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ESB-2001.424 -- Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-051 -- Malformed Dotless IP Address Can Cause Web Page to be Handled in Intranet Zone

Date: 11 October 2001

Click here for printable version
Click here for PGP verifiable version
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===========================================================================
             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

           ESB-2001.424 -- Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-051
              Malformed Dotless IP Address Can Cause Web Page
                      to be Handled in Intranet Zone
                              11 October 2001

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:                Internet Explorer 5.01
                        Internet Explorer 5.5
                        Internet Explorer 6
Vendor:                 Microsoft
Impact:                 Create Arbitrary Files
                        Reduced Security
Access Required:        Remote

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- - ----------------------------------------------------------------------
Title:      Malformed Dotless IP Address Can Cause Web Page to be 
            Handled in Intranet Zone
Date:       10 October 2001
Software:   Internet Explorer
Impact:     Three vulnerabilities:
 - Cause web page to render a web page using inappropriate security 
   settings 
 - Send commands to a third-party web site in the guise of the user
 - Create a file on the system of a user who visited a web site.
Bulletin:   MS01-051

Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-051.asp.
- - ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue:
======
This patch eliminates three vulnerabilities affecting Internet
Explorer. The first involves how IE handles URLs that include dotless
IP addresses. If a web site were specified using a dotless IP format
(e.g., http://031713501415 rather than http://207.46.131.13), and the
request were malformed in a particular way, IE would not recognize
that the site was an Internet site. Instead, it would treat the site
as an intranet site, and open pages on the site in the Intranet Zone
rather than the correct zone. This would allow the site to run with
fewer security restrictions than appropriate. This vulnerability does
not affect IE 6. 

The second involves how IE handles URLs that specify third-party
sites. By encoding an URL in a particular way, it would be possible
for an attacker to include HTTP requests that would be sent to the
site as soon as a connection had been established. These requests
would appear to have originated from the user. In most cases, this
would only allow the attacker to send the user to a site and request
a page on it. However, if exploited against a web-based service
(e.g., a web-based mail service), it could be possible for the
attacker to take action on the user's behalf, including sending a
request to delete data. 

The third is a new variant of a vulnerability discussed in Microsoft
Security Bulletin MS01-015, affecting how Telnet sessions are invoked
via IE. By design, telnet sessions can be launched via IE. However, a
vulnerability exists because when doing so, IE will start Telnet
using any command-line options the web site specifies. This only
becomes a concern when using the version of the Telnet client that
installs as part of Services for Unix (SFU) 2.0 on Windows NT(r) 4.0
or Windows(r) 2000 machines. The version of the Telnet client in SFU
2.0 provides an option for creating a verbatim transcript of a Telnet
session. An attacker could start a session using the logging option,
then stream an executable file onto the user's system in a location
that would cause it to be executed automatically the next time the
user booted the machine. The flaw does not lie in the Telnet client,
but in IE, which should not allow Telnet to be started remotely with
command-line arguments. 

Mitigating Factors:
====================
Zone Spoofing vulnerability: 
 - The default settings in the Intranet Zone differ in only a few 
   ways from those of the Internet Zone. The differences are 
   enumerated in the FAQ, but none would allow destructive action 
   to be taken. 
HTTP Request Encoding vulnerability: 
 - In order to exploit this vulnerability successfully, the 
   attacker would need to possess significant personal 
   information about the victim, such as what web services the 
   user subscribed to, folder structures, and so forth. 
 - Even if the attacker knew the requisite personal information,
   factors outside of the attacker's control (such as whether 
   the user was logged onto the service already) could cause the
   user to see prompts and dialogues that would indicate that an
   attack was underway. 
 - It is unlikely that the vulnerability could be used to target 
   large populations; it is likely that it could be used only against
   specific targets. 
New variant of Telnet Invocation vulnerability: 
 - This vulnerability is only a concern for customers who are using 
   the Telnet client that ships as part of Services for Unix 2.0. 
   No other versions of Telnet contain the command-line feature to 
   create log files, including the versions that ship by default 
   as part of Windows platforms. 

Patch Availability:
===================
 - A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read the 
   Security Bulletin at
   http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms01-051.asp
   for information on obtaining this patch.

Acknowledgment:
===============
 - Michiel Kikkert (security@kikkert.nl) 
 - Joao Gouviea (tharbad@kaotik.org) 

- - ---------------------------------------------------------------------

THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS 
PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS
ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
IN NO EVENT SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE
FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF
MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE
POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION
OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO
THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY.


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Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
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