Date: 28 October 2008
References: AL-2008.0080 ESB-2008.0980
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===========================================================================
AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2008.0738 -- [NetBSD]
BIND cache poisoning
28 October 2008
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: BIND
Publisher: NetBSD
Operating System: NetBSD
Impact: Provide Misleading Information
Access: Remote/Unauthenticated
CVE Names: CVE-2008-1447
Ref: AL-2008.0080
Original Bulletin: ftp://ftp.NetBSD.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2008-009.txt.asc
Revision History: October 28 2008: Further updates to BIND
July 25 2008: Initial Release
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NetBSD Security Advisory 2008-009
=================================
Topic: BIND cache poisoning
Version: NetBSD-current: affected
NetBSD 4.0: affected
NetBSD 3.1.*: affected
NetBSD 3.1: affected
NetBSD 3.0.*: affected
NetBSD 3.0: affected
bind 8.x packages
bind 9.4.x packages prior to 9.4.2pl1
bind 9.5.x packages prior to 9.5.0pl1
Severity: Remote DNS cache poisoning
Fixed: NetBSD-current: July 10, 2008
NetBSD-4-0 branch: July 16, 2008
(4.0.1 will include the fix)
NetBSD-4 branch: July 16, 2008
(4.1 will include the fix)
NetBSD-3-1 branch: July 24, 2008
(3.1.2 will include the fix)
NetBSD-3-0 branch: July 24, 2008
(3.0.4 will include the fix)
NetBSD-3 branch: July 24, 2008
(3.2 will include the fix)
pkgsrc: bind-9.4.2pl1 corrects the issue
bind-9.5.0pl1 corrects the issue
Abstract
========
Deficiencies in the DNS protocol can allow attackers to inject poisoned
responses into a caching nameserver.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE reference CVE-2008-1447 and CERT
Vulnerability Note VU#800113.
Technical Details
=================
New cache poisoning techniques have been discovered by Dan Kaminsky which
allow an attacker to poison a cache. This vulnerability can be exploited
by an attacker in a short amount of time.
For further information see:
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/800113
http://www.isc.org/sw/bind/forgery-resilience.php
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-1447
http://www.isc.org/sw/bind/docs/FAQ-about-random-query-issue.php
Solutions and Workarounds
=========================
It is recommended that NetBSD users of vulnerable versions update their
binaries. If you are unable to update BIND in the base operating system
there are fixed versions in pkgsrc that can be used.
The listed source changes will update to the following versions of BIND:
Branch: Updated to:
HEAD 9.5.0-P1
netbsd-4, netbsd-4-0 9.4.2-P1
netbsd-3, netbsd-3-0, netbsd-3-0 9.3.5-P1
To check the version of BIND you are currently running examine the output
of "/usr/sbin/named -v".
The following points should be taken into consideration when assessing
this issue:
* Do not hard code a query source port using the 'query-source' and/or
'query-source-v6' options. This option was set by default in netbsd-4,
netbsd-4-0 and HEAD branches. Please check your named.conf(5) to ensure
that this option is not used. This option has already been removed from
the default configuration in HEAD as of July 23, 2008 and netbsd-4 and
netbsd-4-0 as of July 24, 2008.
* You are only impacted by this issue if you are running BIND as a
caching resolver.
* For the fixed versions of BIND (9.5.0-P1, 9.4.2-P1 and 9.3.5-P1) ISC
have stated that there is a noticeable impact on the performance of BIND
caching resolvers with high query rates. See
http://www.isc.org/index.pl?/sw/bind/bind-security.php
for more information. NetBSD has taken the additional step of further
updates to BIND in the base operating system. The following table
lists the dates that later versions of BIND were imported which
address these performance issues. If you require these later releases
ensure that you have build BIND from sources on or later than the dates
listed below:
Branch: Date: Updated to:
HEAD August 16, 2008 9.5.0-P2
netbsd-4, netbsd-4-0 August 30, 2008 9.4.2-P2
netbsd-3, netbsd-3-0, netbsd-3-0 August 30, 2008 9.3.5-P2
* Devices performing Network Address Translation (NAT), more specifically
Port Address Translation (PAT) can either decrease or increase the
randomness of source ports used for DNS queries. ipfilter(8) currently
by design assigns ports in sequence when doing port mapping. The work
around for this is to not do port translation on DNS traffic if that
traffic has already been randomised.
e.g. If you have:
map foo0 a/b -> c/d portmap tcp/udp 10000:20000
then you need to do this:
map foo0 from a/b to any port = 53 -> c/d tcp/udp
map foo0 a/b -> c/d portmap tcp/udp 10000:20000
A patch has been committed to the HEAD, netbsd-4 and netbsd-4-0
branches that makes ipfilter(8) use random port numbers by default.
Updates are also being created for the netbsd-3, netbsd-3-0 and
netbsd-3-1 branches. This advisory will be updated with further
details when patches for the netbsd-3* branches become available.
The following instructions describe how to upgrade your bind binaries by
updating your source tree and rebuilding and installing a new version of
bind.
* NetBSD-current:
Systems running NetBSD-current dated from before 2008-07-10
should be upgraded to NetBSD-current dated 2008-07-11 or later.
The following directories need to be updated from the
netbsd-current CVS branch (aka HEAD):
dist/bind
usr.sbin/bind
lib/libbind9
lib/libdns
lib/libisc
lib/libisccc
lib/libisccfg
lib/liblwres
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install bind:
# cd src
# cvs update -d -P dist/bind usr.sbin/bind lib/libbind9 \
lib/libdns lib/libisc lib/libisccc lib/libisccfg \
lib/liblwres
# cd lib/libpthread
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# cd ../lib/libcrypt
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# cd ../lib/libcrypto
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# cd ../libbind9
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# make USETOOLS=no install
# cd ../libdns
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# make USETOOLS=no install
# cd ../libisc
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# make USETOOLS=no install
# cd ../libisccc
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# make USETOOLS=no install
# cd ../libisccfg
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# make USETOOLS=no install
# cd ../liblwres
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# make USETOOLS=no install
# cd ../../usr.sbin/bind
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# make USETOOLS=no install
* NetBSD 4.*:
Systems running NetBSD 4.* sources dated from before
2008-07-16 should be upgraded from NetBSD 4.* sources dated
2008-07-17 or later.
The following directories need to be updated from the
netbsd-4 or netbsd-4-0 branches:
dist/bind
usr.sbin/bind
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install bind:
# cd src
# cvs update -r <branch_name> -d -P dist/bind
# cvs update -r <branch_name> -d -P usr.sbin/bind
# cd usr.sbin/bind
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# make USETOOLS=no install
* NetBSD 3.*:
Systems running NetBSD 3.* sources dated from before
2008-07-24 should be upgraded from NetBSD 3.* sources dated
2008-07-25 or later.
The following directories need to be updated from the
netbsd-3, netbsd-3-0 or netbsd-3-1 branches:
dist/bind
usr.sbin/bind
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install bind:
# cd src
# cvs update -r <branch_name> -d -P dist/bind
# cvs update -r <branch_name> -d -P usr.sbin/bind
# cd usr.sbin/bind
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# make USETOOLS=no install
The following instructions describe how to upgrade your ipfilter binaries by
updating your source tree and rebuilding and installing a new version of
ipfilter.
* NetBSD-current:
Systems running NetBSD-current dated from before 2008-07-24
should be upgraded to NetBSD-current dated 2008-07-25 or later.
The following directories need to be updated from the
netbsd-current CVS branch (aka HEAD):
dist/ipf
regress/sys/kern/ipf/regress
sys/dist/ipf/netinet
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install ipfilter:
# cd src
# cvs update -d -P dist/ipf regress/sys/kern/ipf/regress \
sys/dist/ipf/netinet
# cd usr.sbin/ipf
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# make USETOOLS=no install
* NetBSD 4.*:
Systems running NetBSD 4.* sources dated from before
2008-09-18 should be upgraded from NetBSD 4.* sources dated
2008-09-19 or later.
The following directories need to be updated from the
netbsd-4 or netbsd-4-0 branches:
dist/ipf
regress/sys/kern/ipf/regress
sys/dist/ipf/netinet
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install ipfilter:
# cd src
# cvs update -d -P dist/ipf regress/sys/kern/ipf/regress \
sys/dist/ipf/netinet
# cd usr.sbin/ipf
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# make USETOOLS=no install
The following instructions briefly summarise how to upgrade your
kernel. In these instructions, replace:
ARCH with your architecture (from uname -m), and
KERNCONF with the name of your kernel configuration file.
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install the kernel:
# cd src
# ./build.sh kernel=KERNCONF
# mv /netbsd /netbsd.old
# cp sys/arch/ARCH/compile/obj/KERNCONF/netbsd /netbsd
# shutdown -r now
For more information on how to do this, see:
http://www.NetBSD.org/guide/en/chap-kernel.html
Thanks To
=========
Christos Zoulas, Greg Troxel, Jeremy C. Reed, Havard Eidnes and Manuel Bouyer
for initial patches and testing on various releases.
Dan Kaminsky is credited with discovering this issue.
Revision History
================
2008-07-25 Initial release
2008-08-30 Updated with BIND versions and additional updates
2008-10-18 Updated with ipfilter(8) port randomisation details
More Information
================
Advisories may be updated as new information becomes available.
The most recent version of this advisory (PGP signed) can be found at
ftp://ftp.NetBSD.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2008-009.txt.asc
Information about NetBSD and NetBSD security can be found at
http://www.NetBSD.org/ and http://www.NetBSD.org/Security/.
Copyright 2008, The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Redistribution permitted only in full, unmodified form.
$NetBSD: NetBSD-SA2008-009.txt,v 1.4 2008/10/18 14:30:34 adrianp Exp $
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