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» AL-2009.0035 -- [Win][UNIX/Linux] -- Firefox, Seamon...
AL-2009.0035 -- [Win][UNIX/Linux] -- Firefox, Seamonkey and Thunderbird: Execute Arbitrary Code
Date:
23 April 2009
References
:
ESB-2009.0391
ESB-2009.0454
Click here for printable version
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 =========================================================================== A U S C E R T A L E R T AL-2009.0035 -- AUSCERT ALERT [Win][UNIX/Linux] Firefox, Seamonkey and Thunderbird: Execute Arbitrary Code 23 April 2009 =========================================================================== AusCERT Alert Summary --------------------- Product: Firefox 3.0.8 Thunderbird 2.0.21 Seamonkey 1.1.16 Operating System: UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX) Windows Impact: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands Access Privileged Data Create Arbitrary Files Cross-site Scripting Cross-site Request Forgery Provide Misleading Information Access: Remote/Unauthenticated CVE Names: CVE-2009-1302 CVE-2009-1303 CVE-2009-1304 CVE-2009-1305 CVE-2009-1306 CVE-2009-1307 CVE-2009-1308 CVE-2009-1309 CVE-2009-1310 CVE-2009-1311 CVE-2009-1312 Member content until: Thursday, May 21 2009 - --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- OVERVIEW: Mozilla has released nine advisories relating to Firefox, Thunderbird and Seamonkey. Mozilla has rated one of these advisories as "Critical", two as "High", two as "Moderate" and four as "Low" impact. IMPACT: According to Mozilla, the vulnerabilties corrected in this update are: o MFSA 2009-22 (CVE-2009-1312): "Mozilla community member Michael reported that when a server responds with a Refresh header containing a javascript: URI, Firefox will redirect to the javascript: URI. If an attacker could inject a Refresh header into a server response, or could control the value that a site places in the Refresh header, they could use this vulnerability to perform an XSS attack and execute arbitrary JavaScript within the context of that site." [1] o MFSA 2009-21 (CVE-2009-1311): "Developer and Mozilla community member Paolo Amadini reported that when saving the inner frame of a web page as a file when the outer page has POST data associated with it, the POST data will be incorrectly sent to the URL of the inner frame. This could potentially result in a user's sensitive data being sent to a site for which it was not intended." [2] o MFSA 2009-20 (CVE-2009-1310): "Security researcher Prateek Saxena reported that a malicious MozSearch plugin could be created using a javascript: URI in the SearchForm value. This URI is used as the default landing page when an empty search is performed. If an attacker could get a user to install the malicious plugin and perform an empty search, the SearchForm javascript: URI would be executed within the context of the currently open page." [3] o MFSA 2009-19 (CVE-2009-1309): "Mozilla security researcher moz_bug_r_a4 reported that it is possible to create a document whose URI does not match the document's principal using XMLHttpRequest. This type of mismatch leads to incorrect results in principal-based security checks. An attacker could use this vulnerability to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the context of another site. moz_bug_r_a4 separately reported that XPCNativeWrapper.toString's __proto__ comes from the wrong scope which results in calls to that function being executed in the wrong context in certain circumstances. An attacker could use this vulnerability to run arbitrary code within the context of a different site. Alternatively, if chrome were to call content.toString.call(), then attacker-defined functions could be run with chrome privileges. Note: Thunderbird shares the browser engine with Firefox and could be vulnerable if JavaScript were to be enabled in mail. This is not the default setting and we strongly discourage users from running JavaScript in mail." [4] o MFSA 2009-18 (CVE-2009-1308): "Web developer Cefn Hoile reported that sites which allow users to embed third-party stylesheets are vulnerable to script injection attacks using XBL bindings. While this behavior was documented previously, it was determined that this particular risk was not well-understood by some websites. To mitigate this risk Mozilla added a restriction that requires XBL bindings to come from the same origin as the bound document. Note: Thunderbird shares the browser engine with Firefox and could be vulnerable if JavaScript were to be enabled in mail. This is not the default setting and we strongly discourage users from running JavaScript in mail." [5] o MFSA 2009-17 (CVE-2009-1307): "Security researcher Gregory Fleischer reported that when an Adobe Flash file is loaded via the view-source: scheme, the Flash plugin misinterprets the origin of the content as localhost, leading to two specific vulnerabilities: 1. The Flash file can bypass restrictions imposed by the crossdomain.xml mechanism and initiate HTTP requests to arbitrary third-party sites. This vulnerability could be used by an attacker to perform CSRF attacks against these sites. 2. The Flash file, being treated as a local resource, can read and write Local Shared Objects on a user's machine. This vulnerability could be used by an attacker to place cookie-like objects on a user's computer and track them across multiple sites. Additonally, Fleischer reported that the jar: protocol could be used to bypass restrictions normally preventing content loaded via view-source: from being rendered. Note: Thunderbird shares the browser engine with Firefox and could be vulnerable if plugins were to be enabled in mail. This is not the default setting and we strongly discourage users from enabling plugins in mail." [6] o MFSA 2009-16 (CVE-2009-1306): "Mozilla developer Daniel Veditz reported that when the jar: scheme is used to wrap a URI which serves the content with Content-Disposition: attachment, the HTTP header is ignored and the content is unpacked and displayed inline. A site may depend on this HTTP header to prevent potentially untrusted content that it serves from executing within the context of the site. An attacker could use this vulnerability to subvert sites using this mechanism to mitigate content injection attacks. This vulnerability has not been fixed on the Mozilla 1.8.1 branch, which is used to build Firefox 2 and Thunderbird 2. However, note that there are several mitigating factors which prevent easy exploitation of this issue. In order for a website to be exploitable it must: 1. Allow users to upload arbitrary content 2. Allow users to set arbitrary MIME types, or specifically serve .jar files as application/java-archive or application/x-jar 3. Serve the .jar files from a domain containing sensitive content which would otherwise be protected using Content-Disposition: attachment" [7] o MFSA 2009-15 (CVE-2009-0652): "Security researcher Moxie Marlinspike reported that Unicode box drawing characters were allowed in Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) where they could be visually confused with punctuation used in valid web addresses. This could be combined with a phishing-type scam to trick a victim into thinking they were on a different website than they actually were." [8] o MFSA 2009-14 (CVE-2009-1302,CVE-2009-1303,CVE-2009-1304, CVE-2009-1305): "Mozilla developers identified and fixed several stability bugs in the browser engine used in Firefox and other Mozilla-based products. Some of these crashes showed evidence of memory corruption under certain circumstances and we presume that with enough effort at least some of these could be exploited to run arbitrary code. Note: Thunderbird shares the browser engine with Firefox and could be vulnerable if JavaScript were to be enabled in mail. This is not the default setting and we strongly discourage users from running JavaScript in mail. Without further investigation we cannot rule out the possibility that for some of these an attacker might be able to prepare memory for exploitation through some means other than JavaScript such as large images. Workaround Disable JavaScript until a version containing these fixes can be installed." [9] MITIGATION: These vulnerabilities have been fixed in Firefox 3.0.9, Thunderbird 2.0.0.22 and SeaMonkey 1.1.17. At the time of this publication updates for Thunderbird and SeaMonkey have not yet been released, however Firefox 3.0.9 can be downloaded from the Mozilla web site. REFERENCES: [1] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2009-22 http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2009/mfsa2009-22.html [2] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2009-21 http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2009/mfsa2009-21.html [3] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2009-20 http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2009/mfsa2009-20.html [4] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2009-19 http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2009/mfsa2009-19.html [5] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2009-18 http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2009/mfsa2009-18.html [6] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2009-17 http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2009/mfsa2009-17.html [7] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2009-16 http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2009/mfsa2009-16.html [8] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2009-15 http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2009/mfsa2009-15.html [9] Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2009-14 http://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2009/mfsa2009-14.html - --------------------------END INCLUDED TEXT-------------------- You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your organisation's registration with AusCERT. The mailing list you are subscribed to is maintained within your organisation, so if you do not wish to continue receiving these bulletins you should contact your local IT manager. If you do not know who that is, please send an email to auscert@auscert.org.au and we will forward your request to the appropriate person. NOTE: Third Party Rights This security bulletin is provided as a service to AusCERT's members. As AusCERT did not write the document quoted above, AusCERT has had no control over its content. The decision to follow or act on information or advice contained in this security bulletin is the responsibility of each user or organisation, and should be considered in accordance with your organisation's site policies and procedures. AusCERT takes no responsibility for consequences which may arise from following or acting on information or advice contained in this security bulletin. NOTE: This is only the original release of the security bulletin. It may not be updated when updates to the original are made. If downloading at a later date, it is recommended that the bulletin is retrieved directly from the author's website to ensure that the information is still current. Contact information for the authors of the original document is included in the Security Bulletin above. If you have any questions or need further information, please contact them directly. Previous advisories and external security bulletins can be retrieved from: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?cid=1980 If you believe that your computer system has been compromised or attacked in any way, we encourage you to let us know by completing the secure National IT Incident Reporting Form at: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=3192 =========================================================================== Australian Computer Emergency Response Team The University of Queensland Brisbane Qld 4072 Internet Email: auscert@auscert.org.au Facsimile: (07) 3365 7031 Telephone: (07) 3365 4417 (International: +61 7 3365 4417) AusCERT personnel answer during Queensland business hours which are GMT+10:00 (AEST). On call after hours for member emergencies only. =========================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: http://www.auscert.org.au/render.html?it=1967 iD8DBQFJ78U0NVH5XJJInbgRAkU8AJ9Ki0pbxbjKeoiwe6O4wTJsh+aPkgCfellK w8j4jptdrGKJzxrOG0U+eS4= =u0Sl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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