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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2023.1723.2
Cisco IOS XE Software IOx Application Hosting Environment
Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
29 May 2023
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Cisco IOS XE Software
Publisher: Cisco Systems
Operating System: Cisco
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2023-20065
Original Bulletin:
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-iox-priv-escalate-Xg8zkyPk
Comment: CVSS (Max): 7.8 CVE-2023-20065 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
CVSS Source: Cisco Systems
Calculator: https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Revision History: May 29 2023: The vendor updated proof-of-concept information
March 23 2023: Initial Release
- --------------------------BEGIN INCLUDED TEXT--------------------
Cisco IOS XE Software IOx Application Hosting Environment Privilege Escalation
Vulnerability
Priority: High
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-iox-priv-escalate-Xg8zkyPk
First Published: 2023 March 22 16:00 GMT
Last Updated: 2023 May 8 15:01 GMT
Version 1.1: Final
Workarounds: No workarounds available
Cisco Bug IDs: CSCwd25783
CVE Names: CVE-2023-20065
Summary
o A vulnerability in the Cisco IOx application hosting subsystem of Cisco IOS
XE Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to elevate
privileges to root on an affected device.
This vulnerability is due to insufficient restrictions on the hosted
application. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by logging in to
and then escaping the Cisco IOx application container. A successful exploit
could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying
operating system with root privileges.
Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There
are no workarounds that address this vulnerability.
This advisory is available at the following link:
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-iox-priv-escalate-Xg8zkyPk
This advisory is part of the March 2023 release of the Cisco IOS and IOS XE
Software Security Advisory Bundled Publication. For a complete list of the
advisories and links to them, see Cisco Event Response: March 2023
Semiannual Cisco IOS and IOS XE Software Security Advisory Bundled
Publication .
Affected Products
o Vulnerable Products
This vulnerability affects Cisco products if they are running a vulnerable
release of Cisco IOS XE Software, they have the Cisco IOx application
hosting feature configured, and the hosted application is running. The
Cisco IOx application hosting infrastructure is not enabled by default.
For information about which Cisco software releases are vulnerable, see the
Fixed Software section of this advisory.
Determine the IOx Application Hosting Configuration
To determine the Cisco IOx application hosting environment configuration in
Cisco IOS XE Software, use one of the following two options:
Option 1: Use the show iox-service Command
To determine the status of Cisco IOx functionality, use the show
iox-service command in privileged EXEC mode, as shown in the following
example:
Switch#show iox-service
IOx Infrastructure Summary:
---------------------------
IOx service (CAF) : Running
IOx service (HA) : Not Running
IOx service (IOxman) : Not Ready
IOx service (Sec storage) : Not Running
Libvirtd 5.5.0 : Running
Dockerd 18.03.0 : Running
Sync Status : Disabled
If IOx service (CAF) is in the Running state and there is a hosted
application in RUNNING state, the device is affected by this vulnerability.
Option 2: Use the iox Configuration Command
As an alternative, check the running configuration for the iox
configuration command, as shown in the following example:
Switch#show run | include iox
iox
Switch#
If the output contains a line with only iox , as shown in the preceding
example, and there is a hosted application in RUNNING state, the device is
affected by this vulnerability.
Determine the Hosted Application Status
To determine whether hosted application is running, use the show
app-hosting list command, as shown in the following example:
#show app-hosting list
App id State
---------------------------------------------------------
app1 RUNNING
app2 DEPLOYED
If the output contains any application in RUNNING state, the device is
affected by this vulnerability.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
Only products listed in the Vulnerable Products section of this advisory
are known to be affected by this vulnerability.
Cisco has confirmed the following Cisco products that support Cisco IOx are
not affected by this vulnerability:
800 Series Industrial Integrated Services Routers (ISRs)
Catalyst 9100 Family of Access Points (COS-APs)
CGR1000 Compute Modules
IC3000 Industrial Compute Gateways
IR510 WPAN Industrial Routers
IOS Software
NX-OS Software
Cisco has also confirmed that this vulnerability does not affect the
following Cisco products:
IOS XR Software
Meraki products
Workarounds
o There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. However, as a
mitigation, customers who do not want to use the Cisco IOx application
hosting environment can disable IOx permanently on a device by using the no
iox configuration command.
While this mitigation has been deployed and was proven successful in a test
environment, customers should determine the applicability and effectiveness
in their own environment and under their own use conditions. Customers
should be aware that any workaround or mitigation that is implemented may
negatively impact the functionality or performance of their network based
on intrinsic customer deployment scenarios and limitations. Customers
should not deploy any workarounds or mitigations before first evaluating
the applicability to their own environment and any impact to such
environment.
Fixed Software
o Cisco has released free software updates that address the vulnerability
described in this advisory. Customers with service contracts that entitle
them to regular software updates should obtain security fixes through their
usual update channels.
Customers may only install and expect support for software versions and
feature sets for which they have purchased a license. By installing,
downloading, accessing, or otherwise using such software upgrades,
customers agree to follow the terms of the Cisco software license:
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/end-user-license-agreement.html
Additionally, customers may only download software for which they have a
valid license, procured from Cisco directly, or through a Cisco authorized
reseller or partner. In most cases this will be a maintenance upgrade to
software that was previously purchased. Free security software updates do
not entitle customers to a new software license, additional software
feature sets, or major revision upgrades.
The Cisco Support and Downloads page on Cisco.com provides information
about licensing and downloads. This page can also display customer device
support coverage for customers who use the My Devices tool.
When considering software upgrades , customers are advised to regularly
consult the advisories for Cisco products, which are available from the
Cisco Security Advisories page , to determine exposure and a complete
upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded
contain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and software
configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release.
If the information is not clear, customers are advised to contact the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their contracted maintenance
providers.
Customers Without Service Contracts
Customers who purchase directly from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
contract and customers who make purchases through third-party vendors but
are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale
should obtain upgrades by contacting the Cisco TAC: https://www.cisco.com/c
/en/us/support/web/tsd-cisco-worldwide-contacts.html
Customers should have the product serial number available and be prepared
to provide the URL of this advisory as evidence of entitlement to a free
upgrade.
Cisco IOS and IOS XE Software
To help customers determine their exposure to vulnerabilities in Cisco IOS
and IOS XE Software, Cisco provides the Cisco Software Checker . This tool
identifies any Cisco security advisories that impact a specific software
release and the earliest release that fixes the vulnerabilities that are
described in each advisory ("First Fixed"). If applicable, the tool also
returns the earliest release that fixes all the vulnerabilities that are
described in all the advisories that the Software Checker identifies
("Combined First Fixed").
To use the tool, go to the Cisco Software Checker page and follow the
instructions. Alternatively, use the following form to determine whether a
release is affected by any Cisco Security Advisory. To use the form, follow
these steps:
1. Choose which advisories the tool will search-only this advisory, only
advisories with a Critical or High Security Impact Rating (SIR) , or
all advisories.
2. Enter a release number-for example, 15.9(3)M2 or 17.3.3.
3. Click Check .
[2 ] [ ] [Critical,High,Medium]
[Only this advisory ]
[ ] [Check]
Exploitation and Public Announcements
o The Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) is aware that
proof-of-concept exploit code is available for the vulnerability that is
described in this advisory.
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any malicious use of the vulnerability that
is described in this advisory.
Source
o Cisco would like to thank Frederic Provost, Naima Sadoun, Mickael Dorigny,
Benoit Malaboeuf, and Orange CERT-CC of Orange group for reporting this
vulnerability.
Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy
o To learn about Cisco security vulnerability disclosure policies and
publications, see the Security Vulnerability Policy . This document also
contains instructions for obtaining fixed software and receiving security
vulnerability information from Cisco.
Subscribe to Cisco Security Notifications
o Subscribe
Related to This Advisory
o
URL
o https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-iox-priv-escalate-Xg8zkyPk
Revision History
o +---------+--------------------+--------------------+--------+-------------+
| Version | Description | Section | Status | Date |
+---------+--------------------+--------------------+--------+-------------+
| | Updated | Exploitation and | | |
| 1.1 | proof-of-concept | Public | Final | 2023-MAY-08 |
| | information. | Announcements | | |
+---------+--------------------+--------------------+--------+-------------+
| 1.0 | Initial public | - | Final | 2023-MAR-22 |
| | release. | | | |
+---------+--------------------+--------------------+--------+-------------+
Legal Disclaimer
o THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND
OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT
OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES
THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A standalone copy or paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the
distribution URL is an uncontrolled copy and may lack important information
or contain factual errors. The information in this document is intended for
end users of Cisco products.
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