Date: 05 January 2012
References: ESB-2012.0606 ESB-2012.0062 ESB-2012.0082 ESB-2012.0087 ESB-2012.0113 ASB-2012.0021 ESB-2012.0202 ESB-2012.0305 ESB-2012.0318 ESB-2012.0389 ESB-2012.0431 ESB-2012.0480 ESB-2012.0506 ESB-2012.0532 ESB-2012.0622 ESB-2012.0833.2 ESB-2012.0912 ESB-2013.0309 ESB-2013.0475 ESB-2013.0526 ESB-2013.0537
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===========================================================================
AUSCERT External Security Bulletin Redistribution
ESB-2012.0027
Six security flaws have been fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.0f and 0.9.8s
5 January 2012
===========================================================================
AusCERT Security Bulletin Summary
---------------------------------
Product: OpenSSL
Publisher: OpenSSL
Operating System: UNIX variants (UNIX, Linux, OSX)
Windows
Impact/Access: Execute Arbitrary Code/Commands -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Access Privileged Data -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Denial of Service -- Remote/Unauthenticated
Resolution: Patch/Upgrade
CVE Names: CVE-2012-0027 CVE-2011-4619 CVE-2011-4577
CVE-2011-4576 CVE-2011-4109 CVE-2011-4108
Original Bulletin:
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20120104.txt
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [04 Jan 2012]
=======================================
Six security flaws have been fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.0f and 0.9.8s.
DTLS Plaintext Recovery Attack (CVE-2011-4108)
==============================================
Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension of the
Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption which enables an
efficient plaintext recovery attack against the OpenSSL implementation
of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing differences arising during
decryption processing. A research paper describing this attack can be
found at http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
<seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
for preparing the fix.
Affected users should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.0f or 0.9.8s.
Double-free in Policy Checks (CVE-2011-4109)
============================================
If X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK is set in OpenSSL 0.9.8, then a policy
check failure can lead to a double-free. The bug does not occur
unless this flag is set. Users of OpenSSL 1.0.0 are not affected.
This flaw was discovered by Ben Laurie and a fix provided by Emilia
Kasper <ekasper@google.com> of Google.
Affected users should upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.8s.
Uninitialized SSL 3.0 Padding (CVE-2011-4576)
=============================================
OpenSSL prior to 1.0.0f and 0.9.8s failed to clear the bytes used as
block cipher padding in SSL 3.0 records. This affects both clients and
servers that accept SSL 3.0 handshakes: those that call SSL_CTX_new with
SSLv3_{server|client}_method or SSLv23_{server|client}_method. It does
not affect TLS.
As a result, in each record, up to 15 bytes of uninitialized memory
may be sent, encrypted, to the SSL peer. This could include sensitive
contents of previously freed memory.
However, in practice, most deployments do not use
SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS and therefore have a single write buffer per
connection. That write buffer is partially filled with non-sensitive,
handshake data at the beginning of the connection and, thereafter,
only records which are longer any any previously sent record leak any
non-encrypted data. This, combined with the small number of bytes
leaked per record, serves to limit to severity of this issue.
Thanks to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for identifying and fixing
this issue.
Affected users should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.0f or 0.9.8s.
Malformed RFC 3779 Data Can Cause Assertion Failures (CVE-2011-4577)
====================================================================
RFC 3779 data can be included in certificates, and if it is malformed,
may trigger an assertion failure. This could be used in a
denial-of-service attack.
Note, however, that in the standard release of OpenSSL, RFC 3779
support is disabled by default, and in this case OpenSSL is not
vulnerable. Builds of OpenSSL are vulnerable if configured with
"enable-rfc3779".
Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw, and
Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it.
Affected users should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.0f or 0.9.8s.
SGC Restart DoS Attack (CVE-2011-4619)
======================================
Support for handshake restarts for server gated cryptograpy (SGC) can
be used in a denial-of-service attack.
Thanks to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for identifying and fixing
this issue.
Affected users should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.0f or 0.9.8s.
Invalid GOST parameters DoS Attack (CVE-2012-0027)
===================================================
A malicious TLS client can send an invalid set of GOST parameters
which will cause the server to crash due to lack of error checking.
This could be used in a denial-of-service attack.
Only users of the OpenSSL GOST ENGINE are affected by this bug.
Thanks to Andrey Kulikov <amdeich@gmail.com> for identifying and fixing
this issue.
Affected users should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.0f.
References
==========
URL for this Security Advisory:
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20120104.txt
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===========================================================================
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