Date: 12 August 2003
References: ESB-2004.0120
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AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2003.0562 -- Sun(sm) Alert Notification Sun Alert ID: 50104
Security Issue with kcms_server Daemon
12 August 2003
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AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: Solaris
Publisher: Sun Microsystems
Operating System: Solaris
Platform: SPARC
i386
Impact: Access Privileged Data
Access Required: Existing Account
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DOCUMENT ID: 50104
SYNOPSIS: Security Issue with kcms_server Daemon
DETAIL DESCRIPTION:
Sun(sm) Alert Notification
* Sun Alert ID: 50104
* Synopsis: Security Issue with kcms_server Daemon
* Category: Security
* Product: Solaris
* BugIDs: 4774256
* Avoidance: Workaround
* State: Committed
* Date Released: 23-Jan-2003
* Date Closed:
* Date Modified: 08-Aug-2003
1. Impact
A local or remote unprivileged user may be able to view root
privileged files due to a security vulnerability involving the Solaris
kcms_server(1) daemon.
The Solaris kcms_server(1) daemon is part of the Kodak Color
Management System (KCMS), an API and libraries to create and manage
profiles that can describe and control the color performance of
digital color images on desktop computers and associated peripherals.
The kcms_server(1) daemon is enabled by default in the inetd.conf(4)
file.
This issue is described in the CERT Vulnerability VU#850785 (see
[1]http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/850785) and the Entercept Security
Alert at: [2]http://www.entercept.com/news/uspr/01-22-03.asp.
Sun acknowledges with thanks, Sinan Eren of the Entercept Ricochet
Team, for bringing this issue to our attention.
2. Contributing Factors
This issue can occur in the following releases:
SPARC
* Solaris 2.6
* Solaris 7
* Solaris 8
* Solaris 9 without patch 114636-01
Intel
* Solaris 2.6
* Solaris 7
* Solaris 8
* Solaris 9 without patch 114637-01
3. Symptoms
There are no reliable symptoms that would show the described issue has
been exploited to gain access to view root privileged files.
SOLUTION SUMMARY:
4. Relief/Workaround
The following workarounds can be implemented as the root user to
prevent an exploit for this issue from succeeding:
1. Disable the kcms_server(1) daemon on all systems.
a) Edit the "/etc/inetd.conf" file and comment out the following line
by prepending the '#' symbol as follows.
# 100221/1 tli rpc/tcp wait root /usr/openwin/bin/kcms_server kcms_se
rver
b) Instruct the inetd(1M) process to reread the newly modified
"/etc/inetd.conf" file by sending it a hangup signal, SIGHUP:
$ ps -ef | grep inetd
$ kill -HUP <pid of inetd from above ps output>
2. Remove the KCMS related packages using pkgrm(1) as the root user.
The following are the KCMS packages:
Core KCMS packages:
application SUNWkcslx KCMS Runtime Library (64-bit)
application SUNWkcspf KCMS Optional Profiles
application SUNWkcspg KCMS Programmers Environment
application SUNWkcspx KCMS Programmers Environment (64-bit)
system SUNWkcsrl KCMS Runtime Library Support
system SUNWkcsrr KCMS Runtime Profiles
application SUNWkcsrt KCMS Runtime Environment
application SUNWkcsrx KCMS Runtime Environment (64-bit)
Translated KCMS packages:
ALE SUNWckcsr Simplified Chinese (EUC) KCMS Runtime Environme
nt
application SUNWdkcsr German KCMS Runtime Environment
application SUNWekcsr Spanish KCMS Runtime Environment
application SUNWfkcsr French KCMS Runtime Environment
ALE SUNWhkcsr Traditional Chinese (EUC) KCMS Runtime Environm
ent
application SUNWikcsr Italian KCMS Runtime Environment
application SUNWjkcsr Japanese KCMS Runtime Environment
ALE SUNWkkcsr Korean (EUC) KCMS Runtime Environment
application SUNWskcsr Swedish KCMS Runtime Environment
5. Resolution
This issue is addressed in the following releases:
SPARC Platform
* Solaris 9 with patch 114636-01 or later
x86 Platform
* Solaris 9 with patch 114637-01 or later
A final resolution is pending completion.
Change History
08-Aug-2003:
* Updated Contributing Factors and Resolution sections
This Sun Alert notification is being provided to you on an "AS IS"
basis. This Sun Alert notification may contain information provided by
third parties. The issues described in this Sun Alert notification may
or may not impact your system(s). Sun makes no representations,
warranties, or guarantees as to the information contained herein. ANY
AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR
NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. BY ACCESSING THIS DOCUMENT
YOU ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUN SHALL IN NO EVENT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES THAT ARISE
OUT OF YOUR USE OR FAILURE TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN.
This Sun Alert notification contains Sun proprietary and confidential
information. It is being provided to you pursuant to the provisions of
your agreement to purchase services from Sun, or, if you do not have
such an agreement, th! e Sun.com Terms of Use. This Sun Alert
notification may only be used for the purposes contemplated by these
agreements.
Copyright 2000-2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc., 4150 Network Circle, Santa
Clara, CA 95054 U.S.A. All rights reserved.
References
1. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/850785
2. http://www.entercept.com/news/uspr/01-22-03.asp
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