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===========================================================================
             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

           ESB-2002.409 -- Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-041
     Unchecked Buffer in Content Management Server Could Enable Server
                           Compromise (Q326075)
                               9 August 2002

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:                Microsoft Content Management Server
Vendor:                 Microsoft
Impact:                 Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands
                        Administrator Compromise
Access Required:        Remote

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Title:      Unchecked Buffer in Content Management Server Could
            Enable Server Compromise (Q326075)
Date:       07 August 2002
Software:   Microsoft Content Management Server
Impact:     Three vulnerabilities, the most serious of which could
            enable an attacker to run code of an attackers choice.
Max Risk:   Critical
Bulletin:   MS02-041

Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at: 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-041.asp .
- - ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue:
======
Microsoft Content Management Server (MCMS) 2001 is a .Net Enterprise
Server product that simplifies developing and managing e-business
web sites. Microsoft has learned of three security vulnerabilities
affecting it: 

 - A buffer overrun in a low-level function that performs user
   authentication. At least one web page included with MCMS 2001
   passes inputs directly to the function, thereby potentially
   providing a way for an attacker to overrun the buffer. The
   result of exploiting the vulnerability would be to either
   cause MCMS to fail, or run code in the context of the MCMS
   service (which runs as Local System).

 - A vulnerability resulting from the confluence of two flaws
   affecting a function that allows files to be uploaded to the
   server. The first flaw lies in how the function authenticates
   requests, and would allow any user to submit an upload request.
   The second results because it is possible to override the upload
   location; where the function should upload files to a folder that
   only privileged users can access, it can be overridden to upload
   it to a temporary folder that does allow unprivileged users to
   call it. By exploiting the two flaws in tandem, an attacker
   could upload an .ASP or other file to the server, in a location
   from which it could be executed. 

 - A SQL injection vulnerability affecting a function that services
   requests for image files and other resources. Exploiting the
   vulnerability could enable an attacker to run SQL commands on the
   server, which would not only allow data in the MCMS database to
   be added, changed or deleted, but also would enable the attacker
   to run operating system commands on the server.

Mitigating Factors:
====================
Buffer Overrun in MCMS Authentication Operation: 

 - The scope of the vulnerability could be significantly reduced
   if the URLScan tool were deployed on the server. It is likely
   that in this case, the vulnerability could only be used for
   denial of service attacks. 

Program Execution via MCMS Authoring Function: 
 - Exploiting the vulnerability would not grant the attacker
   administrative privileges on the server. Instead, the
   attacker's code would execute in the security context of the
   Web Application Manager (the IWAM_computername account),
   which has similar privileges to those of an interactively
   logged-on user. 

SQL Injection via MCMS Resource Request: 
 - Exploiting the vulnerability would not grant the attacker
   administrative privileges on the server. Instead, any
   operating system commands would be levied in the security
   context of the SQL Server 2000 service, which by default
   has only Domain User privileges.

Risk Rating:
============
 - Internet systems: Critical
 - Intranet systems: Critical
 - Client systems: None

Patch Availability:
===================
 - A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read the 
   Security Bulletin at
   http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms02-041.asp
   for information on obtaining this patch.

Acknowledgment:
===============
 - Joao Gouveia (tharbad@kaotik.org)

- - ---------------------------------------------------------------------

THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS 
PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS
ALL 
WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
IN NO EVENT 
SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
DAMAGES 
WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL,
LOSS OF 
BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR
ITS 
SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME
STATES DO 
NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL
OR 
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY.

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