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             AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution

                               ESB-2010.0048
A Security Vulnerability in the ntp Daemon (xntpd(1M)) May Lead to a Denial
             of the Solaris Network Time Protocol(NTP) Service
                              15 January 2010

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        AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
        ---------------------------------

Product:           xntpd
Publisher:         Sun Microsystems
Operating System:  Solaris 10
                   Solaris 9
                   Solaris 8
                   OpenSolaris
Impact/Access:     Denial of Service -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution:        Mitigation
CVE Names:         CVE-2009-3563  

Reference:         ESB-2009.1613

Original Bulletin: 
   http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/printfriendly.do?assetkey=1-66-275590-1

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Article ID : 275590
Article Type : Sun Alert
Last reviewed : 2010-01-13
Audience : PUBLIC
Keywords :

Copyright Notice: Copyright © 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All Rights
Reserved

A Security Vulnerability in the ntp Daemon (xntpd(1M)) May Lead to a
Denial of the Solaris Network Time Protocol(NTP) Service
  _________________________________________________________________

Category : Security
Release Phase : Workaround
Bug Id : 6902029
Product : Solaris 8 Operating System
Solaris 9 Operating System
Solaris 10 Operating System
OpenSolaris
Date of Workaround Release : 13-Jan-2010

A Security Vulnerability in the ntp Daemon (xntpd(1M)) May Lead to a
Denial of the Solaris Network Time Protocol(NTP) Service

1. Impact

A Security Vulnerability in the ntp Daemon (xntpd(1M)) associated with
the handling of NTP mode 7 (MODE_PRIVATE), may lead to consumption of CPU
and excessive logging resulting in a denial of the Solaris Network Time
Protocol(NTP) Service.

This issue is also described in the following documents:
 CVE-2009-3563 at: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-3563
 US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#568372 at http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/568372

2. Contributing Factors

This issue can occur in the following releases:
SPARC Platform
  * Solaris 8
  * Solaris 9
  * Solaris 10
  * OpenSolaris based upon builds snv_01 or later

x86 Platform
  * Solaris 8
  * Solaris 9
  * Solaris 10
  * OpenSolaris based upon builds snv_01 or later

Note: Only systems running as an NTP server are impacted by this issue.
To determine if a system is acting as an NTP server, execute the
following command:

      $ netstat -an | grep 123
     *.123           Idle
     127.0.0.1.123   Idle

If the output of the command contains the above two lines, then the
system is running an NTP server.

Note: OpenSolaris distributions may include additional bug fixes above
and beyond the build from which it was derived.  The base build can be
derived as follows:

         $ uname -v
         snv_101

Note: Solaris 8 entered EOSL Phase 2 on 1 April 2009. Entitlement to
patches developed on or after 1 April 2009 requires the purchase of the
Solaris 8 Vintage Patch Service.

See Note in section 5 for more details.

3. Symptoms

If this issue occurs, then the ntpd or xntpd process will use an
abnormal amount of system cycles. Also, an excessive number of MODE 7
NTP packets will be seen on the network.

4. Workaround:

To avoid being vulnerable to this issue until patches can be employed,
add the following line to the /etc/inet/ntp.conf file:

     restrict default noquery

And then restart the NTP process.
For OpenSolaris and Solaris 10 prior to Update 8, do the following:

     $ svcadm restart svc:/network/ntp:default 

For Solaris 10 update 8 and later, do the following:

     $ svcs -a | grep ntp

The above command will show one NTP service enabled. Use the FMRI from
the enabled service to restart. This will be either svc:/network/ntp:default
or svc:/network/ntp4:default

     $ svcadm restart svc:/network/ntp:default

or

     $ svcadm restart svc:/network/ntp4:default

For Solaris 9 and earlier, do the following:

     $ cd /etc/init.d
     $ sh xntpd stop
     $ sh xntpd start

This workaround will prevent the the NTP server from responding to any
mode 6 or mode 7 packets. These are the types of packets used by the ntpq,
ntpq4, xntpdc and ntpdc programs, so these programs will no longer be
able to contact the NTP server.

You can allow these programs to work from individual systems by adding
a restrict line to the ntp.conf file that allows that system again. Using
its IP address, add a line like this:

     restrict <ip-addr-of-system>

Then restart the NTP service as described above.

Be aware that if the system you are allowing is itself an NTP server,
you will defeat the workaround and again be vulnerable.

Interim Security Relief (ISR) is available from
http://sunsolve.sun.com/tpatches for the following releases:
SPARC Platform
  * Solaris 9 IDR143831-01
  * Solaris 10 IDR143833-01 (xntpd) and IDR143834-01 (ntpd)

x86 Platform
  * Solaris 9 IDR143832-01
  * Solaris 10 IDR143834-01 (xntpd) and IDR143836-01 (ntpd)

Interim Security Relief (ISR) is available via the normal support
channels for OpenSolaris.

Interim Security Relief (ISR) for the Solaris 8 OS is available via
normal support channels for customers who have purchased the Solaris 8
Vintage Patch Service (see Note in section 5).

Note: This document refers to one or more Interim Security Relief (ISRs)
which are designed to address the concerns identified herein. Sun has
limited experience with these (ISRs) due to their interim nature. As such,
you should only install the ISRs on systems meeting the configurations
described above. Sun may release full patches at a later date, however,
Sun is under no obligation whatsoever to create, release, or distribute any
such patch.

5. Resolution

A final resolution is pending completion.

Note: The READMEs of Solaris 8 patches developed on or after 1 April 2009
are available to all customers however Solaris 8 entered EOSL Phase 2 on
April 1, 2009 and thus entitlement for these patches, including those that
fix security vulnerabilities, requires the purchase of the Solaris 8
Vintage Patch Service. More information about the Solaris 8 Vintage Patch
Service is available at:

http://www.sun.com/service/eosl/Solaris8.html

This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS"
basis. This Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by
third parties. The issues described in this Sun Alert notification may
or may not impact your system(s). Sun makes no representations,
warranties, or guarantees as to the information contained herein. ANY
AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR
NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING THIS DOCUMENT
YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT ARISE
OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN.
This Sun Alert notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential
information. It is being provided to you pursuant to the provisions of
your agreement to purchase services from Sun, or, if you do not have
such an agreement, the Sun.com Terms of Use. This Sun Alert
notification may only be used for the purposes contemplated by these
agreements.
Copyright 2000-2010 Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle, Santa
Clara, CA 95054 U.S.A. All rights reserved

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