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» AA-97.29 -- statd Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
AA-97.29 -- statd Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
Date:
07 January 1998
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- =========================================================================== AA-97.29 AUSCERT Advisory statd Buffer Overrun Vulnerability 5 December 1997 Last Revised: 7 January 1998 Updated Hewlett Packard's vendor information, added Silicon Graphics vendor information. A complete revision history is at the end of this file. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- AUSCERT has received information that a vulnerability exists in the statd(1M) program, available on a variety of Unix platforms. This vulnerability may allow local users, as well as remote users to gain root privileges. Exploit information involving this vulnerability has been made publicly available. This vulnerability is different to the statd vulnerability described in CERT/CC advisory CA-96.09. The vulnerability in statd affects various vendor versions of statd. AUSCERT recommends that sites take the steps outlined in section 3 as soon as possible. This advisory will be updated as more information becomes available. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Description AUSCERT has received information concerning a vulnerability in some vendor versions of the RPC server, statd(1M). statd provides network status monitoring. It interacts with lockd to provide crash and recovery functions for the locking services on NFS. Due to insufficient bounds checking on input arguments which may be supplied by local users, as well as remote users, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of the statd program while it is executing a specific rpc routine. By supplying a carefully designed input argument to the statd program, intruders may be able to force statd to execute arbitrary commands as the user running statd. In most instances, this will be root. This vulnerability may be exploited by local users. It can also be exploited remotely without the intruder requiring a valid local account if statd is accessible via the network. Sites can check whether they are running statd by: On system V like systems: # ps -fe |grep statd root 973 1 0 14:41:46 ? 0:00 /usr/lib/nfs/statd On BSD like systems: # ps -auxw |grep statd root 156 0.0 0.0 52 0 ? IW May 3 0:00 rpc.statd Specific vendor information regarding this vulnerability can be found in Section 3. 2. Impact This vulnerability permits attackers to gain root privileges. It can be exploited by local users. It can also be exploited remotely without the intruder requiring a valid local account if statd is accessible via the network. 3. Workarounds/Solution The statd program is available on many different systems. As vendor patches are made available sites are encouraged to install them immediately (Section 3.1). If you are not using NFS in your environment then there is no need for the statd program to be running and it can be disabled (Section 3.2). 3.1 Vendor information The following vendors have provided information concerning the vulnerability in statd. BSDI Digital Equipment Corporation Hewlett Packard IBM Corporation The NetBSD Project OpenBSD Red Hat Software Silicon Graphics Sun Microsystems Specific vendor information has been placed in Appendix A. If the statd program is required at your site and your vendor is not listed, you should contact your vendor directly. If you do not require the statd program then it should be disabled (Section 3.2). 3.2 Disabling statd The statd daemon is required as part of an NFS environment. If you are not using NFS there is no need for this program and it can be disabled. The statd (or rpc.statd) program is often started in the system initialisation scripts (such as /etc/rc* or /etc/rc*.d/*). If you do not require statd it should be commented out from the initialisation scripts. In addition, any currently running statd should be identified using ps(1) and then terminated using kill(1). ........................................................................... Appendix A Vendor information The following information regarding this vulnerability for specific vendor versions of statd has been made available to AUSCERT. For additional information, sites should contact their vendors directly. BSDI ==== No versions of BSD/OS are vulnerable to this problem. Digital Equipment Corporation ============================= DIGITAL UNIX V4.0 thru V4.0c At the time of writing this document, patches (binary kits) are in progress and final testing has been completed. Distribution of the fix for this problem is expected to begin soon. Digital will provide notice of the completion/availability of the patches through AES services (WEB, DIA, DSNlink) and be available from your normal Digital Support channel. DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION 12/97 Hewlett Packard =============== HP is not vulnerable to the statd buffer overflow. IBM Corporation =============== AIX 3.2 and 4.1 are vulnerable to the statd buffer overflow. However, the buffer overflow described in this advisory was fixed when the APARs for CERT CA-96.09 was released. See the appropriate release below to determine your action. AIX 3.2 ------- Apply the following fix to your system: APAR - IX56056 (PTF - U441411) To determine if you have this PTF on your system, run the following command: lslpp -lB U441411 AIX 4.1 ------- Apply the following fix to your system: APAR - IX55931 To determine if you have this PTF on your system, run the following command: instfix -ik IX55931 Or run the following command: lslpp -h bos.net.nfs.client Your version of bos.net.nfs.client should be 4.1.4.7 or later. AIX 4.2 ------- No APAR required. Fix already contained in the release. APARs may be ordered using Electronic Fix Distribution (via FixDist) or from the IBM Support Center. For more information on FixDist, reference URL: http://service.software.ibm.com/aixsupport/ or send e-mail to aixserv@austin.ibm.com with a subject of "FixDist". IBM and AIX are registered trademarks of International Business Machines Corporation. The NetBSD project ================== NetBSD 1.2.1 and prior do not ship with rpc.statd. NetBSD 1.3 ships an rpc.statd that is not vulnerable. OpenBSD ======= OpenBSD does not ship with a functional statd and so is not vulnerable. Red Hat Linux ============= Red Hat Linux is not vulnerable to the statd buffer overflow. No versions of Red Hat Linux include statd in any form. Silicon Graphics ================ Silicon Graphics has released a security bulletin containing information on this vulnerability including patch details. The original release of this bulletin can be retrieved from: ftp://sgigate.sgi.com/security/19971201-01-P1391 Information on patches which address the vulnerability described in this advisory has been extracted from the SGI bulletin and is listed below. OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x no IRIX 4.x no IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1 IRIX 5.3 yes 1391 IRIX 6.0.x no IRIX 6.1 no IRIX 6.2 no IRIX 6.3 no IRIX 6.4 no NOTES 1) upgrade operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section. "Temporary Solution" refers to the SGI bulletin which recommends turning off statd using the chkconfig utility. Sun Microsystems ================ The statd vulnerability has been fixed by the following patches: SunOS version Patch Id ------------- -------- 5.5.1 104166-02 5.5.1_x86 104167-02 5.5 103468-03 5.5_x86 103469-03 5.4 102769-04 5.4_x86 102770-04 4.1.4 102516-06 4.1.3_U1 101592-09 SunOS 5.6 and 5.6_x86 are not vulnerable to this problem. The vulnerability described in this advisory is not the same as that described in Sun Security Bulletin #135. Sun recommended and security patches (including checksums) are available from: http://sunsolve.sun.com/sunsolve/pubpatches/patches.html AUSCERT maintains a local mirror of Sun recommended and security patches at: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/sunsolve1.sun.com/ - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- AUSCERT thanks Peter Marelas (The Fulcrum Consulting Group), Tim MacKenzie (The Fulcrum Consulting Group) and CERT/CC for their assistance in the preparation of this advisory. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The AUSCERT team have made every effort to ensure that the information contained in this document is accurate. However, the decision to use the information described is the responsibility of each user or organisation. The appropriateness of this document for an organisation or individual system should be considered before application in conjunction with local policies and procedures. AUSCERT takes no responsibility for the consequences of applying the contents of this document. If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact AUSCERT or your representative in FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams). AUSCERT is located at The University of Queensland within the Prentice Centre. AUSCERT is a full member of the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). AUSCERT maintains an anonymous FTP service which is found on: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/. This archive contains past SERT and AUSCERT Advisories, and other computer security information. AUSCERT also maintains a World Wide Web service which is found on: http://www.auscert.org.au/. Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AUSCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for emergencies. Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Postal: Australian Computer Emergency Response Team Prentice Centre The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld. 4072. AUSTRALIA ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Revision History 7 Jan 1998 Updated Hewlett Packard's vendor information, added Silicon Graphics vendor information. 9 Dec 1997 Updated NetBSD vendor information and added information for OpenBSD ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv Comment: ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/auscert/AUSCERT_PGP.key iQCVAwUBNLN4Rih9+71yA2DNAQEcOAQAnRGff5iesIWtF1YPz/xiUpK9bSzAtX7G Xw0436woeviPj8w9LEbQsII8M8Bvc+RsG7wEkiVMKGo4n50LZAfcfUXVBI/dX3wk TchcypOcPmE3clGhUlApnQVvVzMpZAXjpVs1l+df+AJiKe5Kj5OrR8/flH8kIH6t 9w+mZ5tDlEU= =d4Sn -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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