO YOUR
   COUNTRY, RE-DISTRIBUTE IT FROM THERE OR EVEN JUST EMAIL TECHNICAL
   SUGGESTIONS OR EVEN SOURCE PATCHES TO THE AUTHOR OR OTHER PEOPLE
   YOU ARE STRONGLY ADVISED TO PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO ANY EXPORT/IMPORT
   AND/OR USE LAWS WHICH APPLY TO YOU. THE AUTHORS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR
   ANY VIOLATIONS YOU MAKE HERE. SO BE CAREFUL, IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY.


			SENDMAIL RELEASE NOTES
      $Id: RELEASE_NOTES,v 8.1340.2.132 2003/03/29 14:02:26 ca Exp $


This listing shows the version of the sendmail binary, the version
of the sendmail configuration files, the date of release, and a
summary of the changes in that release.

8.12.9/8.12.9	2003/03/29
	SECURITY: Fix a buffer overflow in address parsing due to
		a char to int conversion problem which is potentially
		remotely exploitable.  Problem found by Michal Zalewski.
  		Note: an MTA that is not patched might be vulnerable to
		data that it receives from untrusted sources, which
		includes DNS.
	To provide partial protection to internal, unpatched sendmail MTAs,
		8.12.9 changes by default (char)0xff to (char)0x7f in
		headers etc.  To turn off this conversion compile with
		-DALLOW_255 or use the command line option -d82.101.
	To provide partial protection for internal, unpatched MTAs that may be
		performing 7->8 or 8->7 bit MIME conversions, the default
		for MaxMimeHeaderLength has been changed to 2048/1024.
		Note: this does have a performance impact, and it only
		protects against frontal attacks from the outside.
		To disable the checks and return to pre-8.12.9 defaults,
		set MaxMimeHeaderLength to 0/0.
	Do not complain about -ba when submitting mail.  Problem noted
		by Derek Wueppelmann.
	Fix compilation with Berkeley DB 1.85 on systems that do not
		have flock(2).  Problem noted by Andy Harper of Kings
		College London.
	Properly initialize data structure for dns maps to avoid various
		errors, e.g., looping processes.  Problem noted by
		Maurice Makaay.
	CONFIG: Prevent multiple application of rule to add smart host.
		Patch from Andrzej Filip.
	CONFIG: Fix queue group declaration in MAILER(`usenet').
	CONTRIB: buildvirtuser: New option -t builds the virtusertable
		text file instead of the database map.
	Portability:
		Revert wrong change made in 8.12.7 and actually use the
			builtin getopt() version in sendmail on Linux.
			This can be overridden by using -DSM_CONF_GETOPT=0
			in which case the OS supplied version will be used.


Instructions to extract and apply the patches for sendmail:

The data below is a uuencoded, gzip'ed tar file.  Store the data
between "========= begin patch ========" and "========= end patch
==========" into a file called "patch.sm" and apply the following
command:

uudecode -p < patch.sm | gunzip -c | tar -xf -

This will give you these files (explanation for each file is on
the left, only "prescan.VERSION.patch" are the files).

prescan.8.12.8.patch	only for 8.12.8, changes version string to 8.12.8p1
prescan.8.12.patch	for 8.12.0 - 8.12.7, does not change version string
prescan.8.11.6.patch	only for 8.11.6, changes version string to 8.11.6p2
prescan.8.11.patch	for 8.11.0 - 8.11.5, does not change version string
prescan.8.9.3.patch	only for 8.9.3, changes version string to 8.9.3p2
prescan.8.9.patch	for 8.9.0 - 8.9.2, does not change version string

Apply the appropriate patch to your version of the sendmail source
code (change the version number below to the right one!), e.g.,

cd sendmail-8.12.8/sendmail
patch < prescan.8.12.8.patch

recompile sendmail, and install the new binary.

========= begin patch ========
begin 644 prescan.tar.gz
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`
end
========= end patch ==========
- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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- --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's
registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is
maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue
receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If
you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au
and we will forward your request to the appropriate person.

This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members.  As
AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control
over its content.  The decision to use any or all of this information is
the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be done so in
accordance with site policies and procedures.

NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin.  It may
not be updated when updates to the original are made.  If downloading at
a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly
from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current.

Contact information for the authors of the original document is included
in the Security Bulletin above.  If you have any questions or need further
information, please contact them directly.

Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from:

        http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980

If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact AusCERT or
your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security
Teams).

Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile:      (07) 3365 7031
Telephone:      (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
                AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business 
                hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).  On call after hours 
                for member emergencies only.

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