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ASB-2010.0245 - [UNIX/Linux] ProFTPD ftp distribution server compromise

Date: 03 December 2010

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                         AUSCERT Security Bulletin

                               ASB-2010.0245
     The main distribution server of ProFTPD was recently compromised
                              3 December 2010

===========================================================================

        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:              ProFTPD 1.3.3c
Operating System:     UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX)
Impact/Access:        Root Compromise -- Remote with User Interaction
Resolution:           Patch/Upgrade
Member content until: Sunday, January  2 2011

OVERVIEW

        A notice posted on SourceForge, stated that the main distribution
        server of ProFTPD was recently compromised at approximately 20:00 UTC 
        on 28th November 2010. [1]


IMPACT

        The ProFTPD team has provided the following details regarding the 
        compromise and its impact:
        
        "The fact that the server acted as the main FTP site for the ProFTPD
        project (ftp.proftpd.org) as well as the rsync distribution server
        (rsync.proftpd.org) for all ProFTPD mirror servers means that anyone 
        who downloaded ProFTPD 1.3.3c from one of the official mirrors from 
        2010-11-28 to 2010-12-02 will most likely be affected by the problem.
        
        The backdoor introduced by the attackers allows unauthenticated users
        remote root access to systems which run the maliciously modified 
        version of the ProFTPD daemon." [1]


MITIGATION

        It is recommended that users running the affected version check
        their systems for any signs of compromise and also install a
        known good version of the ProFTPD code. MD5 sums and GPG signatures 
        have been provided to verify the source files, which are available 
        at: http://www.proftpd.org/md5_pgp.html. [1]


REFERENCES

        [1] ProFTPD Compromise Report
            http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_name=alpine.DEB.2.00.1012011542220.12930%40familiar.castaglia.org

AusCERT has made every effort to ensure that the information contained
in this document is accurate.  However, the decision to use the information
described is the responsibility of each user or organisation. The decision to
follow or act on information or advice contained in this security bulletin is
the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be considered in
accordance with your organisation's site policies and procedures. AusCERT
takes no responsibility for consequences which may arise from following or
acting on information or advice contained in this security bulletin.

===========================================================================
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
The University of Queensland
Brisbane
Qld 4072

Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au
Facsimile:      (07) 3365 7031
Telephone:      (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417)
                AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours 
                which are GMT+10:00 (AEST).
                On call after hours for member emergencies only.
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